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ABSTRAGT 
Firstly, the social functions of mass media are analysed, 
with critical assessment of some significant sociological and 
psychological literature on mass communication and related topics* 
It is concluded they operate principally to maintain definitional 
social categories in the context of change and to sustain a given 
level of public discussion. Secondly, leading theories of race 
relations and industrial relations are analysed critically! it is 
concluded that different theoretical approaches, typically applying 
to different levels of analysis, tend to be mutually contributive, 
not exclusive. Both sets of relationships are then briefly compared 
and contrasted. 
J» 
The nature of racial and industrial conflict in contemporary 
Britain is then surveyed, vrith reference to dominant perceptions of 
the situation and the objective character of these conflicts. Hext, 
content analysis as a research technique is disoussed, and the precise 
methods employed in this study axe described. 
Selected television and press coverage of the 1970 docks 
strike is then analysed, with a particular focus on levels of 
explanation, the degree of public participation in discussion, and 
the definitions provided of the situation. Certain related data are 
appended. The same task is subsequently performed in relation to 
immigration, domestic race relations, the sale of arms to South Africa, 
and some other topics. Certain related data are appended. 
Finally, these data are placed in their sociological 
context in Britain, by integrating them with an analysis of the 
social construction of consensus in that society. After discussion 
of certain theories interrelating culture and social divisions, 
together with analysis of certain institutions bearing on the 
construction of consensus, the particular role of the British news 
media* and the special functions of British ideologies of 
nationalism and objectivity, are surveyed. Conclusions for 
the relation between consensus and conflict in modern Britain 
are then stated* 
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Chapter Ones The role of the паз в media in society 
l.i Introduction 
The first step in this investigation is to attempt an 
assessment of the rolo of mass media in society. This is a more 
complex endeavour than the vast quantities of empirical media 
research would lead the observer to suppose f for most of it has 
been carried out without benefit of any overall theory of the social 
role of the media* There has been protracted analysis of the nature 
of propaganda (l)j and leading firom this, a very great deal of social-
psychological researoh on the effects of communication in general, 
and of mass media communication in particular (2). Within this field, 
perhaps especial attention has been paid to the part played by mass 
media in political communication, especially election campaigns (3)* 
And in the commercial field, market research has not unnaturally 
concentrated very hard on audience reaction to advertising (4)* 
All this is material which must be taken into account in 
the construction of a theory, oven though it usually sorely lacks 
any theory itself* There is however a further question which is 
begged by the attempt to construct a theory of the mass media. Can 
there be a theory of mass communication which is not itself a deduction 
ffcom a general theory of communication? Though logically the answer 
is negative, practically it need not be* Social science is very far 
from a general theory of communication (5)I and in the meantime there 
is everything to be said for attempting to build toward such a 
general theory on a lower level. 
Of what then does a theory of the social role of the mass 
media have to take account? It must first of all, as already stated, 
recognise that modem mass communication is only a category of total 
human communication? It is also only one of a number of specialised 
institutions of communication, for although print and electronic media 
are the most salient communication-institutions in modern societies, 
they are not the only ones: public meetings and informal opinion» 
leadership are important examples of others. In earlier times, 
important communication-institutions were bound up with the roles 
of herald, priest and headman. 
!The communication of news and comment about public affairs 
is a further subdivision of general human communication (and it is 
with this particular subdivision that this research is concerned). 
It is also a subdivision of the specialised institutions of mass 
communication. It is necessary though to be careful to avoid an 
overly tidy definition of items of modern mass communication 
content as (let us say) news or entertainment. Another central 
question to be answered in this connection is the role that news 
plays in society. 
- з -
General constraints on the operation of tho гаазз media 
An attempt at an analysis of these questions will bo 
supplied later. For the moment, there remain several other 
important social factors to be taken into account in the 
construction of a theory of the mass media's social role. These 
social factors consist of the society*з culture(s), including the 
degree of literacy} the nature of its economy* its polity, 
including the controllers of media organisations f and the 
particular technology of each medium. 
Tho existence of separate cultures and even languages 
in a society, or of mass illiteracy, very obviously demonstrate 
tho constraining force of culture on mass communication. Radio 
con surmount the problem of illiteracy, but not print. Conversely 
a more or less common culture naturally facilitates all communica-
tion greatly. It is easy to overlook the power of a common 
culture to shape the content of communication! there are important 
implications in this truism to which a mere nod in its direction 
does not do justice. Some of them will be considered later on. 
There is one however which is worth pausing on for a 
moment now. It is, the implication of a comnon culture for the 
concepts of "balance", "neutrality" and "objectivity", all of 
which are important for UK and US media communicators. The 
implication is of course that balance only exists in terms of 
a particular culture. Thus, to take a very crude example, tho 
Buddhist world-view (or perhaps views) is a symbolic universe (6) 
of enormous significance in the Far East, yet never figures in 
the "balance" between opposing views institutionalised by the 
British media. In practice, "balance" and the rest are defined 
by the social distribution of knowledge in a particular society. 
No Buddhists, no Buddhism. 
A different, but also interesting example is the treat-
ment of communism by the UK media. In general, to use Borger 
and Luckmann's terms once more, the actions of communist 
countries whether internal or external are "nihilated" by the 
British media. That is to say, these aotions are actively 
dismissed from the realm of those to be taken seriously in the 
province of reasonable and acceptable conduct. Arms limitation 
proposals by the USSR "must" be for purely tactioal or strategic 
reasons (unlike Western proposals). The Marxist framework (if 
such it be) provided by communist countries for interpreting 
events in non-communist countries or in their own, is similarly 
given no space except on occasions when it appears risible to 
.«estern journalists. The same processes apply the other way 
round of course. 
The existence of a set of interests among media 
commentators concerning communism (which cannot be said in 
relation to Buddhism) was demonstrated by the media treatment 
of Czechoslovakia during the first eight months of 1968. What 
was being offered by the media then concerning the affairs of 
a communist society was not nihilation but therapy (again 
utilising Berger1 s and Luckmam^s terminology). Czechoslovakia, 
according to many English media commentators for whom liberal 
parliamentary democracy is the natural bent of mam when left 
to himself, was moving very fast and unexpectedly toward the 
English parliamentary model. All Czechs suddenly became people. 
They were encouraged to voice their doubts and questions about 
their political future in the UK media (as well as their own), in 
a way which implied throughout that they were moving toward being 
their real selves. At the same time the Soviet bloc attempts at 
therapy no doubt defined them not as returning to their real 
selves, but to their old selves» 
The implications of these instances for the nature of 
cultural constraints on the media are as follows» It is to be 
expected that the social construction of reality provided by the 
media will exclude symbolic universes alien to tho common culture 
of the society in which they operate, even when there is explicit 
adherence to an ethic of 'balance1. Coercion alone, if hypothesised 
аз the cause of this phenomenon, could never achieve such an overall 
result. Without denying the importance of political considerations, 
the likelihood of media communicators being - like the majority in 
any society - relatively or completely culture-bound is high» 
Reinforcement of the dominant symbolic universe is therefore to 
be expected from the mass media» 
This can be taken a stage further. E. Р» Woolf (7) has 
noted the way views of American poverty characteristic only of 
small cxteme-left political groups became common currency via the 
mass media within a few months following President Kennedy's 
endorsement of Hiohael Harringtons The Other America» He charac-
terises the situation in the United States as consisting of a 
plateau on which certain definitions of social reality are 
acceptable, with very sheer sides which can make it almost 
impossible for deviant definitons of social reality to gain 
access and public credence. Although the instance he mentions 
was triggered by a very significant political action, the role 
of the media in defining this plateau is even at first glance 
a fundamental one» 
It is not to be expected therefore that media communicators 
vri.ll themselves act as independent innovators in the social definition 
of reality. Even if they attempt to do so there are constraints of a 
purely cultural kind which will stand in their way. The recipients 
must be able to grasp the meaning of their communications j and the 
audience will always have its own definition or definitions of 
social reality which will be resistant to other defintions perceived 
аз contradictory. Ifuch here depends on the significance of the 
symbolic universe which is being contradicted. If it is the core 
of the society's symbolic universe, there will be that much more 
resistance than if it is the periphery. An instance in the i960»8 
was the popularity of That У.'аз The .Week That У/аэ» which reflected 
widespread impatience with certain superficial features of British 
society among younger age-groups in particular. It in no way 
attacked any fundamental features of British society (8). 
The economic factors which must be taken into account in 
any theory of mass communication are various» An essential one is 
the amount of money available in a given society for the technology 
of mass communication (broadcasting stations, largo printing 
presses, etc.), and in the case of television for its consumption» 
Thus the staple diet of much Third World television (e.g. Kenya, 
Nigeria, the Lebanon, Singapore, the Caribbean) is pre-packaged 
American soap-opera, because indigenous production is so expensive 
and trained personnel are relatively scarce. And even this material 
only goes out to a small number of people in most of those societies, 
because a television set is beyond the means of the majority» So too, 
quite apart from the illiteracy factor, newspapers often have 
minority circulations simply because of their price» 
In more affluent societies economic factors also have an 
important impact on the role of the media* There are still limits 
to the available money, though much higher ones* but there is also 
the question of the source of the money. In virtually every case 
outside communist countries this source is advertising (the British 
Broadcasting Corporation being a notable exception). The constraints 
exerted on the media by advertisers are sometimes stated very crudely 
as though they were in the habit of telephoning editors or producers 
and threatening to cut off their source of funds unless they complied 
with the advertiser1 s political views. There is of course no need 
for them to do so, since in the vast majority of the national media 
in a society those in control are not actively opposed to the 
perspectives of the companies who buy their advertising space. 
Indeed they may quite easily be institutionally linked: many 
newspaper chains end broadcasting companies arc part-owned or 
entirely owned by multi-product corporations (9). 
It is nevertheless easily conceivable that in the unlikely 
event of a TV company or newspaper or radio station shifting its 
perspective to one whioh advertisers perceived as seriously threatening 
their operations, funds would dry up and tho organ would be forced to 
close or to retract its new policy. This economic factor than acts as 
a boundary-constraint rather than аз a constant supervisor (Ю). 
Another important economic factor is the probable near-
incompatibility between profit-making and serious national newspaper 
journalism. Most "quality" newspapers are - and have to be - satisfied 
to remain slightly more than solvent. Given that in economic terms 
newspaper organisations exist to sell blank space to advertisers, the 
pressure to rest content with much more popular journalism is very 
strong. Even in societies with the longest traditions of literacy 
and mass education the public for serious journalism is tiny in 
proportion to the whole and is consequently far too small to enable 
newspapers to sell advertising space for very much money even though 
this public is usually the most affluent sector, and so advertising 
rates are higher than in the popular press. In general, it is this 
factor which has contributed того than anything else to the growth 
of newspaper and media monopolies, and to the decline in the numbers 
of newspapers (11). . , consideration 
This leads to the last/of the relation between economy and 
media consideration, which in the view of this writer and others 
actually represents a delusory interpretation» The decline in the 
numbers of newspapers has been held to represent a threat to liberal 
democracy, in that the number of independent voices offering differing 
assessment of public affairs drops, and with it the public1s ability 
to make up its own mind and be a well-informed electorate. Bassing 
fron theory to actuality, it is only too clear that the general social 
and political line of the English and American ftress is not one of such 
variety that the disappearance of a particular organ or organs is 
likely to leave a very great lacuna. Clearly some newspapers would 
leave ouch a lacunaj but it cannot be said axiomatic ally of all 
newspapers (12). 
As regards the polity and the controllers of media organisa-
tions, in one way or another it can safely be asserted that the two are 
never fundamentally out of step with each other. Thi3 is not to say 
that ouc?1 a phenomenon is impossible; only that there is no case where 
it is known, and that it is highly unlikely. Naturally there are degrees 
of being in step. The main media in communist states are clear instances 
of virtually perfect correlation between polity and mass communication* 
A little down the line can be placed the situations in Hazi Germany and 
present-day South Africa. In the first, the internationally rospected 
and independent Frankfurter Zeitung was allowed by Hitler to continue 
for most of his poriod in power for purposes of window-dressing. It 
did not however follow a policy-line diametrically opposed to the Third 
Heich, being always careful to avoid criticism which really attacked 
the foundations of Nazi rule. And it was of course only one voice in 
the mass of Kazi communication (13). A similar situation obtains with 
regard to the English-language press in the Republic of South Africa 
(though there ere difficulties for the rationalict Party in 
suppressing it which are not confined to the need for window-
dressing). The Lnelish-lancua^e prose supports the United Tarty, 
whoso policy differ о in no vory significant reopect fron the 
Lationaliot Party1 o. Even then, it is only or.e coction of tho 
preoe, with radio controlled directly by the Government» 
Sor.ewhat further down tho line arc tho Ец&'НзН and /лег Jo an 
• aaoe nedia. Without substantial formal Government controls ovor 
output, it is truiotio to point out that those in control of tho 
media are never likely to bo appointed if they are known to be 
profoundly at varianco with tho political az.d oconosio cyeUa of 
either society. Conversely it is easily dcnonatrablo that they do 
in almost every caco identify either with conservative and cocsaoroial 
intcrocts, or with on ethic of professional neutrality and balanco. 
Thoro iß a certain amount of "play" in the nyoton, but only within 
felrly carefully defined bounds (14)» 
Fbrhapo the nearest approach to a situation where the naoa 
media are fundanontülly at variance with the polity 1« to be found 
in present-dsy France or Italy, whoso Cosmuniot Tarty newspapers 
have moderate circulations. Here hewovor it io important not to 
be too easily mrsyed by срроагапсез. Both parties are eoaovrhat 
suspect in much of tho cozauniot world for their ceceanodating 
attitude to tho political regimeз under which they exist. In other 
words, they fulfil a largely "cocial-doiaooratic" rather tlian 
revolutionary role, And once again, though .powerful they are only 
port of the total of mass communication. In both societies control 
of tho broadcast media Is in otrongly cmti-cormmiot hands, through 
fairly overt Government control» 
It is therefore the сало that there is no instcncc en 
rocord of a root-end-branch opposition to tho polity in the national 
cosa isedia of & society» 2tor, it ouet bo recognised, ie thero likely 
to be» (Small circulation newspapers and magazines catering for 
minority readerships are a different matter entirely, though even 
these are subjeot to police raids in many societies*) 
As regards the constraints imposed by the technologies 
of particular media, this is not a point to be stressed unduly* 
nevertheless, it is not true to sey that the technology of any 
mass medium allows it simply to reflect social reality pure and 
unalloyed* One instance is the impact that television camera-teams 
have on behaviour during social disturbances. There is evidence 
that police behaviour in I967 and 1968 US civil disturbances improved 
considerably in the presence of camera-terns. Another instance is 
the extent to which election campaigning in the US and UK is tailored 
to suit the demands of television аз a medium. A third instance has 
been noted by a former television reporter, that there aro numbers of 
important economio or political events which cannot be (or are not 
allowed to bo) televised (15). Also, any given medium is bound to 
convey certain phenomena better than others, because of its particular 
technology (16). 
So far we have taken account of the fact that mass communi-
cation is a subdivision of general human communication, and also of 
the cultural, economic, political and technological constraints on 
mass communication. So far then, a framework has been established 
within which the media operate. There are two other dimensions to 
this framework, the historical and the psychological. Neither need 
detain us long. Ctoviously the history of a particular medium or 
organ in a particular society is likely to impinge on those who 
occupy roles in it today. For our present purposes it is the 
general patterns of media function, howovor, which are of more 
interest than the numerous small variations. Obviously too, psycho-
logical factors such as remembering, forgetting, attention, persuas-
ibility, also act as constraints on tho social role of the media* 
However, insofar as it i3 impossible as yet to generalise very 
successfully on the likely distribution in a society of many of 
these responses to the stimuli with this research is concerned, 
they axe inevitably beyond the boundary of this investigation. 
As will bo seen shortly however there are elements of psychological 
theory which are useful in the construction of a theory of what 
the mass media do, rather than in the assessment of the boundaries 
within whioh they operate. 
l*iii Complementary theoretloal perspectives on the eooial 
rolea of tho mass media 
There are several different angles, usually discussed in 
isolation from each other, from which it is possible to composite 
a theory of the role of mass media in society. One angle is the 
kind of social world (a) with whioh people identify their interest. 
A second is the role of informal opinion-leadership in society, 
and the social organisation of publio opinion in general. A third 
is the role of communication in attitude-persistence and attitude-
change. A fourth angle is secondary socialisation. A fifth is the 
nature of news, with which this research is especially concerned} 
and related to this fifth angle is the sixth question of the 
connection between cognitive and normative communication and its 
link with social action, and social roles. 
(a) Realms of awareness and interest 
The major debate on the kind of social world or worlds 
with which people identify their interests is that between the 
exponents of mass society theory (17) and its critics. In essence, 
as one of its major theorists has recently argued, the theory of 
пазз society is the first half of Dürkheim» s theory of social 
development shorn of the second half J differentiation without 
reintegration. Alternatively it might be said to realise Dürkheim^ 
worst fears that reintegration would become increasingly difficult (18). 
It is a theory which uses the existence of mass media as one of its 
planks. They are, for instance, said to be the channel by which 
the charismatic leaders so beloved of mass publics project themselves 
and so gain their essential mass support. Mass society theory's 
primary focus is the atomisation of social life, the reduction of 
every human being to a unit at equal distance from, society's centre 
and ruling power. The existence of various associations within 
society is seen as simply a blurring of major realities, since a 
professional association for instanoe only engages a small section 
of most poople's lives within it, and tends to be a nationwide 
association rendering communal contact impossible. 
There is no scope here to engage in a full discussion of 
the theory of mass society. Its implications for the role of the 
mass media in modern society are nevertheless important. Standardised 
communications to huge masses of individuals sitting by their TV or 
radio, or reading their newspaper, have thfe effect (according to 
theory) of drawing people's attention away from their locality, their 
neighbourhood, their informal groupings, and funnelling their entire 
orientation to the centre of society. As Kornhauser soys, by mass 
communication mass arenas replace local arenas. Impersonal local 
relationships produce the desert that is watered by a charismatic 
national figure speaking in populist fashion to each individual 
personally,, ?/ith warmth and passion. But the media may also be 
used by the centre in totalitarian fashion to control the masses % 
and in a variant on this, even in non-totalitarian societies the 
political will of the masses may be sapped by a constant diet of 
lulling entertainment. 
There are three major flaws in this approach to a theory 
of the role of the mass media in modern society. The first is the 
assumption, which has already been noted as conceptually inadequate, 
that таоз communication is the only form of communication in modern 
society, when it is actually only a subdivision of general human 
communication. The second flaw is the assumption that because a 
communication is standardised at its source, from the communicator^), 
its perception is also standardised. The notorious inconsistencies 
of eye-witnesses are reason enough to consider this a highly contentious 
proposition. Tho third flaw is tho assumption that community is 
dead, in or out of conurbation existence. This is not to deny 
that feelings of powerlessness, replaceability, triviality and 
alienation are not present to some degree in many individuals in 
modern sooietyj or even that the incidence of those feelings may 
not be higher in modern societies than in pre-modern ones (though 
tho problems of any form of measurement for this proposition are 
acute). But to take these feelings as the explanatory key to 
modern society rather than as a dysfunction of it, requires more 
Justification than is normally forthcoming. 
Concentrating for the moment on this third assumption 
in mass society theory, what is the evidence that community is 
dead? It must be said that the kind of examples offered to 
demonstrate the truth of this proposition are not very convincing. 
Kernhäuser* s dismissal of the nationwide professional association 
as evidence appears to assume that such organisations have no local 
chapters, and that whatever communal body a person is involved in 
must involve them totally for them not to be simply an atom in society» 
Coser's instance of community studies demonstrating the powerful 
links between looal communities and the wider society is hardly a 
revelation, and certainly does not demonstrate the validity of the 
mass society hypothesis. Even the assumption that villages in pre-
modern Asia represented a conglomeration of closed social systems 
has been shown to bo false (19)? so why links between metropolitan 
and local life in today's world should be evidence for the mass 
society thesis is hard to see. 
Conversely, the evidence for the persistence of community 
in modem society is abundant. Mor is such evidence limited to 
recent urban migrants from rural and/or culturally distinct areas, 
who might be expected to remain in close association with each 
other in the early stages of adjustment to city life for purposes 
of mutual protection and emotional support. Gans* study of 
Levittown (20) demonstrated a wealth of communal activity in 
American suburbia. Janowits1 3tudy of the local press in Chicago 
indicated that local newspapers initiated purely for commercial 
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advertising quickly became important and popular in local areas 
as vehicles of community information and integration. He underlines 
the fact that they acted to facilitate, but not to create, the 
development of local community awareness and activity (21). 
Often there is a confusion engendered by the assumption 
that the impossibility of face-to-face relationships with everyone 
in a large city means the total absence of face-to-face relationships 
in such a milieu. Janowitz' finding that families with small children 
were those with the highest stake in the local community is important 
in this connection, because it points the way to a more sophisticated 
assessment of the varying decrees of local community involvement in 
cities. Professionals, students, single transient migrant workers, 
are all examples of people with weak tendencies to involvement. The 
families Janowitz pointed to are at the other end of the continuum« 
On the other hand, it is fair to say that the social worlds 
with which people identify their interests in conurbations are likely 
to bo more in number and wider ranging than in rural areas (aside 
from long-distance urban commuters). To a certain extent this 
expanded definition of relevant social worlds may be ascribed to the 
greater differentiation of roles characteristic of conurbation 
exiotenoo (22), which is likely to bring Trith it a greater awareness 
by people of the vast range of factors affecting their interosts. 
There is though a limit for most purposes on the expansion of those 
horizons, and that limit tends to be the geographical boundaries of 
one's own society. Inclusion of foreign affaire within one's horizon 
is probably directly related to length of formal education, in most 
cases. A prominent exception is when a war is involved, which 
naturally brings the опешу society sharply into the sphere of 
interest. Everyone knows someone's son who is away fighting. 
Yietnara for the United States, Germany for the United Kingdom, are 
examples. Such inclusion of the outside world, or a part of it, in 
the area of interest is still likely to be a very restricted affair 
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concerned solely with how threatening the епещу is. Nothing else 
about the newly included society iä of real interest. 
In contradistinction therefore to the mass society 
perspective on the social world with which people identify their 
interest, a different model is proposed here. It is one of 
concentric rings, beginning with primary groups and the self in 
the centre, and broadening out through local community to the 
social world of the town or city district! from there to the 
provincial or metropolitan centre? from there to the society as 
a whole. For the majority, as already noted, this will be the 
cut-off point. But from inclusion of prominent enemies in times 
of crisis (or of allies), it is possible in principle to go on to 
include the whole world. Some people do, although the problems of 
coping with the relevant information must become extremely difficult. 
The model is not an elegant one (and will be refined a 
little in a moment), but it serves to pinpoint the kind of horizons 
possible for people in modern society. These horizons are defined 
by the way people see their interests. The model should not be 
taken as offering a complete or rounded picture. It is not intended 
to imply by it that people accumulate layers of interest in the 
sense that someone interested in foreign affairs is bound to have 
the same (or any) interest in local community affairs as well. 
Clearly there is only so much capacity for active interest in 
anything, although it will differ from person to person. 
The model gains from being related to Lerner's study öf 
Islamic society and its modernisation (23). Although hi3 work has 
serious deficiencies, it also has its moments of insight. One of 
the factors Lerner picked out as being fundamental to successful 
modernisation was what he called "empathy", and in a later piece of 
writing "psychic mobility" (24). In a much-quoted instance, he 
described the reaction of a typical Turkish peasant to being asked 
what he would do if President of the nation. The peasant stuttered* 
Godl How can you ask such a thing? How can I.... I 
cannot ....president of Turkey.... master of the whole 
wide world?" (25) 
- IT -
For this man, empathy or psychic nobility with events and life 
out3ido his very local experience was quite impossible. 
Now the question as to the relative priority of empathy 
in tho process of modernisation does not concern us here. It is 
sufficient to recognise that Lerner isolated a variable of great 
significance, which provides a clear distinction between modern and 
pre-modern social perspectives* the capacity to extend one's horizon 
to new experience and second-hand experience; the massive expansion 
of ability to take the role of the other* the readiness for continual 
social change. Lerner attributes a crucial role in this process of 
increasing empathy to the mass media, which describes as "the mobility 
multiplier". By obviating the need for physical travel, they have 
enabled exposure to situations and perspectives otherwise completely 
inaccessible to the people using them. Jointing, mass literacy, 
radio, and finally films and television have all enabled tho psychic 
mobility characteristic of modern industrial society. (In earlier 
societies that confined literacy to their elites, printed communication 
was used as a tool for social control, very often via religious 
institutions (26)). 
Naturally, as Lerner is careful to stress, the media have 
not performed this role in isolation from industrialisation, 
urbanisation, and other social and economic developments. Further, 
as some other studios have demonstrated, the media have been only 
minimally effective in rapid modernisation unless supported by local 
cadres who were able to reinforce the mass communication with their 
own words and to load discussions on the practical local implications 
of the mass message (27). (We shall return to this point again shortly.) 
nevertheless, the role of the media in opening up the world, 
in increasing people's awareness of the ways in whioh their interests 
are bound up with social worlds beyond their immediate experience, 
is a very important one. Clearly, in modern societies with a consid-
erable history of exposure to mass communication the media do not 
have quite the same revelatory impact that they can be seen to have 
in societies where they are new. Still, they can at the very 
least be said to enable the continuing high level of empathy 
(relative to some other societies) characteristic of modern 
society, and to offer the possibility of expanding it still 
further depending on tho way communications are organised» This 
is not of course to portray a modem internationalist culture as 
against a traditional village culture, for as wo have seen the 
majority of people even in modern urban society pay little attention 
to foreign affairs» There is certainly still a tendency to be more 
at homo the nearer home you get» 
It la also undoubtedly the case that national issues 
vary enormously in tho extent to which they penetrate all social 
worlds* Some issues never really filter dorn to tho local level 
even though they aro not in the realm of foreign affairs. Govern-
mental reform (parliamentary, local, civil service) is an example» 
Others, like race relations and industrial relations, permeate all 
levels of a society» 
Having granted all thiB, it ie still true that the proportion 
of Mcosmopolitans" to "locals" (28) is much higher in modern urban 
oooiety than ever before! and cosmopolitans! as will be seen in a 
moment more fully, have a mutually oontributive relation with mass 
communication messages» They derive and develop their empathic 
capacity from them, and in turn provide the demand for them to 
continue. 
The concentric rings model can also bo refined by reference 
to various studies of the way different segments of society use the 
media. J» •/. C. Johnstone (29) argues in a rather similar vein that 
people respond to influence on four levels» the mass, the social 
aggregate, secondary groups and primary groups» Froidson in two 
articles (50) argues that national audiences arc in fact made up 
of local ones, and that in most cases people füll use the media 
in the company of others. In one of the studies, ho found that media 
us© in isolation from others was a peculiar feature of a stage in 
adolescence. White and Hiley (31) found that the way children 
responded to television violence was largely related to their 
integration in a peer-group (or lack of it), A study by Schramm, 
%le and Porker, end another by Steiner, showed that education -
which of course correlates strongly with social class - influenced 
very powerfully the way people use television (32). Schramm and 
his associates distinguished between reality-viewing and fantasy-
viewing, and said the latter grew in strength the further down the 
social scale people were. Steiner found that dissatisfaction with 
the adequacy of information on television grew with increased 
education. He also found that interest in informational programmes 
increased with age. Gerson (33) found that black and white teenagers 
use tho mass media differently in the US. Whereas the whites, 
increasingly with age, used mass communications to reinforce their 
already existing beliefs, the blacks used them to absorb norms and 
beliefs current among the white majority. Onoe again, this material 
demonstrates the superficiality of the mass society thesis at one of 
its key points, mass communication. fI?ho material also indicates 
that the "concentric social worlds" model is only part of the story J 
it is at least necessary also to see how a combination of social 
influences (еде, class, ethnic status, education, peer-group 
integration) define the social world(a) with which people identify 
at any one point in their lives. 
(b) ghe social organisation of public debate 
The second angle from which it is possible to view the 
role of the mass media in modern society is the so-called "two-
step flow of communication". Morton's distinction between locals 
and cosmopolitan^ , already oited, was the first step in this direc-
tion, The approach received its major thrust however in a study by 
Katz and Lasarsfeld published in 1955 (34). They discovered that 
mass media transmissions wore only the first step in the influence 
of any particular communication. The second step was equally vital, 
whioh was tho transmission of tho message by local "influentials" 
to others, who so to speak represented the influontials• cliontele. 
The other major finding of tho study was that influential were 
relatively more exposed to media communications than were their 
clienteles. (Influentials only existed in relation to specified 
issues, such as public affairs or fashion.) 
This recalls the important role of the village cadres 
with relation to mass communication in "modernising" societies 
referred earlier. It also constitutes a further blow to the mass 
society perspective, for it clearly shows tho importance of other 
forms of communication beside mass communication - indeed the 
dependence of mass communication on informal communication for its 
full effect. There have been numerous other studies of tho social 
diffusion of general or mass communications, which have all 
demonstrated the irreplaceable role of informal social net-works 
in their successful transmission (55)« 
This means therefore that it is possible to see the media 
0 0 initiators of a process of communication and diffusion, rather 
than simply as leaving a highly perishable message with however 
many million human atoms the audience-ratings may indicate (56). 
On the other hand, the fact that people already have their own 
perspectives on events and their own symbolic universe(s) means 
that the second step in this coinmunication-flow may act ao a blunting 
process on information that challenges existing definitions of reality. 
This is not necessarily true; it is conceivable that a particularly 
sharply edged message may push the influentials toward assigning 
high status to it in their diffusion of it even if it conflicts 
with some of their previously held presuppositions, and so may 
"amplify1 it. But it i3 salutary to recall the comment in one study 
of the media's role in "modernisation" to the effect that the village 
commentator on a radio broadcast could just as easily nullify its 
message as ram it home (37)» This is not to say he would always do 
so as a conscious action, but simply that unless a trained cadre he 
would tend to adapt it to harmonise with his village's prevailing 
values asad norms. The predispositions of the coomopolitans/influ-
entialo are therefore very important in assessing the role of the 
media in society. 
Л very important complementary perspective, on the social 
organisation of public opinion, has been put forward by Habermas (38). 
Habermas traces the origins and development of the concept *public 
opinion* , and of the operation of the public domain, relating them 
to liberal .economic and political philosophy and to the role of 
literature and journalism in western European societies over tho 
last three centuries. The essence of his .argument is that what at 
the outset of the periodväs a participative exercise in the construc-
tion of political policies via public debate, has been transformed 
into a massive invasion of the private realm by manipulative one-way 
media communications • with the only participation offered the public 
being simplified responses to sedulously devised opinion polls. He 
describes this as the shift from heated public debate of culture, 
to the public as passive consumers of culture. 
There is no need to follow Habermas in his subsequent 
adoption of the mass sooiety concepts already rejected in this 
chapter, in order to recognise nonetheless that the quantity and 
quality of public debate is highly dependent on the mass media; and 
that the style of functioning of political democracy in turn hongs 
crucially on their role. I3y overstating, the mass society theorists 
effectively discourage serious analysis of the very real limits to 
public debate that a narrow spectrum modia system establishes. In 
Mertonian terms, who will teach the cosmopolitans? And more specif-
ically still, on what principles? The very character and texture of 
publio social life, rather than particular opinions, is heavily 
determined by the modus operandi of tho mass media, 
(c) Communication and attitude change 
The third angle from which to assess the social role of 
the media is via the relation between communication, the persistence 
or change of attitudes, and the persistence or change of patterns of 
social action. It is as wo 11 to bo gin with two preliminary observ-
ations. First, there is a considerable disjunction between the 
results of laboratory-tests of this relation, and the results of 
field-tests. Second, it has generally boon assumed that attitudes 
are more malleable than social action, when in fact tho reverse 1з 
quite probably the case. 
Laboratory-studies on the relative effectiveness of one-
sided versus two-sided presentation, of a particular order of 
presentation, of the communicator's credibility, of tho importance 
of persuasibility as a characteristic of the recipient, have all 
shown that there о an be some change made in people's attitudes by 
a communication or set of communications. On the othor hand, there 
are certain atypical!ties involved in the laboratory situation which 
suggest caution in accepting these results. normally effects of 
communications are observed directly after the communication. She 
subjects are generally college students, who are not a random sample 
of the population at large and are highly motivated to take part. 
There is no opportunity in the laboratory for group-discussion to 
"blunt" the edge of the communication. And in the laboratory situation 
issues are often chosen for communication which do not latch on to 
deeply held beliefs of the test-subjects (59). 
All these factors are very important in explaining the 
extraordinary lack of impact from media communications discovered 
by social surveys (40). Many of these surveys have concentrated on 
the effects of political communication, and have adopted an experi-
mental "before-after" design in surveying their respondents. However, 
because of the numbers involved it is impossible to measure effects 
directly after the communication. The result is that the passage 
of time and discussion with others appear to produce a flattening 
effect on the original communication. And of course surveys do deal 
with the population at large, and often with issues on which people's 
attitudes may be deeply ingrained. Voting behaviour is an obvious 
example. 
The reoult is that research has generally concluded that 
the media serve to reinforce already existing beliefs and attitudes, 
and that this is the total of their effect (41). However, it is 
important not to leave the matter there. IbQuail (42) notes that 
it io easy to overlook the obvious in the assessment of media 
effects, and cites the heavy use of the media for leisure purposes, 
the great speed and volume of information-flow which they enable, 
their stimulus to consumption via advertising. Certainly this last 
was very much in the minds of the lobby for commercial television 
in the early fifties in the Ш , who saw its advent as fostering a 
consumer society, and thereby an essentially oonservative-oommercial-
oapitalist society (43)* 
Often the implioit model in studies of media-effects has 
been as follows. The first survey's results (in before-after studies) 
have been taken to represent 11 the-oituation-hold-oonstant". A single 
new variable (1) was then introduced\ attitudes were re-examinedj 
and ^ tiopefuily^  cdnsequent patterns of social action were predicted. 
This is of course a quite unrealistic model of social reality. It 
may be applicable in certain situations, such as the st.udy of the 
development of enthusiasm for some product by market researchers; 
but in relation to the complexities of human attitudes and behaviour, 
it is sadly lacking. Situations are not constant, variables are not 
introduced one at a time, attitude-measurement is still conceptually 
unclear, and prediction of behaviour from it is extremely hazardous» 
Fishbein (44) for instance argues (against much current 
social-psychological theory) that affeot, cognition, behavioural 
intention and actual behaviour are distinct phenomena, which 
naturally may be in line with eaoh other but empirically often are 
not. He further argues that attitude measurement simply taps the 
strength or weakness of a learned predisposition to respond to any 
object in a consistently favourable or unfavourable way. He also 
comments that the failure to predict behaviour successfully from 
attitude-surveys has often arisen from two failures, one method-
ological and the other conceptual. The methodological failure was 
to ask people their reaction to a stimulus-object whioh was 
insufficiently differentiated, so that (for instance) respondents 
would be questioned about their attitude to tax-increases rather 
than tax-increases related to specific government policies. The 
conceptual failure was the treatment of situational constraints on 
behaviour as "noise in the system", rather than as equally important 
predictors of behaviour along with attitudes. 
In fact behaviour probably is more malleable than attitudes. 
Kuch of the research carried out by the cognitive dissonance theorists 
demonstrates that behaviour which is changed out of lino with existing 
attitudes о an pull those attitudes along after it to bo consistent 
with it (45). 
All this social-psychological material is not quoted in 
order to prove that the madia may change people's behaviour before 
they ohange their attitudes. The intention has been to demonstrate 
the groat complexity of what has been attempted in the endeavour to 
теазиге media effects. In particular, there are two aspects of that 
endeavour whioh could predict it3 lack of sucoess in discovering 
any substantial effects (especially changes). 
The first is the question of the relative salience of 
affect, cognition, behavioural intention and group-pressures in any 
given situation. If they are congruent, whethor weak or strong, the 
impact of communication is likely to bo commensurate with that 
congruence. As soon though as these four factors are incongruent 
with each other, the whole business of measurement becomes extremely 
complex and, currently, virtually impossible. Since too some people's 
congruence between a particular value and a particular pattern of 
social action may be other people's incongruence, tho potential 
occurrence of incongruence is likely to increase this difficulty. 
The second aspect of the endeavour to discover media-
effects which may help to explain its unsatisfactory results is the 
absence of consideration given over to the effects of prolonged 
exposure to the media. The cumulative influence of a pro tr go tod 
Dories of communications, going beyond simply an election campaign, 
has never so far been assessed for the simple reason of its enormous 
practical difficulty. And yet this is what actually happens in the 
real world. The media no more cease to convey messages than do parents 
cease to communicate with their children, or friends with their friends. 
It is therefore this continual interaction between mass media content 
and the members of society which research into media-effects has 
attempted to capture. Whether in the laboratory or at large, such 
research has been bound to consist of occasional stabs at a vast, 
cumulative and ongoing process. 
(d) Socialisation and the social construction of reality 
This brings us naturally to a discussion of the media and 
their social role seen from the fourth angle of socialisation. 
Mostly the discussion will focus on the media as agents of secondary 
socialisationj but it should not be forgotten that children are 
introduced to television and radio in many societies from birth, 
and to print from a very early age (46). Halloran (47) notes the 
following fields of enquiry on this very point: 
"...the media as (a) possible teachers of norms, 
status positions and institutional functions, 
(b) presenting models of behaviour, (c) providing 
information which extends for beyond the child's 
immediate experience, (d) giving the child a wider 
range of role-taking models than he would otherwise 
have available, (e) being used in some way as a 
reference group, (f) reducing the opportunity for 
interpersonal exchanges within the family and in 
relation to other agents in the socialisation 
process..." etc. 
Furthermore, whatever social role(s) the mass media may play, 
children are socialised in their concepts of that role by their 
parents' own attitude to and use of the media. 
It is in the nature of secondary socialisation to be 
concerned with "an already foxmed self and an already internalised 
world" (48). This means that it must in most cases build on the 
symbolic universe which people already hold, since too great a 
disjunction between its message and tho contents of primary 
socialisation will make its acceptance very problematic;, ("Altern-
ation" by the media alone - to use Berger and Luckmann«с terminology -
is almost unimaginable.) Further, secondary socialisation аз 
compared with primaiy socialisation does not send down nearly such 
deop roots. Berger and Luckmann suggest that secondary socialisation 
is characteristically important in complex societies where the 
differentiation of roles produces numerous knowledge-specialisms 
into each of which an individual needs induction in order to cope 
with their related roles, and which are too numerous in their 
totality, to be knorm by everyone. 
In secondary socialisation, mass communication has an 
important role. It is a general role, not the specific inductive 
role just referred to. But in their continuing presentation of 
reality within the terms of the core symbolic universe of a society, 
the mass media servo to maintain eubjectivo reality and also to 
legitimate the existing institutional order. They could in theory 
fulfil a different role, which would be to highlight contradictions 
and problems within the existing order} and to some extent this does 
happen in occasional plays and documentaries and news stories and 
articles. But mostly, the media are part of the "chorus" that 
Berger and Luckmann describe as serving to maintain the individual's 
sense of reality (49) I they aro part of his significant others, though 
obviously not occupying the affective role of marriage partner or 
friends. And insofar as the media constantly work within and 
utilise a particular core symbolic universe, they help to maintain 
its legitimation. In fact rather as the Church in medieval England 
was the key organisation for the maintenance of the dominant symbolic 
universe, so are the mass media today, in conjunction with the 
educational system. 
It is often accepted that to appear on or in the mass 
media confers status on people; and that this status more or less 
corresponds to the. number of people who will be exposed to the 
communication. What is more seldom recognised, if at all, is the 
status conferred on ideas, perspectives and orientations by being 
treated, explicitly or implicitly, in the mass media. It is not 
simply a question of who is a person in tho public eye, but muoh 
more significantly it is a question of what are the definitions of 
reality that are granted public significance by their repeated 
presentation in the media. This reoalls what was said earlier in 
this chapter about the "cultural system" as a constraint on the mass 
media, and the discussion a moment ago about the media as legitimators 
of existing institutions and sustainers of the core symbolic universe 
of a society« Erom tho subjective point of view, the media are on a 
far higher level of significance than the rest of tho chorus outside 
tho individual's primary groupsj end it may well be that for certain 
purposes they are as significant as the individual's primary groups. 
There are to be sure no points at which they will independently 
provide the same compound of emotion and information! but they will 
service the individual's primary groups at the same time as the 
individual* In practice, it is far less a case of weighing the 
impact of primary groups qgainat the impaot of the mass media, than 
of studying the ways in whioh they internesh. The most obvious 
instance to hand is their presentation of areas of sooial life about 
whioh recipients know little or nothing - classically, foreign affairs, 
but also it may be argued other people's strikes and other ethnic 
groups (50)• 
And concluding this seotion on socialisation as a perspective 
from which to understand tho sooial role of the media, it may well be 
that once again their most powerful form of influence is a two-stage 
one» For in affluent societies, children are now growing up whose 
parents themselves grew up in the presence of television - a phenomenon 
long present in the case of press, radio and film. This ceans that 
whatever may be the socialising role that the mass media have had on 
the previous generation of parents by way of seoondary socialisation 
is more than likely to be transmitted to their ohildron by way of 
primary socialisation. Insofar as primary socialisation does send 
down far deeper roots than secondary sooialisationt it may be 
paradoxically the case that the influence of the media actually 
grows by this means. 
(o) lews and social change 
Fully to understand the significance of the media as agents 
of socialisation, it is neoessaiy to appreciate their role in relation 
to news. This is the fifth angle on the social role of the media. 
For it is precisely the problems posed to the institutional order 
and to the individual's ability to maintain his subjective reality, 
by tho rapid social change characteristic of today's world, which 
give news its enormous contemporary significance and the mass media 
a vital role in transmitting it. The news media act to mediate the 
processes of change in an assimilable form (51). 
Naturally the method by which this gradual appropriation 
of social change is offered the public consists of "placing" 
occurrences within the already existing core symbolic universe of 
society. One might compare the famous American columnist »/alter 
Lippmann, who said that he saw his writing 
"as an effort to keep contemporary events in such 
perspective that his readers would have no occasion 
to bo surprised .hen something happened" (52). 
Whatever happens then is likely to bo presented as "more of the same" 
or as "another form of the same"* although it does offer the possi-
bility, perhaps imperceptibly, of gradually shifting cultural emphases, 
and of juxtaposing values which conflict but normally belong to 
different spheres of behaviour (the treatment of blacks, and justice 
for "all", for instance). But these last possibilities are muoh less 
likely in practice than the integration of new information into an 
already existing symbolic universe. As R. E. Park noted, there must 
be "a body of tradition and common understanding in terms of which 
events ore ordinarily interpreted" (53)* 
The role of new3 in modem society is given further 
illumination by two other considerations* Tho first arises from a 
suggestive piece of research by Kay (54)> who found that a major 
motivation for news-reading was tho desire to reduce anxiety. This 
implies that the psychological strains of rapid social change are 
considerable for many people, and that its integration into an 
already existing symbolic universe fulfils very much the kind of 
functions suggested above. In this connection we may compare what 
к atz (55) says about the "knowledge-function" of attitudes (the 
function being a psychological one motivating the individual to hold 
a particular attitude or set of attitudes). By this is not signified 
a thir3t for "facto" but a need for orientation and pattern in a very 
confusing world. Out of this need are born stereotypes, which are 
attempts to organise experience coherently (whether accurately or 
inaccurately). Once these orderings of social reality have become 
extablished as satisfactory for the individual, they require consider-
able injections of dissonant information in order to alter or destroy 
them. For they are no longer simply categories, but categories with 
a history of psychological usefulness. Their importance for this 
study is not merely their ordering of previous experience, but their 
role in ordering and accommodating new information. This matches the 
role of the communicators in offering social change in an assimilable 
form: it could be semi-seriously characterised as a double exercise 
(by communicator and recipient) in pain-killing! 
The role of news as offering the gradual appropriation of 
social change is also illuminated by Shibutani's study of rumour (56)» 
which is itself an important form of nows in certain circumstances» 
Rumour is a form of news which comes into its own precisely when a 
crisis occurs which no official or authoritative source is available 
to explain* This is a very clear indication by implication of the 
fundamental importance of the media as news-channels in modern 
society* Shibutani quotes incidents following the San Francisco 
earthquake In 19X1, when the three city newspapers produced a common 
edition and those selling it were greeted with sore enthusiasm and 
urgency than people bringing broad or blankets. The instance nicely 
illuminates, admittedly In extreme circumstances, the role of news 
in general in a rapidly changing social всепо, and the importance of 
пала media as the authoritative sourco of news» Huaour acts as a 
makeshift in tho absence of anything more authoritative (57). 
A theoretical perspective which has interesting points of 
contact with these observations in tho phenoaenological viewpoint, 
ochutz's (58) discussion of the importance of everyday definitions 
of social roality for the maintenance of social relations, of the 
social stock of knowledge at hand imbibed from parents and teachers, 
not only permeates the work of Bcrgor and Luckaenn whioh is frequently 
roferred to in this chapter, but also is quite reninisoont of Katz'a 
discussion of the knowledge function of attitudes» Some of Schutze 
insightful concents on tho texture of everyday lifo arc very suggestive 
within tho present context of analysis of tho media's social role. 
This is true, despite the foot that neither ho nor tho other writers 
discuss tho role of tho media in croating people's "vivid present"» 
or in maintaining what ho describes as tho natural attitude wliich 
suspends "tho doubt that the world and it3 objects night bo otherwico 
than it appears to hin" (59)* 
A study of tho British media coveraso of a largo demonstra-
tion in London in I96S (60), for instance, indicates that the event 
was pre-definod by journalists as extremely threatening to public latr 
and order» !)o3pito the relative tranquillity of tho actual march, 
this definitional Catogory vaa still maintained in TV" covered during 
tho demonstration and in tho Sreeo subsequently» A similar study of 
media definitions of General iiacArthur's rotum to tho United States 
aftor the .end of his Korean command, found tho earn© shortfall botween 
televised and actual roality, and underlines tho role of the media in 
croating everyday definitions which паке 1 souse' of but do not 
accurately portray social reality (6l). 
This represents en© illustration of how social change is 
cast in particular categories, which do not necessarily mute its 
conflictual qualities, (indeed they may enhance them), but serve to 
appropriate it by means of already existing definitions, (it could 
be argued that a study of the media is exactly the kind of attempt 
to relate phcnomenological analysis to the processes of social 
change, that is often claimed to be antithetical to phenomenology 
by ito critics.) 
It is from this perspective on news that the customary 
division between news, comment and entertainment characteristic of 
tho media should be viewed. The distinction between comment (which 
Includes articles, editorials, public affairs TV discussions, docu-
mentaries) and news is obviously of limited value, and simply refers 
to different styles of presenting the some thing and fulfilling the 
same role. But there is also a considerable amount of "newä" in what 
is officially designated as entertainment (62). 
Clearly the amount of "appropriation of social change" 
(news) embedded in entertainment is generally less than in programmes 
or journals officially dedicated to it. But it would be quite mistaken 
to assume th*t the clean divisions made betwen news and entertainment 
by media organisations reflect the reality of what they are doing. 
It may well be that in news bulletins or news stories a conscious 
attempt is made to present "straight" news, with any comment being 
balanced тощ the various disputants. But this is largely a 
difference of style} for "balance", as has already been argued in 
this chapter, does not exist in a social vacuum. Interpretation is 
implied in many eases more strongly by what is left out than by the 
actual discussion which takes place. Facts are only sacred within a 
particular symbolic universe, to adapt the famous saying of a famous 
British newspaperman (63). 
Conversoly, neither "entertainment" or "fantasy" are remote 
from the business of offering the appropriation of social change. Tho 
same perspectives on social reality that news programmes (in the 
organisational sense) convey may be equally powerfully conveyed and 
perhaps more во by the relaxing world of popular entertainment. It 
is not intended to overstate this point and relegate news programmes 
to a subsidiary category of light entertainment, but merely to 
indicate that the two are not separated by the gulf that some prac-
titioners claim. The mass communication of news as such is a 
particular, and particularly important, facet of the mass communica-
tion of socially constructed changing reality. But it also finds 
its place in material not formally defined as news, whioh may 
communicate intensively certain perspectives with a strong bearing 
on the meaning of contemporary events and sooial patters. Instances 
might be the importance of science implied by science-fiction enter-
tainment, the dangers of communism implied by spy-serials, and so on. 
In other words, given this sociological definition of news, 
much of the output of the mass media could be defined as news. News 
itself, in the organisational sense, is the most important part of 
this output, for it is in "news" that the tension between actual 
social change and the existing order is at its most explioit. 
Naturally though, the integration of social change that takes plaoe 
in the media may be delusive in view of the actual bearing of events. 
Of this, more in a moment} but let it be noted in conclusion that it 
is partly the relation of the media to news (in the fullest sense of 
the term) whioh gives the mass media their key role in modern society. 
(f) The relation between cornitivo and normative communication 
The last angle on the social role of the media proceeds 
directly from all that has already been said. It is the relation of 
cognitive to normative communication, and to actual patterns of sooial 
action. This has been expressed in a highly distilled form by the 
American broadcaster P. W. Friendly, as "What we don 4 know can kill 
us". 
Proceeding more formally, it is first of all clear that 
cognitive and normative material cannot possibly be separated from 
each other, normative considerations govern the selection of 
cognitive material, which naturally in turn reinforces existing 
norms, in most instances. This is why the simple recognition that 
the media may not determine what we think, but what we think about, 
io not so straightforward as it looks (64). If Tunstall's approach 
to the social role of the media (65) io examined, this becomes clearer. 
Tuns tall suggests that map-making, focusing and ranking are 
throe key functions of the media. All three ore cognitive terms, and 
express tho way in which the media act to give us knowledge and a 
picture of events and their relative significance which is inaccessible 
to most of us from any other source. But what happens when the map, 
the focus and rank are inaccurate? Instances come mostly from tho 
political sphere. President Kennedy's suppression of news concerning 
the attempted invasion of Cuba in 1962 is one example (66). The 
whole complex of events surrounding the Korean War of 1949-53 is 
another (67). A third is suggested by the recent work of Hartmann 
and husband on tho impact of British media on racial attitudes among 
whites. Accepting that the media define social reality rather than 
creating vierm on it, they nonetheless suggest that a definition of 
black poople as problems is most unlikely to load to their acceptance, 
and may sustain high levels of tolerance for their oppression (68). 
In all those cases it is qui to dear that what people are 
given to think about io immensely important in determining their 
reactions and patterns of social action. Other examples could easily 
be multiplied on a purely speculative basis. If poople aro presented 
continually with national perspectives rather than class perspectives, 
or white perspectives rathor than multi-racial perspectives, or 
secular perspectives rather than religious perspectives, it io 
blindness to suppose these will have no impact on patterns of social 
action and the persistence of certain social norms rather than others. 
Insofar as the media aro such an important filter for perspectives 
and symbols they necessarily play an important role in shaping the 
patterns of social action. By emphasising certain definitions they 
will underpin and reinforce certain key values which are crucial for 
the continuation of the society in which they operate in its present 
Гош? for those values inform myriads of interactions between members 
of the society. The selection and presentation of cognitive material 
implies and feeds value-systems. (Cohversely, in a "free-market" 
media situation there is much more scope for the encouragement of 
change.) 
Further to this, it has been almost consistently the case 
that the literature on the impact of the mass media on social action 
has neglected an extremely important component of sociological 
analysis I role theory. Even the most sophisticated analyses of the 
impact of media output - as in the "uses-and-gratifications" model -
have operated in terms of whole individuals or groups. The fact that 
individuals occupy a complex set of rolos whioh determine their actions -
or at least the boundaries of their choice between actions - should 
have directed sociological investigation to the rolation between 
standard role-sets and media output* (The closest point reached to 
this has been the "usos-and-gratif icationsmodel*) In particular, 
the categorisation of roles in recent work by Gerhardt (69) suggests 
that very fruitful analyses might bo produoed along those lines. 
She provides three categories of rolet status-roles, position-
roles, and situation-roles. By status-roles ore meant roles associated 
with social stratum, ethnic group, age, sex, religion, citizenship, 
nationality, etc. Ely position-roles she denotes occupations in the 
labour-market. The term situation-roles is in principle self-
explanatory 1 she draws a distinction however between specific 
situation-roles with a clearly defined environmental context 
(spectator, pedestrian, golf-player), and diffuse situation-roles 
bound up with particular individuals in a variety of contexts (friend, 
neighbour, neophyte). 
Gerhardt1 s discussion is very detailed, and goes naturally 
far beyond this sketch of her argument! but consideration of the 
function of the media in relation to these different roles, rather 
than to role-less individuals taken in the round, suggests illumin-
atingly how media output may penetrate through to social action. 
The fact that the media produco role-related information, typifications 
and fantasies, necessarily spanning most го1ез over time, explains 
further why •before-aftor1 studies are so unhelpful* they leave the 
complexity of role-sets out of account. If on the other hand, 
particular sections of media output were rolated to particular roles, 
while bearing in mind the interaction of the latter with othor major 
roles, a useful step forward might bo made in the analysis of mass 
communication effeots. 
An illustration could be the relation between Gerhardt1 s 
status-roles, media output, and behaviour in actual situations (in or 
out of situation-roles properly so called). If the status-role of 
citizen of a nation-state is taken аз the example, then it con easily 
be seen that media output which implicitly ("balance") or explicitly 
(international competition in science, trade or sport) supports/ 
reiterates/extends the importance of the nation for the individual 
goes much further than underpinning an abstract concept. If membership 
of the nation is a strongly supported role, then it follows that a 
fundamental norm of that rolo is loyalty to the nation. If workers 
of other nationalities are then focussed on in terms of the point of 
their entry into the nation (immigration)} or if the nation»s economy 
is presented аз threatened by strikes and wage-settlementsj then the 
rolo of national citizen will require loyalty to the nation» In the 
case of migrant workers, loyalty to the national role may imply they 
have lesser rights since their nationality is different? and/or 
threaten the social identity given by that collectivity-role to the 
individual. The more strongly and widely diffused tho ideology of 
nationalism, the greater the adhesion to the national role, and 
correspondingly the greater may be the perceived threat to social 
identity. In the case of strikes end labour militancy, the national 
role may imply disloyalty on the part of trade unions and workers in 
a dispute to the interests of the nation. 
These implications of the role of national citizen may 
overflow into certain situational roles (such as voter) but not into 
others (helping someone taken ill in the street). They may be 
challenged in practice by the implications of certain positional 
roles (union Doliflority In a plant) or вд outvoigh ouch roles (once 
again, union solidarity), Tho comploxily of these role-relationships 
and-conflicts clearly demonstrates once more why simplistic assertions 
about tho strength or weakness of media influence, miss the point. 
l.iv Conclusions 
The position has now been reached where it is possible to 
review the various approaches to the social role of the mass media 
and to аозеоз the extent to which together they assist the construction 
of a theory of that role. The framework of constraints within which 
the media operate was first discussed - cultural, economic, political 
and technological. Six ways of understanding the actual process of 
mass communication were then examined, (l) The role of the media 
in expanding and maintaining once expanded, the social worlds with 
which people identify their interests. (2) The initiating role of 
the media in the diffusion of communications via "influentials" or 
"cosmopolitans" to a much larger public, and the role of public 
debate in democracies. (3) The cumulative impact of exposure to 
mass communication over prolonged periods. (4) The media in the 
socialisation process, acting as (a) secondary socialisers of a 
general significance only less than that of the primary group} 
(b) supplementary primary socialisers} (c) legitimators of the 
core symbolic universe of the society* (5) The media as drawing 
much of their significance from their role as transmitters and 
as3imilators of rapid social changej that is, their reproduction 
of "news". (6) The media's cognitive material as crucially 
related to values and norms and their persistence, and to the 
organisation of social relations in terms of complex role-sets. 
Given the see-saw in media research over the decades 
between predictions of "alternation" via the media to the virtual 
denial to them of any significant social role, these six perspectives 
are very important. They demonstrate that many of the questions 
asked about the social role of the media were bound to como up with 
negative answers because they wore the wrong questions. Certainly, 
from the discussion so far it might easily have boen predicted on 
purely theoretical grounds that the media would be highly unlikely 
to act as an independent revolutionary force in society. The 
interests of the polity, the perspectives of the controllers, the 
fact that the media utilise and work within a particular culture, 
their cumulative expression of that culture together with the 
continued status they confer on it, the crucial role of informal 
opinion-leadership in mediating mass communication, the resilience 
of stereotypes: all those elements in tho situation are weighted 
heavily in the direction of socio-cultural integration. Even rapid 
social change is made assimilable through its integration into the 
core symbolic universe. 
Paradoxically, the media may perform thi3 role even by 
legitimating permissible degrees of pluralism. In Holland, the most 
salient sooial divisions are probably still those between Catholic, 
Calvinist and liberal secularist. They are institutionalised not only 
by separate political parties and other institutions, but even by the 
division of control of the media into each segment's hands (though 
one other such segment is the Labour Party)» The slow development 
of class (and perhaps even ethnic) divisions in Holland may be 
partly attributable to the strengthening of these plural divisions 
by separate media (70)® 
Given however a dissonant community with a sharply defined 
eontraculture (say a religious sect), the media do not have the 
power by themselves to reintegrate that community by dissolving its 
contraculture. (Though even here it might be hypothesised that the 
frequently observed "blunting of the edges" over time in such sects 
could be partly attributable to prolonged exposure to the society's 
countervails, given high status in the media») The point remains 
though that people with a clearly defined counterculture will tend 
to use the media selectively in most instances, accepting material 
which confirms their viewpoint and rejecting material which challenges 
it. The media may not encourage dissonance, but they cannot prevent 
it. Rather, they are likely to slow it down. 
To say they do not encourage dissonance is itself subject 
of course to two qualifications. The first is that the occurrences 
which the media filter have a life of their orm. Society moves, 
social change happens, independently of the media. It ищу bo 
surmised fairly confidently that even societies which tightly 
control their media systems cannot forever keep major social events 
£rom their public. Clearly it is easier to do so with many inter-
national events than with national onesf and clearly too there is 
considerable scope for determining the significance given to the 
event in question ("ranking" in Tunstoll's terms). The true 
significance of the British bombing of Dresden is an instance of 
the way the meaning of an event only trickled out very slowly many 
years after its 3hock-value - maybe greater than Hiroshima, since 
Europeans were the victims - had diminished considerably. 
nevertheless, despite many such instances of news-management 
that could be cited, social change does exist in a basically asymmetrical 
relationship with the media. This moans therefor© that the media have 
an ambivalent relation to its on the one hand they help people to 
appropriate it in terms of their already existing symbolic universe} 
on tho other hand, there are sooial occurrences which "imperceptibly" 
over time serve to shift emphases in the symbolic universo so that 
after, say, five years it is no longer entirely what it was fivo 
years before. As Eerger and Luckoann point out, every symbolic 
universe is inherently problematic, and all the more so given 
current rates of social ohango. It is therefore possible and oven 
probable that over a period the media may facilitate a further shift 
in tho social construction of reality by reflecting a change in that 
reality. To this extent then they may be said to encourage dissonance. 
It naturally follows from this that (some of) those involved 
in the production of mass communication may attempt to push the 
process along. From published press reports, it appears that this 
io precisely what did happen in the Czeoh media in the first eight 
months of 1968. Obviously at a point like this - though the 
Czech case is an extreme one - tho media arc contributing as 
powerfully to social change as they are able» In other circum-
stances it i3 того likely to be individual writers or producers 
who as a minority attempt to push the process along. Their 
impact is correspondingly much slighter. 
On balance then the media may be said, (i) to act as 
significant socialisers, in all the different senses analysed in 
this chapter! and (ii) to exist as potential stimulators of public 
discussion. Their actual impact is primarily integrative even -
and precisely - in situations of social change. In this respect 
they may bo seen, with the educational system, as modem analogues 
of tho medieval Church in western Europa. If then they contribute 
in this way to cohesion and stability, a critical question is how 
they cope with the conflicts considered endemic in race relations 
and industrial relations, and what tho result of their handling 
of those issues is likely to bo« the rest of this research is 
dedicated to providing an answer to these questions. 
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Ghat)tor Туго» Theories of raoe relatione and industrial relations 
2*1 The thooretioal analysis of race relations 
(a) Delineation of the oub.1oct-area 
Yihat are "race relations"? Many definitions take it for 
granted that conflict is inbuilti 
"..•a race may be thought of as simply any group of 
people that is generally believed to be, and generally 
aooopted as, aixace in any given area of ethnic 
competition. Moreover, by race relations we do not 
mean all social contacts between persons of different 
•races1, but only those contacts the social character-
istics of which are determined by a consciousness of 
•racial1 differences." (l) 
Shibutani and Kwon define raoe relations in terms of identification 
and identity, following the symbolic-interactionist traditions 
"...an ethnic group consists of those who conceive of 
themselves as being alike by. virtue of their common 
ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded 
by others" (2). 
Blalock simply talks in terms of •minority groups' (3). 
All these terms are obviously open to certain criticisms. 
«Minority groups' was criticised by l^ rrdal (4) for failing "to make 
explicit a distinction between the temporary social disabilities of 
reoent white immigrants and the permanent disabilities of Negroes 
and other coloured people". A more general criticism, apart from 
having to use the word in its reverse sense in discussing a society 
SUCh as Rhodesia or South Afrida, is that it lays most of the 
emphasis on one side of the relations how far does the minority 
и rQiate" to the status quo? The definition by Shibutani and Rwan 
is ingenious, but omits a situation like that of Nazi Germany where 
people of Jewish ancestry might literally be unaware of the fact 
until faced with the evidence. Cox's definition assumes that 
conflict is a necessary ingredient in race relations, so that 
without it they are no longer raee relations. This is very nearly 
true, but not completely во. Mich depends on the scope of tho 
concept 'conflict'I but at least the absence of overt conflict in 
interactions between people who define each other as belonging to 
different 'races' also needs explaining. There are many more 
situations where this occurs than simply the well-known one whore 
rage io merely simmering below the surface. Not all racial groups 
are in competition, for instance. 
ffiich of tho difficulty in definition stems from tho lack 
of real connection between physical racial differences and social 
differences on the one hand, and the key social role of phj^ ical 
differences оз cues for social response on the other hand. People 
do not behave in a particular way because they are black or yollow, 
but because of the social significance of blackness or yellowness 
in their culture and society. For instance, whites have certain 
patterns of social aotion regarding blacks, and vice-versa, because 
it is normal in their culture. Oertain crucial aspects of social 
action within each ethnic group may also be affected by this normal 
polarity. 
Instanoes of this last dimension of race relations have 
generally been taken from the subordinate group. Thus inferior 
educational performance and greater marital instability and higher 
murder-rates of American blacks (all controlled for "class") have 
been noted as indices of tho acute stress experienced by blacks in 
an oppressive white society (5)* But an equally important example 
is the frequently noted warmth and courtesy of members of a dominant 
minority (the ante-bellum South, South Africa) to visitors of the 
dominant group. Such cohesion betokens the necessary solidarity of 
an elite in the face of the masses. And while this с our to ay may not 
be so much in evidence among the lower members of the elite group 
(e.g. the poor whites), their aggressiveness on occasion is often 
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prompted precisely by the incongruence between their deference-
position as elite-members, and their lack of material resources, 
which is not only uncomfortable in economic terms but also very 
threatening to their deference-position. 
It is then the social role of physical differences as cues 
for behaviour according to the culture of a particular society, 
which is the only social or psychological reality in physical 
differences. To this extent, physical differences are analogous 
to tribal, linguistic and religious differences as oues for 
patterns of social response (although "passing" is possible with 
those latter cases in a way it very rarely is with physical 
differences). But these cues "explain" nothing* they merely act 
to mediate and focus aa already existing set of norms and valuos 
which themselves originate in a particular social structure and 
cultural tradition. In order to understand the social origins of 
race relations, it is this sooial structure and cultural tradition 
whioh must be investigated. 
This demonstrates the importance of the assertion above, 
that the non-existence of conflict between physically different 
groups also needs explanation) for this explanation will also lie 
in the culture and social structure in which the groups co-exist. 
The foot that most sociology has concentrated on the conflict-element 
in race relations, and that empirically racial groups certainly 
appear to be more often in conflict than not, does not alter the 
theoretical importance of this observation. The field is therefore 
defined as embracing all situations in which physically different 
strata co-exist. 
This does not exclude situations in whioh their relations 
are organised in terms of national states. In other words, the 
relations between South African whites and Tanz anion blacks are 
part of the subject area, as are "aid'^ prograames from Europe to 
Africa or Asia. The situation of the Chinese in South East Asia is 
another example of the validity of this approach, for their relation 
to the mainland Beoplees Republic is an important element in that 
situation. Furthermore, given tho essential tenet of traditional 
racist ideology that physical differences determine social 
behaviour (6), the political difficulties of black countries can 
easily be slotted into the ideology of "violence-prone children". 
Extra-national events can and do contribute to the maintenance of 
racist ideology even when those events have no impact otherwise. 
An example was the Congo, is Haiti. 
Having then defined the field and indicated that it is in 
culture and social structure that explanations are to be looked for, 
what are the main cultural and social-structural explanations 
available? Assessment of their adequacy must bo related to their 
treatment of a) the emergence of racial stratificationj b) the 
different patterns of racial stratification! and c) the persistence 
of racial stratification. 
Explanations tend to be of three general types. The first 
is what might be labelled social-psychological, or micro-structural* 
tho second* Marxistf and the third non-Marxist, but institutional 
and structural. 
(b) Social-psychological and micro-structural approaches 
The sooial-psychological approach is characteristically 
an 1 immediate1 one. Examples are the work of Adomo (7), Bettelheim 
and Janowitz (в), and G. \7. Allport (9)$ not to mention innumerable 
attitude-surveys essentially inspired by this perspective. However, 
this approach is also to be found in the work of sociologists such 
as Shibutani and Kwan who utilise the syubolic-interactioniat 
perspective! and also Banton (10) who proposes sis 'orders of race 
relations', consisting of peripheral contact, institutionalised 
contact, acculturation, domination, paternalism and integration. 
(Actually, he adds pluralism as a seventh.) 
The focus of this approach is on the "immediate"! on what 
goes into day-to-day relations between representatives of racial 
groups. The basic question that this approach asks is how do they 
see each other and why in those particular ways? 
Adorno and his associate о, for instance, with tho example 
of Hazi Germany hoforo their eyes, concentrated on the mechanisms 
by which fascism and authoritarianism oould become respectable in 
a society. The existence of a particular personality-type peculiarly 
prone to any authoritarian propaganda was their discovery and explan-
ation. The link-threads they öfter with other social forces are 
only occasional J a roference here to the virtual identity of the 
sooio-ooonomio and psychological aspects of "pseudo-conservatism" 
in Nazi Germany, a reference there to the role of powerful economic 
interests in using racist propaganda to maintain their dominance (11)» 
This is very much a theory which concentrates on the emergence of 
racial stratification, but nothing else* And its explanation is 
essentially in terms of the distribution of this particular 
personality-type and its proclivities through all ranks of society (12). 
Bettelheim and Janowits studied tho relation of ethnic 
hostility to inadequate ego-controls and downward sooial mobility» 
In their work, the whole problem of attitude-measurement and 
prediction of behaviour comes up yet again. For instance, out of 
their sixty or so "tolerant" respondents, in tho case of 1езв than 
25>a oould their tolerance be attributed to fully or partly internalised 
ego-controls (1J). In other words, the vast majority even of the 
"tolerant" on their own showing would not find it difficult to alter 
their views to suit a racially hostile situation. As is so often 
pointed out, concentration on hostile attitudes (or favourable ones) 
focuses attention on a variable which is itself determined by many 
changing forces (14). But if to hold a particular attitude is both 
a poor prediotor of one's behaviour, and is itself tho result of 
more than merely internal psychological factors, then its use as 
explanation is impossible. For it presumes that the core-factor in 
race relations is the ingrained personal antipathies of individuals, 
whioh is a demonstrably weak account. 
In actuality, attitudes are a mediating factor in race 
relations. It does not assist illumination to dismiss attitudes 
as irrelevant, as a particular style of Marxist analysis prefers. 
On tho other hand, it is important to limit the attitudinal focus 
to its proper place in the explanation of race relations. 
It cannot be said that either Shibutani and Kwan, or 
Banton, score any more highly in this endeavour. Banton's theoret-
ical focus is all the time on modes of contact, reminiscent of his 
earlier theory of black migrants in Britain as "archetypal strangers" 
(15). Although one or two of his modes imply a stratificational base 
(paternalism, dominance), his theory relates almost entirely to the 
social texture of day-to-day relations between various typos of 
racial division. But how did these typos emerge, and how do they 
persist? Banton's only attempts to answer these questions are by 
reference to by-products of industrialisation (he instances urban 
residential segregation) and continuing widespread tolerance of 
inequality. The implication seems to be that different kinds of 
racial contaot just "happen", and that many at least arc maintained 
by quite casual factors. Without claiming the reverse of the latter 
statement to be true, it is 3till the case that Banton*3 approach 
has very little explanatory power $ and this is because it tends to 
conoentrato on tho surface elements of race relations. 
Shibutani and Kwan concentrate explicitly on "the kinds 
of distinctions men make on tho basis of traits believed to be 
inherited" (16). Here again, tho implicit focus is on day-to-day 
and fcoö-to-faöe relations. Although these are not irrelevant to 
the understanding and explanation of racial stratification, a mors 
significant issue is what lies behind them. To be fair to Shibutani 
end Kwan, their book does discuss these underlying faotors - but 
only in very piecemeal fashion, and with the symbolic-interaotionist 
perspective acting as the unifying thread on its own. 
The "immediate" focus concentrates on variables and topics 
such as migration, culture« contact, tho extent of racial hostility 
and tolerance, tho psycho-dynamics of prejudice, the role of mutual 
definition in sooial interaction, the face-to-face and day-to-day 
interactions of racial groups, the frequency of discrimination, 
the likelihood of the disappearance of awkward ethnic relations in 
the future. These are all real issues, not simply epiphenomonal$ 
and yet they are in need of more explanation than the studies so 
far reviewed have been able to offer. Their inadequacy in this 
respect is demonstrated very clearly by one range of excellent social-
psychological studies which points repeatedly to tho fundamental 
importance of structural and cultural factors in explaining the actual 
day-to-day behaviour on which the "immediate" theories concentrate. 
According to R. M. Williams (17), the existence of considerable racial 
prejudice among people with no personality pathology shows clearly 
that prejudice is to be explained mainly by the cultural norms and 
social structure of its milieu. This conclusion is reinforced by 
quite different levels of prejudice that were discovered (using the 
same research instrument) in the different communities studied. 
(o) Marxist approaches 
Marxist approaches to the explanations of racial stratif-
ication represent the most thorough-going endeavour to produce а 
macro-structural theory of the phenomenon voiy far removed from the 
"immediate" focus which has just been surveyed. They originate 
largely with Marx's observations on the relations of Irish and English 
workers, and other scattered observations? and with Lenin's Imperialism! 
the highest stage of capitalism. The latter saw mature capitalism as 
ineluctably driven to expand its operations overseas and to carve up 
the world for exploitation. In pursuit of this end, it would establish 
formal or informal control over those activities of the countries it 
dominated that were relevant to its interests. If formal control, then 
the territory would become a colonyf if informal control, then the 
territory's resources would be exploited with the tolorant acquiescence 
of the continuing indigenous elite (examples being China and large 
parts of Latin America). In early capitalist development this expansion 
took place, but with a muoh greater element of choice attached to it* 
in the final stages of capitalism, the choice was removed. It had to 
expand territorially to survive. 
Tho Marxist perspective seas racial stratification as an 
outgrowth of these developments innate in capitalism itself. In 
order to justify colonial expropriation and slavery, an ideology of 
the inherent inferiority of non-white people wa3 developed, as was 
an ideology of the civilising mission of the whites. Further, the 
very juxtaposition of white, black, brown and yellow people in 
virtually every part of the world from Australasia through Africa to 
the New World is to be attributed to one aspect or another of imperial 
expansion. 
Asi regards the relations of block and white workers, the 
Marxist approach stresses two fundamental points. First, tho appeal 
of racist ideology to the proletariat of the metropolitan country« 
The attractiveness of belonging to the ruling nation and its 
enhancement of status meant that the white worker tended to identify 
with his white overlords rather than with his fellows in oppression. 
It was another fom of tho mechanism which led the labour aristocracy 
to disdain the 1озз skilled workers within tho metropolitan country. 
Second, Marxist analysis emphasises the deliberate uso of labour 
migration to create a bulging labour market and so to reduce the 
aggressiveness with which workers would combat their grievances. 
This led inevitably to a situation of intense competition for employ-
ment, and often for reasonable accommodation as well; and further, to 
strike-breaking and similar phenomena. The hostility which exists 
between black and white workers, and the lack of identification of 
interests between tho workers in the metropolitan country and their 
colonised fellows overseas, wore all to be explained by recourse to 
these feetorSf,( 16). 
The implications of these considerations for the study of 
race relations are as follows. The only real differences between the 
life-situation of black and white proletarians is the existence of 
racist ideologies concerning the former. This docs not man that 
black workers» miseries may not in many instances be oven greater 
than the miseries of v/hite workers. But they are all in essentially 
the same relationship to capital, and this neoessarily overshadow 
everything else. Race relations are therefore epiphenomenal, however 
bitter current racial antagonisms may be| for in fighting each other 
for scarce resources (including 3tatus), black and white workers are 
leaving the owners of capital free to enjoy abundant resources. A 
particular instance of the equality of all workers before the law of 
capital is that the same mechanisms (of the labour-market) attract 
workers from the areas underdeveloped by capitalism - Pakistan, 
Ireland, southern Italy, the Caribbean - to areas of fast oconomio 
growth. Instances would be England in the late 1950» s, West Germany 
in the fifties and sixties, and the United States from 1840 to 1920. 
The hard experiences of nearly all migrant workers are then explained 
primarily by reference to the capitalist labour-market. 
A major exposition of the llarxist orientation is to be 
found in the work of 0. C. Cox (19)• lie argues that "all racial 
antagonisms can be traced to the policies and attitudes of the 
loading capitalist people, the white people of Europe and America", 
and that "racial exploitation is merely one aspect of tho proletarian-
isation of labour". He defines racial prejudice as "a social attitude 
propagated among the public by ад exploiting class for the purpose of 
stigmatising some group as inferior, so that the exploitation of the 
group itself or its resources or both may be justified" (20). Following 
on from this approach, Cox differentiates anti-Semitism from black-
white hostility. The former, he argues, is a form of social 
intolerance that would be resolved by the cultural assimilation of 
Jews; the cultural assimilation of blacks would not be allowed to 
alter their oxploited status. The main underlying reason preventing 
racial intermarriage^ according to Cox, is that if it became widespread 
it v/ould make it impossible to distinguish clearly whom to oxploit. 
The future, he concludes, is for blacks and whites to form together 
into a "political class" which will spell the end of capitalist 
oppression. 
Whht are the strengths and weaknesses of the Marxist 
approach to race relations? First, tho strengths, which ore 
particularly evident where the "immediate" focus is weak. Tho 
Uarxist approaoh is able to point to European imperialist expansion 
as the major source of tho juxtaposition of racial blocs in todoy's 
world. In other words, it offers an explanation for the emergence of 
racial stratification. It is able to show how racist beliefs and 
ideologies arose out of colonialist expansion? and of course in some 
Ilarxist analyses, an ideology once bom has a life of its own and 
can certainly be adopted by people whose real interests it attacks. 
The historical source of these beliefs, together т/ith the emphasis 
on objective competition in certain situations by blacks and whites 
against each other for scarce resources, means that hostility no 
longer has to be explained on the basis of some internal psychological 
disposition of uncertain non-psychological rationality. Race conflict 
is not necessarily unrealistic in certain circumstances, even though 
the Marxist would claim that it is ultimately unrealistic. The 
Ilarxist approach is not so hypnotised by the cue-factor in race 
relations that it fails to see the very real analogies that exist 
between the experiences of nearly all migrant workers entering on 
expanding economy at the bottom. And in Cox's analysis of anti-
Semitism as a phenomenon which is not isomorphic with black-white 
relations, there lies the seed of differentiation between different 
patterns of racial stratification - though it must be said that his 
analysis of anti-Semitism and its potential for dissolution through 
cultural assimilation look very weak when applied to Hazi Germany. 
The strengths then are the provision of a unifying theory, 
and a macro-theory at that, so avoiding the plethora of low-level 
factors (housing, education, etc.) which are the focu3 of so much 
writing about the subject. The weaknesses are partly the weaknesses 
of Marxism as such, and partly the particular failures of the Ilarxist 
approach to account satisfactorily for certain phenomena specific 
to race relations. 
It is empirically doubtful for instance whether imperialist 
expansion is an inevitable feature of the development of maturo 
monopoly oapitalism (21). This is not to say that capital markets 
have not expanded into virtually every corner of the world - a denial 
would be absurd. But to assert that capitalism had to do this in 
order not to stagnate is a much larger claim. 
Another inevitability, this time of capitalism engendering 
its own destruction as an economic system through forging unity and 
revolution among the oppressed» is also open to question (and not 
merely because it still remains in the future). It is not at all 
clear that the disappearance of oapitalism would serve the objective 
interests of the labour "aristocracy" (which means quite a largo 
section of the proletariat in affluent societies). What pauperisation 
means is not what this sector of the labour-force is experiencing! and 
this is not restricted to a narrowly economic definition of pauperisation. 
It is perfectly conceivable that this large section of the proletariat 
will continue to see its interests as coinciding with the persistence 
of capitalism; rather more so than that it should elect to throw in 
its lot with its seaker fellows. Many demands whioh in the past were 
considered irreconcilable with efficient capitalism (such as tho 
demand for participation in factory or urban planning decisions) are 
gradually being conceded. The problem of prediction with relation to 
the greater diffusion of wealth and power is no greater than the 
problem of predicting tho necessity of pauperisation. This may have 
implications even for the mass of people in tho Third World, though 
their conditions aro objectively incomparably worse, and their 
revolutionary inclination currently much more real. 
Tho specific weaknesses of Marxism regarding race relations 
aro their failure to avoid reductionism, and to explain the persistence 
of the phenomenon at all satisfactorily. The tenacity of "primordial" 
ties of nation, race, culture, religion, community is only disregarded 
by cramming it into an alien mould. Merely labelling it as a 
disagreeable throwback to capitalist society when class identifi-
cation 3hould be all, is moralisa not science, and does nothing to 
explain popular anti-Semitism in the USSR end Poland, or the 
attitude of European Russians to their Muslim minorities or to the 
Chinese (oven before the Sino-Soviet split developed). Granted the 
USSR's claim to be an example of real Marxism in practice is disputed 
among Marxistsf but even so, the persistence of non-class social 
divisions in present-day Russia where they are mostly officially 
discountenanced, should guard against dismissing them as evanescent. 
Pebrayfs contrast of the success of Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions 
whioh were able to harness nationalist feeling to socialist revolution, 
with tho problems of Latin American peasant revolution, is an unusual 
recognition of this reality (22). 
Really, it is the accuracy with which people*s rational 
interests are analysed, and the prediction of their rational action 
in accordance with that definition of their interests, that is the 
weak point of Marxist analysis of race relations. It is an analysis 
which of course springs from the distinctively llarxist attribution of 
a unique and overriding role to capital in modern society. Given the 
space available hero for argument, it seems that this attribution is 
misplaced (at loaot in this form). 
(d) Structural approaches 
The third type of explanation of race relations is non-
iüarxist, but institutional and cultural. There are four variants 
whioh will be reviewed here. The first is the "caste" approach, 
discussed amongst others by I^ jrrdal. This discussion will concentrate 
on %rdal«s presentation of the argument for using «caste1 as a 
comparative and interpretive category for understanding race relations. 
Ityrdal says he prefers the term 'caste1 for three reasons. 
•Race1 has spurious biological overtones$ »class1 implies the possi-
bility of individual mobility out of one stratum into another) and 
•minority group1 or •minority status* obliterates the distinctions 
between reoent white immigrants to the US and black Americans (for 
instance), in terms of their long-term disabilities in the social 
system. For l^rdal, the Horth American black-white relation is 
defined precisely by the impossibility of social mobility from 
either raoial stratum into the other except by the process of 
"passing". No other attribute of intelligence, wealth, goodness, 
athletic prowess or even subservience (or any of these taken 
together) was able to overbalance the single defining attribute 
of being black. This means of course that the two strata ore 
endogemous. I^ rrdel accepted that within each fca3te' there oould 
be variation in status. The origins of this caste-system are 
identified by Ifyrdal as "tradition and, more specifically ....the 
traditions of slavery society" (23). 
The basic focus of this application of the term "caste' to 
blocks in the United States (especially the southern States) is then 
tho virtual impossibility of social mobility. Its use has implications 
too for the practice of endogamy, and tho low status of the blacks» 
It also carries overtones of the mutual repulsion of castes by the 
pollution-meohanisms. (And it probably also has an apologetic 
undertones не are no bettor than the Hindus I) 
There is however far more to the Hindu caste-system than 
this. First and foremost there is the relatively far higher consensus 
in the Hindu system, which is integrated with a belief-system more or 
less common to all castes (in the US the black church was the earliest 
and has been the longest focus of dissent). The absence of continuous 
overt conflict in the southern Statee and the evidence for inter-caste 
tensions in India should not be allowed to obscure this basic consensus 
in the latter society. Secondly, in the southern States thorc is 
nothing approaching the jajmani-system of hereditary division of 
labour, beyonfc the single division into masters and servants, rulers 
and ruled. As Sinha points out, a Hindu villager in the southern 
States of the US would find that within hie racial category "his 
sooial status is guided mainly by his personal attainments in 
wealth, occupation, education and the like, arid not by the ascribed 
status of his extended kin or .iati group Racial stratification 
has no feel for such micro-stylisation" (24). 
In other words, the comparative use of •caste1 tends to 
select certain variables within each social system for comparison, 
but does not compare both social systems as articulated wholes. To 
this extent the application of the term »caste1 outside India is 
likely to be confusing without careful prior definition of the 
precise areas of comparison. It would be fair to compare the 
difficulties of Harijans in India, Eta in Japan and blacks in white 
societies; but this does not demand the initial labelling of each 
stratum as a »caste*. 
The second variant on the non-lJarxist structural approach 
is also well exemplified by lyrdal. It is what might be called the 
11 abundant-multitude-of-low-level-factors" stylo of analysis, byrdal 
quite specifically attacks the attempt to explain race relations by 
"one predominant factor, a »basic factor*". It may well be that he 
was motivated to make this attack by the dangers of oversimplifying 
the needs of black Americans* What emerges from this however is a 
re-casting of monetary equilibrium theory; for he defines the black 
American's "plane of living" as consisting of "employment, wages, 
housing, nutrition, clothing, health, education, family stability, 
manners, clecnliness, orderliness, trustworthiness, law observance, 
loyalty to society and criminality". He then hypothesises that 
"on tho whole, a rise in any single one of the ITegro 
variables will tend to raise all the other Negro 
variables, and thus, indirectly as well as directly, 
result in a cumulatively enforced effect on white 
prejudice....the variables are assumed to be 
interlocked in such a causal mechanism that a change 
of any one causes tho others to change in the same 
direction, with a secondary effeot on the first 
variable, and so on " (25) 
Racial prejudice and the social position of black Americans 
are here conceived to be in balance, so that a change in the sooial 
status of blacks would entail a change in white prejudice, so much so 
that should the original term of the equation occur in the black 
stratum, the original Y/hito term might not» Lyrdal refines this 
model a little, acknowledging that prejudice does vary among whites, 
especially as related to the "class"-position of blacks; and also 
that the expectation of change in the black "plane of living" may 
well increase white hostility. Ho adds, in a rather delphic fashion, 
that the "actual pushes go in both directions, thus often turning 
the system round as it is rolling" (26). 
Much of this discredits sociology and sociological analysis» 
the identification of manners, oloanliness and loyalty to society as 
important elements ie the situation simply reflects conventional 
rationales for racist feelings, and timö has disproved the contention 
that an advance in one of these factors in the "black plane of living" 
makes much impression if indeed any at all. But its essential 
inadequacy is its concentration on a plethora of mutually contributing 
low-level factors, without offering an explanation of how these things 
came to be. Admittedly, housing, education, employment, are three key 
mediating mechanisms in the persistence of black inequality) but they 
cannot be explained oimply in terms of themselves. In fact, this 
approach of I^ rrdal^  is an example of much popular administrative 
thinking - but suffers from its deficiencies too. 
A rather better version of a multi-factor structural approach 
is provided by Blalook (27). (This is the third variant under dis-
cussion.) Blalook is careful to state that he is only attempting to 
encourage more systematio sociological thinking in this field, and is 
not putting forward an integrated theory himself. He proceeds to 
discuss status, competition, рот/er and the role of the numerical 
proportion of a particular racial stratum, in determining patterns 
of race relations. Here at least are more general dimensions than 
I^ rrdol'a approach offers. Competition, for instance, is extended by 
Blalock to examine frontior-contact situations, "middleman" minorities 
(such as tho Chinese in South Bast Asia or the Indians in East Africa), 
the ambivalent attitude of American trade unions to black labour, and, 
the "permissible" competition of blacks with whites in American sport. 
The two considerable merits of Blalock's discussion are 
firstly that he begins to give appropriate weight to tho various 
patterns of race relations (inoluding some existing outside the US). 
Secondly, he stresses power as a oruoial variable in the explanation 
of why various patterns of racial stratification persist. In doing 
so, he draws on Biorstedt1 s definition of power (28) as consisting of 
numbers, resources and mobilisation. The greater the power generated 
from these three factors by a raoial stratum, the greater its chances 
of altering or maintaining the existing situation (depending on which 
stratum is able to generate more power). In fact, it is possible to 
take Blalook's analysis a little further still, and to see the 
competitive situations he analyses as essentially power-struggles 
except for sport where viotory is only of marginal symbolic significance 
in most contexts. Competition is a power-struggle for access to 
scarce and valued resources, inoluding power itself. What is missing 
£rom Blalock1 s analysis is any explanation of how raoial stratification 
emerges. 
The final variant to be reviewed among non-Marxist structural 
approaches to race is the theory (or theories) of pluralism. A hitherto 
rather unsatisfactory debate around pluralism as applied to race was 
stimulated by a more solid contribution in the form of essays edited 
by L. Kuper and M. G. Smith, Pluralism in Africa (29). Discussion of 
pluralism as a tool in the explanation of race relations will be 
limited to that particular contribution. The authors of the various 
essays in it are very for from presenting a unified theoretical 
orientation to pluralism« the nearest they get to agreement io 
acceptance that "non-class11 social divisions are an important focus 
for social theory and research. Davidson, in an essay on Zambia 
before independence, argues that whites and blacks there were only 
members of one society because the whites had a monopoly on the means 
of violence; Gluckman, in an essay on the Republic of South Africa, 
argues that blacks in that society have over a period defined their 
situation as one in which various valued objects (education, medicine, 
internal peace) have been the products of contact with whites, and that 
this has brod an equilibrium and consensus for a time. 
Howevor, tho most organised discussion of pluralism is to 
be found in If. G. Smiths paper at tho end of the volume. There he 
distinguishes between three kinds of pluralisms cultural, social 
and structural. Cultural pluralism would define the situation of 
the Jews in How York, who share equally in the city's public life 
but who maintain certain distinct ethnic/religious practices in the 
private sphere of sooial existence. Cultural pluralism by itself 
neither implies necessarily inequality of status nor incorporation 
into the society. Social and structural pluralism are essentially 
less and more rigid forms of what Smith calls "differential incorpor-
ation'. By this term he denotes unequal access to resources and 
status. Instances he quotes of structural pluralism aro English 
society before the extension of the franchise, or various African 
pre-colonial societies (e.g. Ruanda-Burundi), or racially stratified 
societies such as the old southern States, tho Republic of South 
Africa, andbso on. Social pluralism in thi3 sense refers to the 
northern states of tho US, modern England, Brazil, whoro differential 
incorporation is not maintained by official legal and institutional 
structures. 
The merits and demerits of this approach are to a certain 
extent the merits and demerits of all typologies. Every typology has 
a certain degree of explanatory power, for if Sfioiety A belongs to 
Category 1, there are oertain predictions that can be made about its 
forms of social Organisation. On the other hand, typologies only 
really present the groundwork for further sociological ananlysis 
and explanation. Smiths approach is useful insofar as it encourages 
a comparative framework for the analysis of any mechanisms of differ-
ential incorporation. Power, the methods of social mobility, marriage-
rules, aro among the means of perpetuating the status quo characteristic 
of all socially or structurally plural societies. Racial cues are 
only one kind of cue in this respect. On the other hand Smith's 
approach does offer the possibility of avoiding the roduotion of 
racial stratifioation to a subtype of claae-oxploitation, or аду 
other obliteration of those aspects of being black that are qualita-
tively different from other forms of stratification. 
What then do all the approaches to race relations contribute 
to understanding tho emergence, variety and persistence of patterns 
of racial stratification? First, the emergence of racial stratifica-
tion. Here the Marxist approach is at its strongest, in its identif-
ication of capitalist imperial expansion as the connecting thread in 
the juxtaposition of racial groups almost everywhere (and even of 
groups not normally considered racial, such as the Ibo minority in 
northern Nigeria). The Marxist approach also offers a convincing 
explanation of the origins of racist Ideology in that expansion: a 
more satisfying explanation than the psychological focus on internal 
mechanisms of individual prejudice offers on its own. All tho other 
approaches to race relations того or less disregard tho emergence of 
patterns of racial stratifioation, and simply treat it as a "given". 
This is a facet of the academic division of sociology and psychology 
from history which seriously obscures real understanding of the 
phenomenon of race relations. 
Variation in patterns of race relations is barely touched 
on by any of tho theories discussed; indeed some of them, like the 
•caste* approach, quite explicitly only di3cus3 one pattern, that of 
the southern United States. Shibutani and Kwan discuss the variations, 
but without producing any general explanations of them, ierhaps a 
combination of Blalock'e typos of power- and competition- end minority 
percentage-variables with Smith»s introductory typology of pluralism 
offers the best prospect so far for the development of explanation of 
the various patterns that do exist. Л real synthesis of them still 
remains to be worked out* but whatevor its result it will still have 
to mesh closely with the explanation of how patterns of racial 
stratification persist, whioh is the third question to be answered. 
It is a question which can equally well be reversed, for no 
explanation of persistence whioh does not account for the persistence 
of all the patterns of racial stratification can be held to be a very 
satisfactory explanation. It is in the explanation of persistence 
that the Marxist approach is at its weakest - the only contribution 
it makes is the existence of realistic competition between black and 
white workers for scarce resources. This is not a negligible contrib-
ution, either in itsolf, or its encouragement to sooial science to 
look for the realistic factors in racial conflict. But it is by 
itself an insufficient explanation! and its ultimate theory of devel-
opment of sooial stratification rests on strongly disputed analytical 
foundations. 
Any full explanation of the persistence of patterns of race 
relations must take account of at least four other basic insights in 
social science beside the Marxist-competitive analysis. i.yrdal»s 
multi-factor approach is important in terms of understanding the 
numerous micro-structural mechanisms whioh maintain the relative 
position of raaiaL strata to each other. The sooial-psyohological 
perspective - which has been labelled "immediate" - is necessary in 
order to understand how racist ideology is transmitted, as well as 
the personal needs it serves for many individuals. The acquisition 
of countless racist responses for countless situations is preoisely 
the area that sooial psychology is best fitted to explain. 
The other two basic insights aro as follows. Blalook»s 
insistence on power as a crucial variable in tho persistence of any 
particular pattern of race relations is in this writer's view 
fundamental, particularly in the sense of the absence of power in 
an oppressed racial stratum as leaving the way clear for the 
continuance of its oppression. But it is also valuable for the 
analysis of Kaley-Chinese relations in Malaysia and Indonesia, where 
what has been at stake for decades is a struggle for poi?er between 
one stratum with economic resources and another with political 
resources (30). 
The final insight amounts to a revaluation of the importance 
of the cue as enabling mechanisms in racial stratification, '»mat 
marks out racial stratification from other forms is partly the 
experience of continuous definition in all forms of social inter-
action and human existence as the member of a stigmatised or honorific 
group. From ono angle this consideration is subjective $ yet the 
writer would argue that such a total subjective experience shared by 
a oollectivity must have some impact (in most cases a considerable 
impact) on reactions, responses, social action, social organisation, and 
definitions of the situation. It is a question of being unable to 
escapo not merely ffcoia inequality or oppression (though these are 
obviously fundamental to the situation), but from an attribute which 
acts as a mas tor-programmer overriding all other programmes of human 
interaction whioh would normally operate (31). The salience and 
persistence of racial cues also enable "institutional" patterns of 
race relations (such as raoial discrimination) to persist tenaciously. 
Before concluding this section, It is as well to clarify 
the negative implications of the theoretioal position taken up here 
for certain popular explanations of race relations. Explanations of 
race relations in terms of "the archetypal stranger" (32) or in terms 
of culture conflict or in terms of a strongly prejudiced minority of 
a population or in terms of the internal psychological functions of 
prejudice, are all entirely inadequate and even very misleading, 
especially if presented by themselves. There ore no doubt elements 
of sociological truth in all of them* but they are traces rather 
than anything more. 
2 , i i Tho theoretical analysis of industrial relations 
Answering the question "What are industrial relations?" is 
on tho face of it much more straightforward than attempting to define 
race relations» "Relations between employers and employedt those who 
give orders and those who carry out orders concerned with work", is 
simple enough. And on one level, the explanation of the existence of 
industrial relations is simple toot the process of division of labour, 
greatly accelerated by industrialisation, has made most work industrial, 
in the technological and/or bureaucratio sense. 
Assessment of the significance of industrial relations is 
much more complex a matter than accounting for its emergenoe or 
persistence. Popularly it is equated almost entirely with strikes 
and wage-negotiation of one kind or another! and certainly in the 
media this is what the term comes to moan« However, it does not 
require empirical research to establish that overt conflict is only 
one small part of the continuing prooess of industrial relations. 
The basic question to date in sociology has been how far, and in what 
sense, this relatively small amount of overt conflict represented and 
expressed tho ontire process. 
(a) Marxist approaches 
The answer to this question that inevitably dominates any 
debate on it, is the Harxlst one - partly because of its existence as 
a widespread belief system, partly because of the considerable weight 
of Marxist literature, portly because out of all the 19th ccntury 
sociologies that raised the issue it did so in tho sharpest form. 
Therefore it is as well to begin by assessing it. 
Industrial relations are particularly significant for 
Marxist social analysis, not because they are industrial nearly so 
much as because thoy presuppöse an advanced form of capitalism. What 
the economic system of capitalism does to the work-process is to 
separate its final product or result from the control and often изо 
of its producer, the worker (unlike historically earlier forms of 
work). Characteristically, the worker in a capitalist economy does 
not own his tools or machinery or his products. Divorced from them, 
the only thing he owns is his capacity to work; and this he sells to 
an owner of capital in order to buy necessary products Ibr his liveli-
hood (which may quite conceivably include tho product of his own 
labour). The only sector of society which is not alienated in this 
way from the process of production is the capitalist class, which 
owns the technology, the workers1 labour-power, and the finished 
product. 
The result is that for the worker the entire work-process 
becomes a purely instrumental activity in order to stay alive. There 
is nothing in the work process which confers any dignity or interest 
or pleasure. These are things which the worker must seek in his non-
work time. Further, the enormous expansion of the division of labour 
in the development of industrial capitalism means the increasing 
reduction of men to more and more specialised occupations utilising 
an ever-decreasing fraction of their innate capacities. 
Trade union activity is able to ameliorate some of the 
worst surface features of this process, particularly such things as 
very low wages, very long hours, very bad working conditions. But 
since this alienation is a*mocessary outgrowth of capitalism, trade 
unionism cannot remove it without removing its root cause. 
Work relations in Marxist sociology are thus fundamental in 
the actual operation of capitalist society. The implication must be 
that tension in these relations is perpetually latent, and that 
industrial disputes are merely manifest symptoms of this tension 
(however little they may contribute to removing it for once and all) 
(35). 
As in the Marxist analysis of race relations, so here the 
connecting thread is the nature of capitalism. It is not necessary 
however to attribute universally benign features to capitalist economic 
processes in order to deny that as an economic system it has a single 
uniform end all-pervading logic, as a kind of maleficent demiurge. 
Further, the analysis of the nature of work in capitalist society, 
although very suggestive in many respects, contains assumptions 
about man's truo nature as producer which are at once impossible to 
verify and also are not possessed of completely compelling logic. 
They moreover imply an attitude to the division of labour which if 
takön in a fundamentalist sonso would make the operation of any 
modem industrial society completely impossible. 
The literature on industrial relations contains only one 
systematic attempt to subject the Marxist schema on industrial 
relations to empirical test, in Banks' work on the British steel 
industry (34). The endeavour io very interesting, although it 
ultimately founders. Banks selected the British steel industry as 
a critical case study of tho Ilarxist thesis that the more advanced 
the technology and the more spatially concentrated the labour-force 
in production, the greater the class consciousness of the proletariat. 
From the historical evidence of this particular British industrial 
sector, he is able to conclude that a very major question-mark is to 
be pieced against this Karxist hypothesis. 
An important problem in Banks' discussion is, however, that 
he does not succeed in keeping certain concepts constant. One illus-
tration is the way he specifies "the conversion of capitalist enter-
prise into state, municipal or co-oporative enterprise" as the essence 
of trade unionist or revolutionary aims, and nationalisation as 
"the end of capitalist ownership" (pp. 55» 105)» at certain points 
in his argument? yet elsewhere he accepts tho view that nationalisation 
is simply a State form of capitalism (pp. 148-9)- ?his has significant 
implications for his assessment of the degree to which the steel-
workers have attained proletarian objectives! both definitions cannot 
be true simultaneously. 
Another problem io the way he accepts the particularly 
leninist distinction between trado union class consciousness and 
political class consciousness, without reference to the latter's 
necessary concomitant in that strain of Karxist thought, the 
revolutionary politioal party. 
Yet another difficulty in his node of procedure is his 
tendency to treat British steel workers as though historically they 
had existed in a social vacuum filled only by advanced technology 
and the experience of working in large factories. Tho origin of this 
assumption may very well lie in the highly unschematic nature of 
Karx's writings, which do not usually assemble testable propositions 
in a a ingle coherent order. Banks himself notes this problem in 
principle when he tries to assess llanos analysis of trade unions 
(p* 77)* But it is very hard to suppose Marx or any otter thinking 
person would seriously argue a case on the presumption of this Social 
vacuum. Banks1 work effectively come to grief on his failure to 
analyse sufficiently the sources of consciousness, whether of olass 
or of other social phenomena. A rigorous empirical testing of l!arxes 
work in relation to industrial relations would havo to try to assemble 
a series of propositions on that score ftom his writings - an instance 
might be the role of political parties, аз discussed in his 18th 
Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. However, that work remains to be done. 
(b) Structural approaches 
lion-Marxist macro-structural approaches to industrial 
relations, which will now be reviewed, all owe something to Гагх, 
whioh underlines tho value of placing his analysis first. Throe such 
approaches will be briefly assessed. 
The first is what might bo called the subjective use of 
"alienation". For Marx himself, the tern was concreto and precise, 
and denotod an actual separation and divorce between the worker and 
his product. He strenuously attacked those who reduced the concept 
to refer to a generalised t/eltschmorz. Nevertheless, it Ьаз been used 
rather in that way by some sociologists, sometimes with particular 
reference to the boring and unsatisfying nature of work in modern 
industrial society. The archetypal alienated worker is the one who 
gloomily screws a tiny part into a machine moving along an assembly-
line. (For some writers, this appoaro to be the only industrial process 
which exists!) The relatively high propensity to strike among car-
workers the world over is oonotimcc explained by reference to this 
element of their work-process. 
The best example of this approach is the' work of Jlobert 
Blauner (35), who avoids several of tho pitfalls that other writers on 
alienation have fallen into» He argues that there aro four elements in 
the work-pr о с с s о which will affect tho extent of subjective alientation. 
One is tho prestige of the work, a second is the amount of control over 
the work-process, a third is the extent to which work 1з performed by 
closely integrated teams, end the fourth is the presence or absence of 
an occupational community within which people spend their non-work time. 
In studying various types of industrial production which exemplified these 
four features in varying ways, Blauner came to the conclusion that the 
more a particular work-process was marked by the absence of those four 
elements the less satisfying it was» The implication for the study of 
industrial relations is that various forms of industrial conflict may 
especially originate in particular kinds of work} and conversely that the 
absence or low incidence of industrial conflict in certain industries 
may bo primarily attributable to the way work is structured within them. 
In its absolute form this hypothesis must be modified to take 
account of other studies of various forms of industrial production that 
have not confirmed Blauner'с predictions to the letter. There is in 
fact no perfect or necessary relation between Blamier1s variables and 
job-satisfaction and industrial conflict (36). On the other hand, it 
aeons altogether reasonable to assort that job-satisfaction or -dissat-
isfaction may be a contributory underlying cause of industrial peace or 
industrial conflict» It is the relation between job-satisfaction and 
the absence of industrial conflict which seems much weaker than its 
opposite» 
Л second macro-structural perspective on industrial relations 
ic offered by Dahrendorf (37). Iiis approach is also a variation on 
Ilarx, but this time demythologiced» Conflict between those in positions 
of authority and thooe in oubordinate positions is, ho argues, an 
inevitable feature of modern societies in all institutional spheres. 
It is not a polarisation induced by the development of capitalism, 
but simply a continuing friction of interests. Since there is no 
prospect of this friction being removed by the development of nerr 
forms of social organisation, it is quite simply a permanent feature 
of all societies. Similarly, Aron (58) points to conflict between 
management and workers in the Soviet Uhion as evidence for the 
perpetual likelihood of such conflict in any social system, even 
in a non-capitalist one. 
Fox (59) has argued in a similar but more differentiated 
fashion that thoro are three forms of relationship in works acoopt-
ance of managerial authority, rejection of that authority, and a 
"pluralistic" negotiating stance between authority and workers. In 
his analysis, these positions are in turn strongly influenced by the 
cumulative impact of labour movement development on social and 
political institutions, and vice versa. His "pluralistic" alternative 
clearly resembles Dahrendorfs position. 
The third macro-structural approach to industrial relatione 
is to be found in the recent work of Goldthorpo and his associates on 
affluence and the British class structure (4&). The main contribution 
of this research to the sociology of industrial relations lies in its 
emphasis on what workers bring to the workplace in terms of attitudes 
to work, as a crucial determinant of their behaviour while at work. 
Goldthorpefs particular area of interest ley in the role of factors 
outside the work-experienco itself in influencing work-behaviour. 
Characteristically the affluent workers of Goldthorpo's survey adopted 
a strongly instrumental attitude to work because of their desire for 
a higher standard of domestic consumption. Work that was less 
attractive than many of his respondents had previously known was 
nevertheless sought because of its high financial rewards. It is 
instructive to contrast tho work-orientation of the traditional white-
collar worker, who in most cases was prepared to accept low financial 
rewards for higher status and security (41). 
Goldthorpe hao olco ouggested cloewhore (42) that the 
exictenco of a clearly unequal distribution of wealth in British 
society (or in any society), combined with the absonco of a 
consensually based method of its distribution, may be the moet 
important factor in the explanation of industrial disputes (espocially 
pay-disputes), There is a vacuum where values might exist that would 
restrain wage-demands and industrial action to support them, This 
argument concentrates on the disputes in industrial relations, which 
as noted may or may not be symptoms of continuing latent confliot 
in thooe rolations. 
In answer then to the question "What is the social import 
of industrial relations?" there are these three non-Marxist macro-
structural approaches» One defines them in terms of the nature of 
work; another in terms of authority relations} and the last in terms 
of their own connections with the world outside work, and the influence 
of that world upon them. Only in the second of those three approaches 
is conflict considered to bo built in to the situation. 
(c) I.Ücro-struotural approaches 
There are also a number of micro-structural approaches. Here 
the focus i3 largely policy-oriented, :and so dispute-oriented. The 
kinds of area chosen for examination include the structure of the 
particular union(s) involved in a dispute, the differing propensities 
to strike in various industries, the particular bargaining procedures 
in operation, the reasons for unofficial strikes, demarcation-disputes, 
the history of labour relations in particular plants, and factors of 
a similar order. Such an approach would often take into account too 
the standard focuses of organisational sociology! communications, 
d e c i s i o n-making, authority-patterns, career-patterns, are all instances 
(43). 
The various perspectives on industrial relations that have 
been reviewed rather more clearly need each other than do tho various 
perspectives on race relations. Even the üarxist approach, which it 
is here argued makes unnecessary philosophical assumptions, turns 
up again in partial and bastardised form in the macro-structural 
approaches of Blauner and Dahrendorf. The deficiency in all these 
approaches is that they tend to concentrate on what appears to be 
the problematic aspect of industrial relations, industrial tension, 
and often deduce it from other aspects of the work-situation. This 
is very far from being illegitimate, and is on the contrary quite 
essential. But there is always the tendency, inherited perhaps from 
the lüarxist perspective, to assume all industrial relations are at 
loast potentially stressful; that they are conflict relations. 
The central question to be answered before proceeding any 
further is therefore how far this may be held to be true. Very often 
a model of the following kind is proposed, which implies that it is 
trues "Employees want more money, employers need as largo profit-
margins as posoible (for reinvestment, shareholders, personal 
consumption)." Once again, a denythologised version of the Marxist 
perspective; but a very incomplete definition of the situation even 
in purely economic terms. After all, profit-margins may be large 
enough to meet all actual demands without difficulty; far from all 
work-situations (e.g. governmental bureaucracies) axe structured in 
terms of profit-maximisation; and wage-demands may even act as a spur 
to rationalisation or investment in more productive technology, or both. 
Without an initial assumption about conflict (on the part 
of sociologist, workers or management) there is every reason to believe 
that such conflict is less significant than the underlying consensus 
about the desirability (l) of the enterprise's survival as a source 
of employment and even (2) of the continuance of "professional 
management" (ao a legitimate form of occupational specialisation 
which is beyond the worker's horizon and competence, even though 
certain decisions relating to the workforce may bo questioned or 
opposed). It is quite credible that ouch a consensus could sustain 
a relatively high level of conflict with actual management policies. 
The rarity of "political" definitions of the situation by moot 
workers in Britain or most other advanced capitalist countries is 
yell known? yet their virtual absence indicates that most people will 
stop well short of pushing an enterprise out of existence in order to 
realise their demands. Quite simply, they are only too aware that 
for their demands to be met, it must continue in existence. 
It is therefore argued here that the central dimension of 
industrial relations is the secure provision of wants that work 
supplies. Iroduction is directly related to the need for security 
that consumption-demands will be met. To this extent, work in pre-
modern and modern societies io very much the same phenomenon. The 
nature of this security rests primarily on the assurance of continued 
provision of material needs for self and dependants. Hence the 
almost universal disturbances at tho onset of capitalism in a 
society, when it was usually precisely that security which wa3 
dissolved (44)* 
Beside this central dimension of work, the form of organisa-
tion of work (peasant small-holdings, giant factories), the nature of 
authority relations (in general or in particular), the inherent 
(dis)satisfactions of certain kinds of work, его lesser though still 
important variables. Even stribng religious or political legitimation 
for particular kinds of work serves as an extra reward for work 
rather than as its central interest. The appeal of Ilarxiom to 
particular groups of workers within capitalist societies may lie 
largely in its analysis of capitalist society as unable to guarantee 
precisely this security and as tending normally to guarantee the 
opposite. 
Industrial relations ore therefore to bo understood first 
and foremost in the light of their relation to this essential security 
that work gives. As already noted, job-satisfaction, the experience 
of authority, and other factors mentioned earlier, are all also 
relevant. But only the overriding interest in security explains why 
poople will continue in unsatisfying work, or indeed like Goldthorpe's 
affluent workers will seek it out in preference to more satisfying 
work to meet securely their particular wants - for the definition of 
wants naturally varies. This also explains the perpetual spiral of 
wage-demands, especially in response to price-inflation. Workers 
rarely demand therefore a larger slice of the cake in real terms; 
and statistics of income-distribution over the years in tho UK and 
the US for instance chow that they do not get it either (45), And, 
as already argued, in nearly all cases this overriding concern for 
security will not allow the escalation of industrial conflict past 
the point whore the employing agent ceases to be able to employ. Only 
where the situation is defined as intrinsically insecure (as in Marxism), 
or in the very isolated oases where insufficient information leads 
employees * representatives to force unawares an impossible pay-demand, 
does industrial conflict pass this point. Whatever the dissatisfactions 
of job or authority, however dispute-prone the industry or jblant, this 
concern for the secure provision of wants dominates, modifying the extent 
to which discontent on all these scores is translated into action. It 
is probably the case that even the awareness of discontent itself is 
often much less than it could be, because of the need to accommodate 
oneself in practice to the shadow-side of an activity which securely 
supplies wants. 
This is not an absolute assertion, for obviously if this 
shadow-side means ä loss secure provision of wants overall than is 
obtainable from another known/accept able/accessible employing agent 
then people will change employment. There are numerous qualifying 
factors of this kind which need not detain us here, such as the near-
certainty that workers will enjoy less than perfect knowledge of 
available pay and conditions elsewhere, may mistakenly change their 
job with a view to improving their situation, may be inhibited from 
improving their situation by affeötive ties in a particular neighbour-
hood, and so on. 
What is essentially at issuo for present purposes is the 
assertion that industrial relations are oonfliot relations; that 
confliot is the unifying thread running through all industrial 
relations whether or not it becomes manifest. Against this it is 
argued here that although conflict is built in to many industrial 
relations situations it is not the unifying thread running through 
them. It is very much a variable; whereas the desire for the secure pro-
vision* of wants is the central attribute of all work. It is therefore 
argued that apart from certain specified situations the consensual 
ba3is of industrial relations is more powerful than conflict-issues 
which may arise in them. This is not to say that the conflict is 
unrealistic; only that it has bounds defined by the underlying 
consensus.-
'while it is true therefore that industrial conflict can be 
explainod largely by one (or a combination) of the macro- and micro-
structural approaches outlined above, it will only bo properly 
explained with reference to this consensus. Anticipating a little, 
it may bo said that the almost exclusive focus on the conflictual 
aspect of industrial relations in tho main English news media echoes 
this very partial treatment of the subject by most sociology (46). 
In some ways the replacement of the term »industrial relations* fcy 
the term »work relations', although seemingly rather trivial, has 
something to commend it. «Industrial relations' almost inevitably 
evokes conflict and problems and factories. «Work relations' draws 
no hard-and-fast distinction between pro-industrial, technological 
and bureaucratic work, and suggests neither conflict nor consensus. 
It also leaves it open whether it is the nature of the work-or the 
nature of authority which is the focus of attention; it does not 
exclude lateral work relationships as a focus of interest; and it has 
no particular overtones that would imply work relations exist in 
a vacuum. 
2*iü Comparisons and oontrasta between the oocial impacts of 
both sets of relationships 
In this research the treatment of race relations and work 
relations by the main English nows media 1з compared and contrasted» 
It is as well therefore to establish the sociological continuities 
and discontinuities between these two areas of social life to start 
with. There is a point of course at which they overlap, in that 
racially heterogenoous societies involve different racial strata in 
work relations of one kind and another, and that the position of 
block migrant workers in tho labour market is a very depressed one. 
it is argued here that race relations and work relations do for most 
purposes nevertheless constitute two separate dimensions of social 
existence. People of different races relate to each other in almost 
eveiy sphere of life (housing, education, the legal oyotem, sport, 
politics, employment), whereas work relations although not insulated 
from non-work relations nevertheless are more partial and limited. 
This begs the Ilarxist question about the unity of employers, 
owners of land and property, and the authority of tho state. From 
this perspective, the workers at work are only facing one manifestation 
of an exploiting hydra, albeit tho most dofinitive in their alienation. 
Work relations also largely define the forms of social life outside 
the workplace, not only in the restricted sense of constraining leisure-
and consumer-choices, but in the much wider sense of preventing workers 
from realising their full humanity. 
Without accepting the (to the writer) dubious philosophical-
anthropological assumptions in this perspective, it is still valuable 
to have a corrective to the over-isolation of work relations from the 
rest of social life implicit in much industrial sociology, which tends 
to treat the workplace as a closed system (47)- Cleorly, particular 
kinds of work offer particular economic and status rewards which are 
very important in non-work spheres of life. Workers may а1зо in 
certain cases share in occupational subcultures of a kind that flow 
out into thoir non-work social relations (43). 
Race however impacts at every turn. At work jmd in leisure, 
in the search for accommodation, in the experience of the legal 
system and the educational system, blackness travels with you. It 
does so in a way which overrides other forms of social inequality, so 
that the hi£&er the job-qualifications the harder it is to get a 
suitable job (49)J so that щу. black person is as likely to encounter 
random racial hostility in the street as any other. As argued earlier, 
it is this virtual impossibility of escape from the situation which 
distinguishes the experience of blackness in a white-dominated society 
and its concrete manifestations in housing, employment and so on, from 
the experience of work and its ramifications. As noted particularly 
in tho discussion of tho Marxist perspective on raoo relations 
earlier on, checking off the isomorphisms that do exist between workers 
of all racial strata by no means exhausts the full reality of racial 
stratification. 
Perhaps the most important discontinuity lies in the charac-
teristic European ideology of raoism (50). This has several forms, 
but its essence is to deny real humanity to black (or brown or yellow) 
people. It is of course not primarily a coherently organised set of 
propositions (although Gobineau and others have endeavoured to present 
it in a systematic form), but a social definition of reality informing 
everyday, decisions and attitudes of people in all kinds of roles and 
in all kinds of situations. It is, certainly, not absolutely discon-
tinuous with ideologies concerning the poor - in the UK for instance, 
the black stratum may well suffer from being defined as both black 
and poor. Once again, though, non-blacks however poor characteristically 
3hare this ideology about blacks (with perhaps the exception of some 
sooial marginals at the bottom end of society). The choice between 
wealthy whites and black poor as reference groups for the white poor 
is classically resolved in favour of race rather than poverty. This 
has already been noted in the discussion earlier of the relation of 
white workers in metropolitan sooiety with colonised blacks - a 
disjunction seen at its very sharpest always among working class 
white settlers in a colonised territory* 
This ideology and its manifestations in racialist sooial 
action are then far more pervasive than any elitist ideology concerning 
the working class or the poor. The discontinuity may well have been 
less in an earlier epoch such as late eighteenth oentury England, and 
no doubt in late twentieth oentury England there remain considerable 
areas of ambiguity concerning the extent to which the white working 
class actually is an equal segment of British society» Common 
attitudes to industrial conflict and working class affluence refleot 
a major area of such ambiguity» But by contrast with tho black segment 
of British society, the white working class segment is very securely 
ensconced within the pale of equals as defined by the dominant ideology. 
Outside for many purposes are non-whites, whether nationally or inter-
nationally. 
The international dimension of racist ideology is especially 
important, because what any person of a particular race docs anywhere 
in the world tends to be fitted in to a particular stereotype of how 
people of that race behave. This is not true of the actions of a 
worker anywhere in the world. The political and economic difficulties 
of newly independent black states are a very important case in point, 
where in England and elsewhere these problems are popularly attributed 
to racial inadequacies rather than structural causes. The political 
and economic stability of the Bepublio of South Africa is held to be 
significant for tho same "reason". 
There are one or two important implications which still need 
to be drawn out from this disjunction between work relations and race 
relations. In this discussion the30 will be related specifically to 
British eociety, though no doubt there ore parallels elsewhere. In 
work relations, power tends to be the formal and fairly well defined 
property of certain individuals in managerial roles who are fairly 
few in number. The workers also have considerable informal power, 
but it is power which takes its origin from their numbers and not 
from property ownership, or legal entitlements (apart from a few on 
oafety, etc.). Most significantly, it is a power which is confined 
to setting limits and establishing vetoes rather than a power to 
initiate. 
ЗУ contrast, in British race relations the asymmetry of 
power io infinitely greater* There power is informally diffused 
throughout the dominant white majority to act against the interests 
of the black minority when it so chooses. Discrimination against 
blacks in their search for housing, employment, promotion, and other 
valued objects, involves whites in what amounts to the policing of 
their own superior social position. Discrimination in these crucial 
areas is therefore an act of power by the powerful white majority. 
Related to this disjunction is the differential "organisation" 
of industrial relations and raco relations in the Ш. Workers and 
employers are both organised to a fairly large extent, especially if 
staff associations ore taken into account along with trade unions» 
There are also the TUG and CBI which act as umbrella organisations 
to represent at least somo of their members1 overall concerns. 
Political parties at national and local level represent certain 
interests of employers and workers, though there is considerable 
dispute as to the actual details at this point. Conversely, the 
black minority is poorly organised for a number of reasons, and io 
"spoken for" by upper-middle class т/hitos in leading roles in certain 
official and Governmental bodies (Race Relations Board, the Community 
Relations Commission). 
The gap between spokesmen and those spoken for is consequently 
far wider than it is even in industrial relations, where union leaders 
are often found to be out of touch with their rank and file. Even so, 
it io only with tho protracted strike which is refused union recognition 
that the two situations begin to resemble each othor in this respect. 
"Unofficial" strikers in a lengthy dispute often find their lack of 
status as a tiny minority, which io implied by their lack of official 
representation, together with the аЬзепсе of formal organisation or 
resources for strike-pay, combine to form a considerable handicap in 
coping with their problems. At this point the power-situations in 
both cases do converge. Nevertheless the work relations powor-
situation is temporary, whereas tho race relations power-situation 
continues. 
Another disjunction between work relations and race relations 
is that in the case of the former, public concern is related to tho 
prevalence of disputes and large-scale pay-awards. In the case of 
tho latter, the concern of many whites is over the actual presence 
of black minorities in Britain. In other words, conflict arises over 
actions in the case of work relations, and over people in the case of 
race relations. The contrast is not absolutes objections by whites 
to blacks are sometimes restricted to particular actions by individual, 
blacks, though this is relatively rare} and in industrial conflict 
the focus of attack is quite often on certain persons (Communists, 
iYotskyites) who are defined as omnipresent fomenters of disturbances, 
rather than seeing the origins of the conflict as ordinary people 
acting to redress a specific and limited grievance on this more or 
less Isolated occasion. 
In general however it is the physical presence of black 
people that is blamed by many whites for certain grievances rather 
than any particular action or set of aotions on their part. Similarly, 
although there is still a much stronger tendency among the black 
minority than among the white majority to assess people of the other 
racial stratum on their individual aotions, such a tendency seems to 
be currently sharply on the decline. More and more it is the white 
majority as such, with a few exceptions who must prove their integrity, 
who are defined as the source of grievances. Conversely strikers -
at least when they are white - are thought of as erring members of 
the same society rather than as a continuous threat. The emphasis 
of the distinction is once again on the total nature of raco relations 
as against the partial nature of work relations. Аз already noted, 
this is the case whether structural realities are at issue, or 
Phänomenologie al realities. It is the task of the next chapter to 
analyse both sots of realities in contemporary Britain. 
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Chapter Throei Raoial and industrial oonfliot in contemporary 
Britaint perceptions and realities 
In order to analyse phenomenological and structural 
features of raoe and industrial relations in present-day Britain, 
the discussion will be divided into three sections, the white 
majority perception of blacks, the standard perception of work 
relations, end the extent to which conflicts in these areas 
actually do threaten the current patterns of the British social 
order. Relatively little attention will be paid to perceptions 
of whites by Ь1аскз, since tho research literature on this 
subject is negligible $ the fact regains that this question io 
of paramount importance even though this study is forced to 
noglect it
5-i Contemporary perceptions of blaoke by whites in Britain 
As regards race relations in British society and its 
culture, there are three main sources of information. The first 
source is the numerous evidences of Britain's racist oulture derived 
ftom the experience of Empire (l). As a general factor, this has 
been noted in chapter 2. It is important to recall that the racist 
perspectives originating in Britain's imperial past do not have to 
manifest themselves in precise views concerning biologioal inferiority 
(2), or even in expressions of regret at the loss of tho Empire, but 
oan persist in myriad forms in everyday assumptions and social inter-
course. There 1з no necessity for a person to possess a fully 
articulated ideology about the inferiority of blacks in order to 
treat blacks as worthy of less respect and attention, or of more 
resentment and hostility, than whites. 
The mechanisms of transmission of these imperial perspec-
tives are chiefly primary socialisation, together with children's 
reading matter which presents blacks as insignificant, uninventive, 
primitive or comic (5). These mechanisms operate in conjunction with 
two continuing external stimuli. One is tho links, past and present, 
of many British parents with the former colonial territories. This 
may be through" .military service overseas, or through friends and 
relatives still living in Africa, the Caribbean or Asia. But 
undoubtedly the most important stimulus since 1950 has been the 
introduction to tho lowest end of the labour market of a minority of 
people of Caribbean, Asian and African descent who have consequently 
almost all occupied a place at tho bottom of Britain's stratification 
hierarchy. Personal experience of blacks as normally in socially 
inferior positions and occupations is probably (given standard under-
standings of the reasons for this pattern) the most powerful social-
ising force of all. Tho structural and the cultural position of 
blacks in white society reinforce each other to reproduce racist 
definitions. 
The ееcond source of information about the core British 
perspective on race, or the main perspectives, are the various 
attitude-surveys of racial prejudice that have been undertaken (4). 
There has already been occasion to comment cautiously on the naturo 
of attitude-surveys (5)? and certainly it is difficult to know 
precisely what a survey of racial prejudice really reveals, given 
the situational and other constraints on social action that exist. 
It might perhaps be taken as an index of the strength of appeal at 
any one tine of Britain's racist cultural perspective at the expense 
of other cultural perspectives on the nature of justice, human 
dignity, and so on» 
Tho problem of assessing the value of these surveys is 
unfortunately compounded by the poor design and/or slender sampling 
frame of the great majority of them. In number they have mostly been 
of the opinion-poll kind, which is really not geared to explore any 
of the complexities associated with race relations, quite apart from 
their normal use of quota-sampling methods. One of the few that 
have been based on a reasonably long questionnaire and random sampling 
was tho attitude-survey in Colour and Citizenship. Regrettably, its 
method of scoring replies almost certainly gave a totally confused 
picture of the "extent"/"depth!', of racial hostility among whites -
it claimed that "only" Щ » of the British population could be labelled 
extremely prejudiced, for instance, though this is entirely based on 
the method of scoring (6). 
An exception to this rule whose results have been made 
available only very recently is tho survey by Hertmann and Husband of 
racial prejudice among teenagers and their parents in three kinds of 
area in Britain. Tho areas were those of high black concentration, 
low block concentration and no black concentration} and the teenagers 
were further divided into those at schools with a large proportion of 
black pupils and with a low proportion of black pupils (in the first 
two sets of areas). They discovered a strong positive correlation 
between black concentration in areas and the existonco of white 
hostility In Britain, which they explain by reference to the 
response of traditional racist hostility to the presence of black 
people, and also to disdain for tho subordinate roles performed by 
the majority of black workers. Their results, at least in this 
respect, confirm the analysis of this study* 
"Harder" than these attitudinal studies is tho third 
source of information, which relates to actual behaviour by whites 
toward blacks. Here a famous study by Political and Economic 
Hönning (7) is of value, for it indicates to a considerable degree 
the incidence of actual racial discrimination in Britain5 in other 
words, the extent to which white members of the society were prepared 
to translate their racism into action. There was little investiga-
tion of wby they should do so, which lay outside the terms of the 
investigation; although the finding that people tended to attribute 
their own acts of discrimination to the hostility of.vlhers around 
them may be a further pointer to the widespread grip of racist 
feeling and ideology in British society. But the frequency of 
discrimination in employment, housing, credit services and insurance 
was index enough of tho normality of racist behaviour in key areas 
of social life. 
In some ways the most significant index of all of the 
persistence of England's racist culture may be governmental policies 
on black immigration from the Commonwealth pursued from the oarly 
1960*3, together with their grateful acceptance by the mass of whitos. 
The restriction of Commonwealth immigration in 1962 and numerically 
much more sharply in 1965, in the absence of similar controls over 
Irish and European immigrants, was the expression in law of the 
view that black migrants were less desirable (for whatever reason) 
than white migrants. The extension of immigration curbs in one 
parliamentary week in Karch 1968 to East African Asians of British 
citizenship represented an extraordinary and dramatic further 
concession in this direction. Tho events surrounding the expulsion 
of Asians with British citizenship from Uganda in 1972-73, were a 
further index of the mutually contributing and accumulating 
definitions of black people by Government and white population. 
The justification for these policies in almost every case 
was tho conviction that racial hostility in Britain had reached a 
point whoro conflict between racial groups shortly would become overt 
and violent, whitee being seen normally as the initiators of such 
violence. Tho legislation may be taken therefore as both an index 
of racial hostility, and as its encouragement by appeasement. Each 
appeasement in turn proved insufficient, especially given the attack 
against black immigration spearheaded by the MP Enoch Powell and а 
number of very active parliamentary supporters. Bach "defusing11 of 
the issue apparently lighted yet more fuses (8). 
While oil this evidence is tribute to tho tenacity of 
racist ideology in British culture, it neods also to be understood 
in structural terms. The socialising impact of the structural position 
of blacks in Britain's stratification has already been referred to 
above? but the hostility of whites neods to be explained also by 
reference to their porooption of blacks as having created a competi-
tive situation for valued resources through their migration he«, 
as in certain ways lowering tho attractiveness of British society, 
and as being the potential for interminable end destructive conflict 
on the pattern of the US in the 1960's and since. The distinction 
between cultural and structural factors is naturally largely 
analytical; on the other hand, it is important not to fall into 
tho trap of viewing white hostility as unrelated to "rational" 
factors. Rather, it is related to factors of limited rationality, or 
perhaps to a particular order of "rationality" in which on alien 
stratum is seen as the origin of actual and imagined ills, often 
enlarged by rumour. In this situation, actual competition for а 
house or job or girl becomes invested with far more than individual 
significance (9). In othor words, the "rationality" consists of the 
logic of particular forms of social action granted certain promises 
(which ere themselves irrational), and of the fact that in certain 
circumstances scarce resources (e.g. council houses) do go to blacks 
before all whites• needs have been met for those resources. Hostility 
to this is both "racialf,/,firrational" (why not priority if a particular 
black family's needs are greater?) and "rational" (the council house 
was needed and wanted). So too, for instance, the fear that Britain's 
racial confliot will develop to Amor lean proportions is a rational 
thing to fear even though the usual "theory" behind it (racial groups 
"naturally" conflict) is quite irrational* 
3«ii Contemporary perceptions of Industrial conflict In Britain 
In the case of industrial relations, tho picture is a little 
more confused» On the one hand there has been traditionally opposition 
to moot or all union activity in tho middle and upper classes of 
British society ever since unions became a feature of that society» 
This opposition cannot of course be divorced from the anxieties of 
those strata concerning the direction of development of the working 
class, and their continuing ambivalence about the incorporation of 
that stratum into "tho nation"» The distantiation until very recent 
times of white-collar workers and professionals from union membership 
has largely refleoted the extent to which people in such occupations 
have consciously modelled their behaviour on traditional upper-class 
patterns» In general alignment with this lack of enthusiasm concerning 
unions and everything associated with them, there has also been some 
very influential academic thinking on tho subject. Economists, as 
noted later in this chapter, often link together wage-inoreasos, cost-
inflation, and damage to Britain's international trading position. 
Some sociologists have demonstrated the slender involvement of the 
rank and file in union activity, and the poor communications between 
leaders and members - a picture which could easily imply that the 
unions are only of real relevance to their officials' and militants1 
interests. Public and media discussions often allude to these comments 
by social scientists. Finally, there are the numerous opinion-polls 
that have shown widespread enthusiasm for the views that the unions are 
out of date, too powerful, and require legal curbs - although a 
question-mark has been raised against these poll-findings by come of 
tho research carried out under the auspices of the Donovan Commission (10), 
which demonstrates a local attachment to trade union branches. 
There is then in British society a strongly held and widely 
distributed view that ouch and perhaps most activity to secure higher 
wages, especially industrial action, is reprehensible and "sectional" 
(i.e» against the national interest)» Inter-union disputes and 
demarcation-disputes which result in stoppages are only the crowning 
evidence of irrationality and irresponsibility. It goes without 
saying that for adherents of this view, the suggestion of any actual 
political motivation in industrial action, whether merely to embarrass 
the government or actually to topple it, is not only abhorrent but is 
often slightingly attributed to tho strikers or the union in an 
industrial conflict. 
The evidence for a contrary viewpoint concerning norms in 
industrial relatione is very difficult to assess. Only about 42>I of 
the British labour-force is unionised (ll)$ on tho other hand, British 
whito-oollar workers in the late 1960»s began to shed their traditional 
reluctance to join a union, and professionals have also grown much more 
militant in pursuance of their interests. (Мог can it bo assumed that 
workers outside unions are there by choioe.) And the survey conducted 
under the auspices of the Donovan Commission (referred to a moment ago) 
found that not only workers but substantial sections of the management 
interviewed thought the union in their place of employment was con-
ducting itself reasonably (12). 
What is really very clear is that the vast majority of 
workers do not join unions for political ends, and do not use their 
unions for political ends. Throughout the history of British trade 
unionism (13) the accent has always been on local and economic 
objectives. National organisation and mobilisation has rarely been 
at all easy; and in many periods the trade unions have co-operated 
to a great extent with tho Government of the day. 
Recognition of this explains why members of unions can be 
favourably disposed to their own union, yet rarely if ever attend its 
branch meetingsj it is left to be a watchdog over their interests, in 
a form of division of labour. It also explains how large numbers of 
people can he found who will express agreement with the view that 
"something ought to be done about strikes" without its appearing to 
thorn to imply any particular curtailment of their own union1 s activity 
in their own interests. Industrial action in general is not seen as 
having any real connection with any local industrial action that 
they themselves might fool impelled to take. Given the empirical 
data on tho relative infrequency of strikes - the average manager 
being faced by ono not more than once in twenty years - the feeling 
that one's om ease is unique is all the more possible (14). Certainly 
the absence of interest in workers1 control (15) and the readiness to 
concede to management a specialist role in the organisation of tho 
firm, ore indications of the passivity of moot British workers. The 
national leadership of the unions has also been in almost every case 
either in the hands of "right-wing" officials, or of officials who 
did not match their militant words with militant actions. 
In effect then the attitudes of those who adhered to unions 
and of those who distantiated themselves from them have not boen all 
that for removed from each other in the majority of cases. What 
disagreement there has been has centred on local and economic issues, 
not national and political ones. It can be argued then that there is 
a core perspective on industrial relations in British society, in the 
negative sense at any rate that industrial relations are not seen by 
tho vast majority as a key area for the development of political power 
for workers. Conversely, industrial peace is very highly valued by 
virtually everyone in the sooiotys it is very rarely (if ever, for 
most of the participants) broken for its own sake. Sven tho twenty-
four hours* "shot-across-tho-bows" stoppage is generally designed to 
avoid a more protracted test of strength in the future. 
In fact, Pox's pluralistic model of industrial relations (16) 
is a more coherent version of a fairly familiar perspective, Hoggart's 
"Us" and "Them" (1?). The implications of this view for action are 
that although "Wo" don't wont to become "Them" or take over "Their" 
positions or oven use "Our" pov/er to alter the structure of tho rela-
tionship, "We" do have our proper sphere on which "They" should not 
encroach. If "They" do, they are likely to retire temporarily hurt. 
This orientation 1з again akin to that described by Gramsci as 
"economic-corporative" (oee eh» 7). There lo nothing in this very 
familiar perspective which denies the general merit of industrial 
peace, or whioh guarantees peace under all circumstances. But it is 
a posture of legitimate self-defence, not of aggressivo principled 
attack! it will bo rather more likely to respond to a decrease in 
security in the provision of wants, than to initiate a demand for 
more security in the provision of wants. 
Kedia content then, not existing in a cultural vacuum, is 
perceived in these oontoxts. Whatever the media say about raco 
relations and work relations is to a large extent bound to be under-
stood within the standard range of images, stereotypes, and prescriptive 
axioms offered by a culture which defines non-whites as something less 
than human, and industrial peade as a prime value. These values may 
naturally on occasion come into conflict with other values, such as 
"justice for all" or a man's duty to provide for his family. In such 
cases, there is naturally scope for the former values to be modified 
a little to accommodate the latter values (10). But the main focus of 
interest in this study's content analysis is the extent to whioh media 
material challenges those core cultural perspectives, especially given 
the fact that being already "established" only prolonged exposure to 
clearly dissonant material, well produced, would be likely to dent 
them at all. 
-ThQ Gxtent to which conflicts in these relations are 
threatening to the social order in Britain 
This leads directly to the remaining question for our present 
purposes, which is the implication of industrial conflict and racial 
conflict for British society as a whole. Bow far do conflicts in both 
relationships genuinely challenge the social cohesion and consensus 
of British society? In term3 of the role of the media in society, 
which has already been defined as essentially an integrative one, 
this question is extremely important. How do the media define these 
conflicts and how do they handle them - and what relation does their 
treatment of them bear to the realities of the situation? 
Certainly these conflicts appear to bito more deeply than 
any others into the consciousness of British people. There are many 
other continuing areas of conflict which figured largely in the mass 
media in 1970« the Israeli-Arab war, the situation in northern 
Ireland, the fighting in South East Asia, international Communism, 
crime and controversial ethical iscues such as abortion, drugs, 
homosexuality, non-marital sex. The first four however aro defined 
by the vast majority of the population as not particularly affecting 
them, as being more or less beyond their personal horizon. Crime is 
rather different, since the controversy really centres on what 
society*s practical response should be to it by way of detection and 
sanctions and rehabilitation of offenders, rather than on crime 
itself which is almost universally defined as undesirable. The 
ethical issues referred to are conflicts over private morality, and 
only occasionally veer toward conflict between definable groups 
(in this case, generations). 
The only remaining conflict which might stand comparison 
with industrial and racial conflict in British society is student 
unrest. This is perceived by most people in the UK as an amalgam of 
other issues: youth versus experience and age; disorder versus law* 
privileged inactivity versus hard work; deviance versus conformity; 
in many instances, communism versus the status quo; and perhaps also 
sexual freedom vcrouo sexual restraint. Although, the overloading 
of issues involved in student conflict explains the heat frequently 
engendered by the issue, it still does not "bite" to quite the same 
extent as industrial or racial conflict. 
For one thing, the rolo of student is inherently transitional, 
шгй io very much akin to tho transitional status of youth. For 
another, student unrest io relatively new to the UK, at least as a 
widespread phenomenon. Both these considerations probably imply to 
many people that student conflict may be a passing phase. Also, the 
isolation of students ал a group means they can be regarded as an 
annoying but manageable eruption. They have not yet succeeded in 
articulating and bringing to a head an important popular "discontent, 
like the students at Chinese universities in 1919. Student agitation 
is therefore still something relatively insulated from other social 
relations. 
This is not the case with industrial or racial conflict in 
the minds of most people in Britain (though sometimes for different 
reasons). Two national sample surveys in 1966 and 1970 found these 
two issues to bo the ones which respondents mentioned spontaneously 
most frequently as troubling or worrying them (19). They are also 
both political issues, in that all political parties have a policy 
on them because they perceive the need to do so. Indeed, theso two 
forms of conflict are probably more real to most people in the society 
than tho conflict between the parties (20). It still remains to be 
decided, however, whether сь* not this perception of these two confliots 
can bo considered objectively accurate. 
The presence of black minorities as a throat in itself to 
tho interests and culture of white people is argued popularly on the 
following grounds. Immigrants, if they are black, must be shown to 
be an economic proposition. If thoy impose strain on tho supply of 
housing, or of adequate education (viewed as an economic resource), 
they arc uneconomic. A similar argument applies to the social and 
medical services. Kot only are they a drain oh those services, but 
the competition they engender for those soarce resources will provoke 
undesirable racial violence. Another view is that the continuity of 
British culture may be threatened. Another still io that people of 
different races automatically clash with each other (the existence of 
racial conflict in many societies throughout tho world io cited as 
proof of this), so that merely tho presence of black poople or another 
racial group is argued to create irreconcilable strife. Lastly, it 
io also argued that the concentration of black minorities in the 
urban centres of the UK will give them enormous power in the future, 
quite out of proportion to their numbers or rightful significance. 
These views depend on tho following indefensible assumptions. 
Black poople must be defined in purely economic terms, and within 
those confines the economic terms must themselves bo confined to the 
need for housing and for education (treated as on economic resource)» 
The source of competition for scarce resources must not be defined as 
the political decioion(o) which have allowed the resources to be 
scarce, but must instead b.e the advent of black migrants (who are 
consequently responsible for tho hostility they engender). British 
culture must be do fined as having attained an unapproachable summit 
from which no movement could be thought necessary or desirable. 
Racial сиез must be thought to havo a social role independent of the 
structures of power, privilege and poverty they symbolise and represent* 
and a socially explosive rolo at that. And power exercised by black 
minorities must bo deemed necessarily threatening to the white stratum. 
As is obvious, economics and »folk1-sociology are being 
used in these arguments as thinly disguised tools for traditional 
racism. The definition of interests as purely economic, the exclusion 
from economic consideration of tho contribution made by black migrant 
labour end tax-payments, the exclusion of the political origins of 
inelastic resources, the ethnocontric perspective on British culture, 
and the vacuity of the remaining assumptions, all demonstrate the 
wild fallacies of this perspective. 
This is not to say however that Britain1 с black minorities 
do not present a challenge to the status quo. They do so in three 
ways. Firstly, their perspectives do not necessarily harmonise with 
British cultural perspectives. This applies especially to the racist 
elements in British culture, but also to other elements (which 
naturally vary with the original culture). To this extent, British 
society may pluralise its culture much more than at present. 
Secondly, there are indications already that tho presence 
of black minorities has highlighted a number of serious deficiencies 
in urban are аз that until the early 1960's were barely recognised at 
an official level. Very omall-scale approaches to remedy these 
deficiencies have begun to be made (the Urban Programme, the Educational 
Priority Area programme). Although much more would have to be done 
in order to eliminate these deficiencies, it is true to say that the 
arrival of black migrants has sparked off the attempt to do so. In 
both these cases it would generally be accepted that any throat posed 
by Britain's black minorities is of a vexy positive and fruitful kind. 
Thirdly, the wild fallacies in the racist perspective 
delineated above do not prevent it from exorting considerable sway 
over attitudes and social action in practice. The result could 
certainly bo that the black segment of British cociety will respond 
to continued poverty and hostility with physical counterviolence. 
Tho processes by which discontent and protest come to be expressed in 
this way are as yet but dimly understood by sociologists (21). It is 
at least clear however that the unlikelihood of a small minority 
achieving its objectives by such means does not inhibit its members 
from translating their frustration into violence. In other words, 
action of this ld.nd may 3till be engaged in, however unstratcgic or 
untactical it may bo. To this extent Britain's black minorities ere 
a threat to the stability and cohesion of British society - but they 
are only so to the extent that white racism ic allowed to prevail. 
The question of how far industrial conflict actually 
challenges the status quo is primarily an economic one, though there 
i s a politic-! dimension to it. The p o l i t i c a l aspect r e l a t e s of 
course to the me© of i n d u s t r i a l ac t ion m a weapon fo r political 
ea is , e i t h e r by e ceotion of tho labeur«»foroe or by a smaller group 
hrvrnossinf a larger prow9a discontents to a broader p o l i t i c a l aim. 
•\ltho\i,"h this p o l i t i c a l dimension is a popular these w i t h the e x t r e » 
J i - h i and tho extreme Left in British öoeiety t the actual evidence for 
i t i s orarpyisingty s l ights Even tho I f 2 6 General Strike» which on 
the face of it i s the » a r t e t approach in English history to the 
syndicalist vision, was in actuality motivated byrj i t ipi ly economic* 
i n d u s t r i a l concerns f o r tho vast majority of i t s murtieipento ( 22 ) . 
'.lie p o l i t i c a l challenge represented by industrial conflict has to 
date then been very week*. 
The economic m l - e f f e e i e of industrial conflict ere loss 
e a s i l y assessed« 'Olaina that industrial conflict йтв^ва British 
society centre on six assertions» first, that fronting mtre*domrmds 
produces or aecelorates inflation* Seconi, that loss of production 
thrrufh atril'GS leads to cancellation o f orders ш й loss of future 
trade both fir i nd iv idua l f irms i n the f i r s t tm%mm9 and c f a 
country's overseas customers and international export position i n 
the second instraicc. Third, that s t r i kes cost the firm considerable 
amounts of money i n l o s t production Fourth, that a firm may actually 
bo destroyed through loss of production or thro a. h impossible wago-
demonds backed by unrolenting industrial action. F i f t h , that strikes 
in particular iadmstries or plants are especially" йшшщ'3ixth, 
that tho authority of properly constituted ohannels of negot iat ion i s 
brought in to question. In Britain in tho late 196Cfo and early 1970's, 
thfeoe arguments were held to have quite especial potency, since a 
single economic sneeze Was thought capable of brir~ir.g the entire 
economic s t ructure and fatm*e crashing about the publ ic 1 s ears. The 
priority of national over sectional interest was tho donir.ant popular 
thene. 
In f a c t these claim hnvc a treble focusi the ri ;ht of the 
individual firm to stay in business* the needs of individual consumers* 
and - in the British context - the demands on Britain to export in 
order to live. The argument about inflation has two variants. One 
sees wage increases as forcing up the prices that firms charge for 
their products (cost inflation). Here, a large round of wage-increases 
could stimulate an inflationary spiral, where eventually prices rose 
to such an extent that further wage-demands would be generated, and 
British exports would eventually become uncompetitive in the inter-
national market. The other variant starts from a situation in which 
there is too much money chasing too few goods, consequently enabling 
higher and higher prices to be charged for those goods (demand 
inflation). If wage-increases are granted rapidly to match these 
price-increases, the situation returns to square one. In this second 
case, wages quickly following prices accelerate, rather than initiate, 
inflation (23). 
Both models are of course enormously over-simplified accounts 
of reality. They assume a passivity in employers* accession to wage-
demands and an aggressiveness in union pressure for wage-increases, 
which empirical study docs not boar out. There is also tho role of 
credit inflation and the expansion of the money supply to be taken 
into account in tho explanation of any one inflationary spiral, 
together with the possible role of international corporations (24). 
And the damage done by inflation to on economy's trading position 
internationally depends entirely on comparative rates of inflation 
among rival producers of the same products. The failure of firms to 
reinvest profits adequately in more productive technology is yot 
another factor to be taken into consideration. In general then, 
considerable caution is needed before any axiomatic verdicts on wage-
increases can be pronounced. 
The second and third assertions belong together. Firstly, 
the coot to the firm in loot production. If this io calculated in 
terms of the profits that would have been made on tho oxpccted 
quantity of production during the period of tho strike (or had all 
the labour-force been working at normal speeds throughout, to take 
alternative forms of industrial conflict), then it is a fallacy* 
What the firm does not pay out in wares (generally far the largest 
item in production-costs) during the strike has to he set against 
this estimated loss. Further, it cannot simply "bo assumed that the 
market demand for production continues unchanged - on the contrary, 
somo strikes have probably been provoked by managements during periods 
of low demand in order to economise on the wage bill (25). On the 
other hand, go-slow1 s and absenteeism at a period of high demand 
involve a probable diminution of production without any substantial 
reduction in the wage-bill. Cancellation of orders is not an automatic 
consequence of s trite-action? tho volume of production and trade can 
often be made up by increased production after a strike or by stock-
piling beforehand; and confidence in the ability of a firm, one 
industry or an ссопоцу to deliver orders on timo roots on a complex 
of factors, of which comparative strike-rates are one, and individual 
knowledge of preferable alternatives another. 
On tho (third) question, that of comparative strike-rates, 
it has recently been demonstrated that the actual incidence of strike-
action in Britain, as measured by any of the very imperfect indices 
that ore available, is not nearly so staggeringly high as is often 
popularly claimed. On most indices, the British strike-record has 
never been anywhere near DO high as it was in the period 1912-26. 
/aid tho statistics available for comparative incidence of strikes are 
made very difficult to utilise because of their varying definitions 
of a strike. In terms of the impact of strikes on Britain's inter-
national trading position, it is actually very hard to make any 
assessment at all beyond tho observation that by most criteria 
Britain's strike-record is better than that of most other industrial 
countries (26). 
It must al&o be borne in mind that the impact of strikes 
and industrial action in tho tertiary sector of the econoiqy is 
extremely hard to assess. In the public sector of tertiary industry, 
increased labour-cost3 aro generally passed on to the tax-payer; but 
sinco wages in this sector notoriously lag behind wages in other 
sectors, the impact cannot be very great. Industrial action in 
medical and social services would ccrtainly have a serious, though 
largely non-economic impact; such action in these sectors is however 
generally conspicuous by its rarity. 
Tho fourth consequence of industrial, action - the destruction 
of the firm - is rare, for reasons discussed earlier in this chapter. 
The strategic position of certain firms and industries in the есопощу, 
and the consequently heightened impact of any industrial action in 
them, is tho fifth assertion, and is undeniable. Seamen, dockers, 
steel-workers, transport workers, and workers in key components 
factories, are all instances of sectors of tho labour-force whose 
industrial action is likely to have much greater impact than average. 
This point io much more of a model for discussions of the genuine 
conflict and throat posed by industrial aotion: tho conventional 
generalisations are higlily misleading. 
The sixth and last assertion, concerning a tendency in 
British society toward industrial anarchy, is associated with some 
leading industrialists and politicians, but has received academic 
expression in an article published in I969 by and Flanders (27). 
They claim that the spreading development of ohopfloor bargaining in 
the UK is reducing the order so painfully constructed in British 
industrial relations over the decades, and is rendering the processes 
of industrial collective bargaining anomic (in tho Durkheimian sense). 
This io a description of a trend in British labour relations that has 
been present for some tine ("wage-drift")» although its full impact 
is only considered to have been experienced from ahout i960 onwards. 
It io an explanation of the increase in industrial disputes in tho IK 
sinco that time; but the explanation io only pitched at tho level of 
a disintegration of the established mcchanisms, not of the reason for 
that disintegration. Л general explanation might bo that of Goldthorpe 
cited earlier (28), that prevailing levels of inequality mcy reduce 
the legitimacy of appeals for restraint (29) I this might bo usefully 
combined with recognition of the general upsurge of price-inflation 
in western economies from the second part of the 60«s onwards (30). 
In terns of the threat posed by these disturbances to the 
social order in Britain, it is at leaot arguable that discontent is 
better allowed to surface than forced to smoulder underground; and 
that short-term conflict is more conducive to stability than an 
artificially induced lull. After all, the focus 00 far in this 
diocussion various forms of industrial conflict has been exclusively 
on how far it nay bo said to have mal-effects on the economy and 
oociety at large. This should in no way be taken to imply that indus-
trial conflict itself has no basis in the rial-effects of existing 
industrial arrangements on Industrial workers themselves. Price-
inflation, the nature of their work, their experience of managerial 
authority, aro all possible sources of realistic discontent that have 
already been noted. In other words, the emergence of conflict nay 
well be a atop forward for the people concerned in both the ehort 
torn and the long term. It may, even have tho positive effect of 
forcing management to organise production more efficiently. 
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Both industrial relations and raoo relations then have a 
strong aura of conflict about them - only some of which can be shown 
to have any necessary basis in reality. The reality is, that the 
prevalence of racism and the experience of economic inequality -
sometimes increasing with rapid price-inflation - are likely to 
provoke spontaneous outbursts of feeling among those affected. It 
is then these forces, -rather than the outbursts themselves, which 
px*i>nc l-pcil ly threaten disruption of the social order. The methods by 
which these major "conflict-areas" are processed by the English news 
media is therefore of considerable interest, for on that day-to-day 
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Chapter Four I I let hods of Content analysis 
4*1 ?he methods and presuppositions of content analysis 
Content analysis of the ünglish news media io the obvious 
first оtop if their presentation of work relations and race relations 
iß to be assessed. Content analysis itself is the subject of some 
dispute, hot/ever; so it is initially necessary to clarify the principles 
on which it rests. Л leading exponent of one approach to this method 
of research is Berelson (l), who is concerned with three main principles 
in content analysis. These were that the data should not be selectively 
analysed simply in order to demonstrate what was already believed* 
the analyst must leave open the possibility that his hypotheses will 
be refuted by an actual survey of the matorial. Secondly, the 
categories used for analysis oust be sufficiently clear and explicit 
for other trained social scientists to be able to apply them to the 
data mid arrive at comparable conclusions. Lastly, the analysis 
should also attempt maximum scientific objectivity through the 
quantification of its results, thus avoiding subjective impressions 
and oven opening the way to statistical handling of the data. 
Obviously the dominant concern here is to escape the charge 
of subjectivity. The more implicit a meaning, the more likely that 
people would overlook it in practice, and that the hypersensitive 
contcnt analyst would overestimate its true significance. An instance 
in this particular piece of research was the writer's initial impression 
that television interviewers and newscasters very frequently indicated 
their attitude to an item by means of a raised eyebrow, a glint of 
amusement in their eyes, pulling down the corners of their mouth, or 
their particular tone of voice. In the course of Actual research it 
was discovered that although this dees happen, it occurs not nearly 
30 frequently as first expected. 
However, in his desire to protect the content analyst end 
the technique of content analysis from criticism, Berelson completely 
overlooked certain fundamental aspects of communication that virtually 
any content analysis oust take into account (2). The most obvious is 
the impossibility of equating manifest content (Bereisen1s rather 
question-begging term) with the intention of communicators anü 
perception of recipients. This is not to say there is no content 
at all between these three "moments" in the communication-process, 
for obviously in a more or loss common symbolic universe communication 
can and does take place successfully! But to argue from "manifest 
Content" to audience effect without reference to tho perception of 
tho recipients of the communication has already been shown to be 
empirically unjustifiable (in chapter l). Boople often appropriate 
media material in accordance with their отаг already existing perspec-
tives, and may well "bend" a message to suit their preconceptions. 
A classical instance in the literature of media effects is the impact 
of a film intended to promote "democracy" as against "fascism". The 
intended message largely failed to register, because "fascism" was 
presented as dynamic and its protagonist aa personally attractive, 
whereas "democracy" scored low on both these counts (j). The actual 
argument, tho precise words, were of only secondary importance. 
This is not to say that whatever came across in mass commu-
nication would be irrelevant, because whatever happened everyone 
would go on thinking in exactly the same way. Such a conclusion 
omits the pressure of actual events both as dirootly experienced and 
as indirectly experienced through the mass media - mass communication 
being only a part of general human communication. What is undoubtedly 
the ease however is that if any predictions of audience-effoct are to 
be made from media content they must meet two important criteria. 
First, tho relevant audience*0 already existing perspectives 
on the matter(s) in hand must be known. \,hore tho relevant audience 
(say the British public) is so large that there are likely to be 
differing pcrspeotives, their distribution should be known. In other 
words, cultural or subcultural orientations to the subject-matter 
must first be studied and charted, at least to some extent, if any 
prediction is to be made from content to effect. The bettor tho 
charting, probably the more accurate also will be the prediction. 
Second, the further removed the message ±e from market 
research and advertising presuppositions, the more essential it is 
to take into account the overall social structure within which 
communication oocurs. The point about market research and advertising 
is not a blind side-swipe, but an acknowledgment of tho way the very 
limited sphere of product-marketing has influenced thinking on the 
content-audience relationship in a highly oversimplified manner. 
If the message communicated is not about ice-cream or beer or tooth-
paste, but is about a vastly more complex matter (such as work 
relations or race relations), then the opportunity for insulating 
tho message from all kinds of other influences has gone, inspiration -
ice-cream, thirst - beer, pure breath - lots of sex, are reasonably 
prociso stimuli not requiring involved decisions about appropriate 
responses. In the sphere of race relations on tho other hand, not 
only what recipients already think about race but the numerous inter-
connections between race and other aspects of their lives are involved. 
The question of role-structures raised toward the end of chapter 1, 
is dearly fundamental to this discussion; yet as noted there, such 
considerations are usually conspicuous by their аЬзепое. 
The example of the propaganda film quoted above is an instance 
of other variables being involved with what was thought of as a single, 
direct message. Another instance is the advertising context of media 
content on commercial television. This varies in importance according 
to the advertising regulations of the country concerned. It may be 
thought to have a greater impact in the US where breaks for advertising 
are more frequent and where non-commercial television barely exists, 
than in the UK. And in general, modia content not directly related 
to any topic can nonetheless have powerful implications for it. In 
an analysis of American magazine fiction, it was found that numerous 
stereotypes concerning non-WASP's were supported by this branch of 
American mass communication (4). The analysis of a film intended to 
combat racial prejudice found that the film's failure lay quite simply 
in the fact that it communicated only within tho confinos of en 
operationally racist society (5)* 
All this only oorvos to underline tho conclusions on tho 
eocial rolo of the naoo mdia in chapter 1. The media do not 
normally challengo existing oocial institutions or symbolic universeo, 
at loaot systematical!^ ! end evon if thoy should, the chcncoo are that 
the predispositions of the audience, both first- and second-stage, 
will drew their sting. Inevitably though, Bereloon'o approach is 
thrown into question by this. Hi® desire for scientific objectivity 
led hin to overlook tho many possibilities in tho transmission of 
"manifest content". Mot only his equation of "manifest content" with 
audience effect io questionable* M s methods by which objectivity is 
to be assured are also rather doubtful. 
For Instance, the establishment of well-defined, oategoriee 
for contcnt analysis la in practice veiy often on the lines of 
"Favourable-neutral-unfavourable". Tho tores aro clear enough| but 
just how m item ie to be assessed in this way with the audience In 
Д1*Ц iß not really diocuscod. Furthorf the real significance that cor. 
be attached to any statistical manipulation of data sorted en such en 
uncortain basis ie extremely uncloar. Tho whole question of quantifi-
cation in content analysis needs to be handled very carefully. If tho 
intention is simply to avoid casual and fleeting inprtcciono, by 
establishing the actual distribution of a particular unit of analysis, 
then quantification can be useful» It can establieh a profile or 
contours of certain units or features of communications. It can also 
summaries in assimilable form what would otherwise be a vast mass of data« 
Ы thoroughly mistaken, however, io to treat quantifi-
cation as though it imparted additional ocicntifie validity to the 
technique of contcnt analysis. Certainly if tho categories, however 
neat, boar no relation to tha actual proceoscs of coo::.unication, any 
conversion of thorn into numerical form io simply en exercise in 
mystification. An example from this research night be to count the 
number of tinoa all the causes of racial conflict were mentioned in 
a Tl current affairs item, as though £roquenoy of mention in pno item 
meant that the audience would automatically take one cause того 
seriously because it was more frequently mentioned. Without reference 
to the nature of the discussion, which speaker identifies with whioh 
viewpoint, who the speakers are, and no doubt Other variables as well, 
ouch a conclusion would bo unjustified. Hypothetically, the discussion 
might centre on a subsidiary cause after general agreement аз to tho 
major cause; or on impressive and respected public figure might identity 
with a particular cause, thus outweighing several attempts by an 
unimpressive "unknown" to draw attention to another cause. All this 
io without regard to the already existing perspective of the audience 
on tho subject under discussion? and also without regard to the improb-
ability of causes being analysed in news media output, аз the succeeding 
analysis in chapters 5 and 6 makes plain. 
The nearest Berelson comes to admitting this problem io when 
he accepts that quantification should not be performed if the material 
is "impossibly irregular" | but far from being a deviant situation this 
"impossible irregularity" is quite usual, just as the dividing line 
between manifest and latent content is impossible to establish by any 
criteria that Berelson offers. 
4*Ü Content analysis and the cultural context of communication 
The implicationo of these methodological considerations for 
content analysis of national news media items on race relations and 
work relations, are various. First, it has to he recognised that a 
particular content С may in fact end up in the audience as Ca, СЪ, Co, 
Cd Cn. In practice of course, a vciy few of these views will be 
distributed throughout tho vast majority of the population, with the 
remainder to be found only in a tiny minority. 
An instance v/ould bo the subject of strikes. It may for the 
moment be posited that A^ of the population is against all strikes; 
that is against all strikes by people in service occupations 
(police, teachers, nurses), and that broadly tolerates all strikes. 
No doubt there are also small percentages of the population who inter-
pret strikes аз one and all steps on the road to proletarian conscious-
ness, or who only sympathise with a striko which promises to better 
their own lot. A news item about a strike therefore will possess 
content Ca, Cb, Cc for most of the population, and Cd....Cn for the 
remaining minority. 
However, as already implied in the disoussion at the 
beginning of this chapter, it is possible to go further than simply 
positing a general "usos-and-gratifioations" model for content 
analysis. For given a set of cultural norms and values which are 
very dominant in tho society as a whole (soy the general undesirability 
of strikes) and given certain stereotypes (say that workers and/or 
unions initiate strikes), only a very sustained and carefully argumentod strike 
and documented presentation of any give^/is likely to challenge these 
values and norms. Therefore even for those who for one reason or 
another do not cling wholeheartedly to the dominant values and norms, 
there is every encouragement not to veer too sharply away from them. 
There is an obvious world' of difference between broadly tolerating 
strikes and actively supporting the». Only for those with a clearly 
articulated and divergent definition of social reality (intellectuals, 
radicals) are dominant norms and values definitely unappealing. 
Pluralism has its bounds. 
An important illustration of this hegemony of dominant norms 
is provided by the background to the "blaok-ia-beautiful" movement in 
the U3. Media material in the US till very recently never expressed 
this value, with the result that it was possible for beauty norms and 
values of the white majority to go unchallenged and even to be required 
of fashion-conscious American blacks. Widespread advertisements for 
skin-lighteners and hair-straightener3 produced enormous sales in the 
black American market. It has required an enormous drive to encourage 
a minority stratum to reject those definitions, values: and norms whioh 
its members more than anyone else could recognise downgraded themselves» 
As discussed further in chapters 1, 3 and 7» the existence of varying 
perspectives in a society as a whole does not mean either that members 
of the society are unaware of the other perspectives existing in the 
society or that if there is a dominant view they will not bo likely to 
stay within hailing distance of it (6). The need for the "black-is-
beautiful" movement in the US is a tribute to the penetrative power of 
dominant values; and its relative success, to the hierarchy of 
elasticity of those values. 
The charting of the dominanoe and tenacity of definitions* 
values and norms in British society is a daunting task, both in soope 
and methodology. For tho purposes of thi3 investigation only those 
definitions relating most closely to race relations and work relations 
that have already been researched and presented in the sociological 
literature will be utilised. The previous chapter has outlined the 
main findings of this research} in the analysis of the impact of the 
content on news media consumers, those findings will be taken to be 
as accurate a picture аз is currently attainable of contemporary sooial 
definitions. The content will be "read" in terms of its most likely 
form of integration into those dominant definitions, or if appropriate 
in terms of the degree to which it challenges them. 
4* iü Content analysis in this research study 
The remainder of this chapter v/ill detail the particular 
units and methods of content analysis employed in this research. 
The year chosen was 1970. Hews media and items were chosen 
out of total media output because they related most directly to work 
relations and race relations, particularly the former. Undoubtedly 
entertainment media are also very important, especially for race 
relations I many magazines and broadcast entertainment have a racial 
bias which is all the more important for being implicit in material 
whioh people consume with their "guard down". As tho argument in 
chapter 1 showed, there is no tidy division between entertainment and 
news when it comes to forming people's map of the world. But news 
items are the point at which the media most consciously and system-
atically present social events and sooial reality. 
The news media chosen for 1970 were selected for having the 
widest possible coverage (except in one case). This meant television 
and the press. Under the television heading, all the major news 
programmes (BBC It 8.50 p.m. ilewsi BBC 2i iiewsroom: ITH: Hews at Ten) 
from Konday to Friday wore watched, as were all relevant current 
affairs and documentary programmes (24- Hours. Panorama. World in Action). 
Tuesday's Documentary(BBC). Late Iliaht Documentary (ITV, Tuesdays), 
lion Alive. The Money Ideogramme. This Week). As regards the Jfcess, the 
newspapers were tho Daily I.ürror. the Daily Kxpress. and tho Daily 
Telegraph. 
Random sampling of discrete units was naturally attractive 
in order to reduce this vast mass of material. However, tho difficulty 
in using random sampling in this way was that both industrial relations 
and race relations tend to appear and disappear in the news. If the 
lovol of explanation of any particular episode was to be cm important 
consideration (see below), random sampling could easily load to false 
conclusions through arbitrarily ceasing or starting to analyse a 
particular item part-way through its media-life. 
Reluctantly, It was decided to analyse the entire output. 
An additional and fundamental advantage of doing so however was that 
it now became possible to measure tho frequency of incidence of certain 
features of reporting on both issues. This in its tum meant that 
some index of cumulative effect on thoso exposed to the media could be 
lOTOthosised from tho measured incidence of media habits of presenting 
items on race and industry. Admittedly a looso index, but still an 
index; especially if 1970 itself is taken as a random year. 
naturally, not every TV" programme among those listed could 
actually be watched. Clashes between programmes (Panorama and World 
Ml Action always clashed), together with human frailty, made this 
inevitable. The proportion of programmes missed is noted in chapters 
5 and 6. The method of analysing television material was to take very 
rough notes on tho visual content while running a tape recorder. After 
tho programme, the spoken content of tho programme would be analysed 
from the tape. 
In order to record items systematically, standard data-sheets 
were drawn up. So far as possible these sheets were made identical 
for JTODS and TV" analysis, the differences being confined to indicee 
of salience. It is important to state from the outset that the 
questions asked, although very general, were not designed to find a 
place for every single statement or action in the media content. On 
the other hand, due to the pressures of actual analysis, the tendency 
was to include as much as possible of the item simply because fine 
decisions about what might be seen to be relevant at a later date when 
the pressure was diminished^  could not be made satisfactorily. It 
would bear no relation to the actual analysis to suggest that the 
researcher only used material which confirmed any hypotheses ho had in 
mind. This will be ofrvious when the actual form of the questions is 
presented in a moment. 
The indices of salience mentioned a moment ago are important 
in assessing as precisely as possible cumulative effect. It would 
obviously be unwise to take every item, however minute, as having the 
same"weight" as every other item. Therefore in TV, the length of 
tho item was recorded, and in a news bullotin, whether it was the 
first item. For the ITess, salience was taken as whether the item 
was on the outside or inside pages, and its size (greater or less 
than five column-inches). 
The main area of the data-sheet was given over to a number 
of standard and fairly general questions. These questions concerned (l) 
the level of explanation offered for the events reported or discussed! 
(2) the image presented of the event(s) or people concerned; (3) issues 
related to "balance". Clearly all three headings are the major con-
stituents of the map that the media draw for the British public. The 
questions in every case were framed as open-endedly as possible, in 
order to leave scope for further analysis of the data once colleoted* 
Questions on the level of explanation offered were simply on 
tho causes mentioned for the event in question (if any), and the impli-
cations mentioned (if any). What kinds of explanations, what depth of 
explanation, what adequacy of explanation, are available for the modia 
public for happenings in race relations and work relations? It haa 
already been seen (in chapter 2) that any industrial dispute ie likely 
to have a complex of macro-factors behind it, as well as the particular 
grievance which touched it off. Race relations situations are often 
charged with such emotion because they are "overdetermined" (7). How 
far are these two conflict-areas genuinely explained; or conversely, 
how far are they only semi-comprehensible? 
A sub-question on the level of explanation recorded by whom 
any particular cause or implication was mentioned. As already noted, 
the opinions of some people carry more weight than others, or are more 
easily discounted. Also, it may be that in any given item the proponents 
of one perspective receive a very disproportionate amount of attention. 
The sub-question is one way of checking on this. 
As regards the image presented of the events or people con-
cerned in a particular work relations or race relations situation, 
there wore sovon aspects of this that the data-sheet attempted to tap. 
This is not to зеу, of course, that tho level of explanation offered, 
end by whom, is not closely related to the image question. But 
inevitably, the question of image is much more blurred, less easy to 
verify, than the adequacy of a particular kind of explanation. 
The first of these seven aspects was what the participants 
were presented as doing at that time. The italicised words aro 
important, for there wa3 no attempt to азоезз the Implications of what 
they were doing. Aro, say, students expressing opposition to apartheid 
presented as struggling with serried ranks of policemen, or explaining 
in a sustained way the reasons for their opposition to it? Law and 
order J or moral repugnance? This question was more important for press 
analysis than for TV analysis, where it largely overlapped with a later 
one on the visual content of the item. 
The next question concerned the extent to which, and the ways 
in which, participants in the event in question were internally differ-
entiated. Very often one "side11 in a conflict is actually a coalition 
of interests, and the fact that it is so becomes important at a particular 
stage in the development of the conflict. How far was this factor ever 
given attention; and how far was the particular divido between moderate 
and militant highlighted? In many cases this related back to the 
questions about the level of explanation, in that disputes and disturb-
ances are often attributed in whole or in part to a militant minority. 
Also, a particular "wing" of a particular "side" is sometimes presented 
as dangerous or ludicrous. How often, and to whom, did this apply? 
The next question concerned the extent to which any particular 
stereotype (of blocks, of whites, of industrial relations) could be 
reinforced or attached, verbally or implicitly, by an item or a part 
of an item. Once again, a particular kind of explanation would 
naturally play a part in this reinforcement or attack. This question 
is strongly related to the argument earlier in this chapter that not 
only does media content not exist in a vacuum, but that also there is 
a reasonable amount of knowledge about the context in which it doe3 
operate and within which it is understood. If then the only material 
about Afro-Aoion countries relates to violent riots and coups-dfetat, 
tliis powerfully roinforcos the white stereotype that black poople 
cannot manage thoir own affairs (to take but one example). 
A closely related question recorded whether any particular 
prescriptive axiom would \bo reinforced or attacked, verbally or 
implicitly, by an item or part of an item. Axioms of this kind go 
hand in hand with stereotypes! if strikes are ruining the country, 
then for many it follows that legal curbs should be placed on strikers. 
Cognitive and normative dimensions, as noted in chapter 1, feed each 
other. In this question, as in the previous two, a sub-question 
relating to the source of any particular statement was added. 
Specific instances of white stereotypes concerning whites 
and blacks are as follows« blacks have low intelligence, poor hygiene, 
greater sexuality, ore more troublesome, are competitors for scarce 
resources, ore overcrowding the country, live crammed together by choice, 
are unable to run their own affairs in tholr own countries, cause 
violent civil strife, dosire and prepare to dominate whites. Whites 
are patient, tolerant, did much unsolicited and unthanked good in 
imperial days, are still really necessary to blacks to show them correct 
lines of behaviour, have numerous justifiable grievances in housing, 
employment, education and othor areas against blacks, and are wise to 
be aftaid for thoir future in a society with a black minority. Instances 
of the stereotypes concerning strikes and industrial relations are as 
followss strikes are initiated by workers and/or unions, whose motivation 
is greed, who have no responsibility to the society ao a whole, who 
endanger the country's economy, and make it impossible for firms to 
manage. Britain is also thought to be peculiarly plagued by them. 
The kind of prescriptive axioms that exist in the field of 
race include i immigration should be stopped, immigrants and blacks 
ought to conform to British mores, tolerance and commonsonse trill 
solve everything, blacks should be sent homo, should bo the lost on 
every list. In tho field of industrial relations they include* 
unofficial strikes should bo curbed, the unions should be hampered, 
wage-rises ought to bo kept to a sensible minimum, management muot 
have proper freedom. 
Another question relating to the image presented is directed 
at the overall impression of the event, unrelated to the particular 
topic. Io the overall impression one of conflict/threat/complaint/ 
probleVpositivo/good news/other? This question io derived from the 
frequent observation that only bad news is news, and is especially 
important in determining how far certain areas of social life such as 
work relations and race relations are commonly conceived of only as 
nuisances. The question is only related to the manner of presentation 
of the item* thus a ballot to end a strike might be greeted with 
enthusiasm by management and media, but with rather less enthusiasm 
by substantial sections of the labour-force involved. It is how the 
media present it that determines it3 assessment here. 
The sixth aspect of the image presented is tapped by the 
question; who speaks or is quoted on the issue, and in what role? 
The question integrates with five out of the seven questions already 
asked, where the source of any explanation was always recorded. It 
has also a secondary purpose, which was to ask how often black people 
are asked to comment on any issue that concerns them, and how often 
strikers are given opportunity to explain their view of tho situation. 
It was hypothesised that particularly in the case of blacks, others 
would speak for them. 
The final aspect of the image presented was noted by a 
question whioh recorded whether support or condemnation was forthcoming 
from any source not directly engaged in the event. This again would 
be an important factor in "mapping" the event. 
The remaining questions, relating to "balance", arose from 
a threefold interest in the practical implications of the ethic of 
balance in пеш-presentation end discussion. First, the obvious 
question аз to how far it is actually maintained, consciously or 
unconsciously (8). 
The second eroa of interest was how for the ethic of 
presenting news impartially and the definition of newsworthiness 
combine to allow the media to be exploited by a particular propagandist* 
In the US a classical instance of the manipulation of the media in just 
this way was Senator Joseph McCarthy. Once LfcCarthy had established 
himself as a newsmaker, he was able to изе this ethic to convey effort-
leaoly what ho wanted at any stage of his campaign (9). Was there 
any evidence of the media being used in this way in England in relation 
to work relations or race relations? 
The third area of interest in the neutrality ethic is its 
implication for the maintenance of consensus, partucularly when 
conflict is involved. Does the fact that tho TV interviewer to a 
large extent, and the newspaper journalist to a lesser extent, 3tands 
in the middle between opposing viewpoints imply that the cenfliot, any 
conflict, is between two extremes! and that consequently the interviewer 
standing in the middle represents "the sane community"? Does the insti-
tutionalioation of neutrality in this way imply that negotiation and 
compromise aro of the essence of conflict, almost more than truth 
versus untruth (10)? 
It became clear in practice that content analysis of the 
Егезз absorbed ihr more time than content analysis of television. The 
number of words in a leading story, even in the Ilirror. would correspond 
to a very substantial tract of air time; also, the sample of the Press 
output was a lOO/o one. In order to reduce the volume of content 
analysis, both in terms of collection and presentation, the following 
method was utilised. It was simply to concentrate on the analysis of 
editorials, and headlines (which are reproduced in the appendix to this 
chapter, in capitals for outside page items, and in lower case for 
inside page items). 
The rationale behind the adoption of this method is that 
there exists evidence that the headline haa considerable influence on 
the way readers interpret the story underneath it (ll); and also that 
it may consequently have a greater impact on tho memory. Many readers, 
too, may often skim news headlines end then concentrate on the sports 
pages. As regards editorials, there is also evidence that newsmen 
road their own paper's editorials carefully as one means of discovering 
the editorial policy on issues (12). Subsequently, they are able to 
write their stories not only in the house-style, but in conformity 
with the newspaper's outlook. In tho case of the türror and Express, 
it io generally recognised, over and above what has been said, that 
sub-editing plays a very vital role in their production; and in the 
case of the Telegraph, it is generally recognised to be a tightly 
controlled newspaper internally. Certainly there are some feature-
writers for oaoh paper who are allowed to deviate from editorial norms, 
but who are а1зо less likely to be scanned than the main stories. With 
these three papers therefore, it is reasonable to predict that although 
many readers may not read the editorials, the output will be presented 
in considerable conformity to the editorial line, and that headlines 
will also bo written accordingly (with a consequent impact on the 
overall impression of the news information related underneath them). 
The sampling method for the Press was therefore a three-stage one: 
first, a period out of the 1970 output (constituting the frame) was 
randomly selected} second, a lOCfi sample was drawn from the three 
dailies I third, a 10Cf/o sample of editorials and headlines was analysed« 
The last otago might be described, in line with the classification of 
metaphors, as synecdoche sampling. 
Tho last range of operational decisions which have to be made 
clear concorn what was, and what was not, included under the heading 
of race relations and industrial relations for the purposes of this 
study. Under the heading of industrial relations: anything to do 
with trade unions; industrial disputes; the Government, CBI or TUC, 
insofar as thoy played any role in industrial relations; productivity-
deals, wage-demands and wage-negotiations, incomes policy, the Prices 
and Incomes Board, wages as a factor in inflation; workers' partici-
pation, profit-sharing, control; redundancy, unemployment, new 
industry in depressed areas. Excluded wore agricultural workers, the 
armed forces, students, and others in non-industrial roles. 
Under the heading of race relations i immigration, repatri-
ation, minority rights, Ыаскз in the educational process, housing, 
employment, health and hygiene, fertility, tho police, racc relations 
legislation, the various statutory and voluntary bodies in the race 
relations "industry"; tho National Front and similar organisations; 
tho policios of parties and central and local government; southern 
Africa, Britain«s relations with black countries, tho political and 
economic affairs of black countries, their relations with South 
Africa, racial strata in any part of the world. Excluded ore blacks 
presented as doing something normal, though a count was kept; natural 
disasters involving black poople; relations with Communist China and 
the South East Asian war, both because of tho complicating factor of 
communism; and the Israeli-Arab war. 
Some of these lost exceptions may seem odd, since there are 
aspects of tho Vietnam war (at ^ east in the attitudes of US troops to 
Yiotname3e of any political complexion) which ore clearly racist; and 
in the Israeli-Arab war, for some the Arabs ore Hitler's successors, 
while for others the Jews of Israel are building a state founded on 
racial exclusiveneso. (For others again, they both are Semitic, so 
their division is irrelevant.) There io considerable logic in tho 
view that the failure to dopict these situations as racist by the media 
io part of the map they draw of the world. This research nevertheless 
uses deliberately an absolutely minimal definition of race relations, 
3ince it i3 concerned with the way that situations considered by the 
British public as unambiguously racial are presented to it by the media. 
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Chapter Five: The coverage of industrial relations 
Out of the mass of material collected on industrial relations 
during 1970, the national docks strike was selected as evidence of the 
treatment of work relations in the main British news media. Ideally, 
two or three such disputes would have been selected for analysis; but 
to do so would have necessitated ал extremely lengthy presentation. 
One of the hazards intrinsic to qualitative content analysis is that 
in order to carry conviction substantial quantities of the original 
data need to be cited; for even if Berelson's solutions to the problem 
of subjective interpretation are unsatisfactory, the problem still 
remains. One way out might have boen to seleot certain days or weeks 
at random; but аз indicated in the previous chapter, the difficulty with 
this approach is the way it fails to account for the continued present-
ation of a particular media stoxy over time. Since this research is 
particularly concerned with the depth of explanation and the kind of 
explanation in news output, only analysis of continuous coverage will 
suffice. -
Before commencing this analysis, some outline of the back-
ground to the 1970 docks strike and of its main sequence of events is 
necessary (l). The background has a number of components, whioh vary 
with the perspectives of the major participants and protagonists. From 
the employers1 perspective, the amount of time and labour needed to 
unload and reload a ship was the key to profitability; labour intensive 
production and restrictive practices were therefore their principal 
target for change. More generally, they were anxious about the degree 
of wage-inflation over the previous 12 months. From the dock employee 
perspective, the components numbered the history of casual employment, 
fluctuating and uncertain earnings, tho increase in redundancy, the 
absence of successful representation of their interests by the Transport 
and General Workerз1 Union, and - conversely to the employers - the 
development of price-inflation. From tho government's perspective, 
docks disputes were perpetually contributing to difficulties in 
Britain's export position; from this concern stemmed tho 1965 Devlin 
Report (2) which recommended the end of casual employment (Phase l), 
and the negotiation of productivity bargains to end restrictive 
practices (Phase 2). 
The perspectives of tho employers, and of tho government, 
are reasonably straightforward; tho perspectiv® of the employees require 
a l i t t l e further elaboration. Casual employment ($) had been a feature 
of dockwork for well over a hundred years. It meant that even in 1965 
the groat majority of dockers had to present themselves for hiring twice 
a day, morning and afternoon, generally in gangs. Thiö bred immediate 
insecurity, and also a longer term insecurity based on age, sinco the 
older dockers wcro progressively 1езз likely to be hired. Although 
tliiо system was abolished in 1966, tho attitudes i t had generated 
toward the employers were unlikely to evaporate overnight; especially 
since o f f i c i a l and unofficial reports condemning the system had come 
and gono oinco the Victorian era without the employers apparently 
tailing any notice. 
The disappearance of militancy among dockers was rendered 
even less likely by the other components in the dispute, which continued 
as strongly in evidonce as ever after decasualisation. Tho fluctuating 
and uncertain earnings (4) wcro due to a very low basic rate, which on 
dead days meant very poor earnings (amounting to just over £11.00 per 
wo ok); and also to an enormously complicated payments system. Hccowork 
was calculatcd on tho basis of tho particular cargo, together with its 
weight and type of рас leaging; on weather delays; on delays through 
mechanical failure; on overtime; on the particular firm; and on the 
particular gang (fast gangs earned noro)• Several hundred rates wore 
generated in this way; and it is significant that in practically every 
strike occurring between decasualisation and the national strike in tho 
Port of London Authority area, piecework was tho central issue (5). 
The third component was the progressive loss of jobs; 
restrictive practices, aimed at sharing the workload more evenly in 
the face of these endemic fluctuations, had an additional effect of 
employing more labour than operationally necessary. Part of the 
productivity bargains involved redundancy payments for older dockers; 
but the development of capital-intensivo cargo-handling in tho form of 
container! о at ion also made for a dramatic decline in the need for labour. 
Certain employers went further still, and deliberately contravened the 
letter of tho productivity agreements by employing unregistered labour 
at much lower rates to handle cargo away from the quayside, a development 
made feasible by containerisation. This too had an obvious effect on 
the declining demand for labour. Between 1967 and 1969 there was a 25$ 
decline in tho number of registered dock workers (6). 
Insecurity, therefore, was only partially tackled by decasual-
ising the labour force; and as noted in chapter 2 section ii, tho most 
fundamental component of work is the secure provision of wants. This 
insecurity was alleviated to no appreciable extent by the main union, 
tho Transport and General Workers1 Union, whose totally inadequate 
performance in tho docks (7) created tho vacuum to which the militant 
national Association of Stevedores and Bookers was one response. 
During the three years preceding tho strike, negotiations on 
Phase 2 productivity bargains had been continuing slowly, but by 1970 
were within sight of conclusion, (in the period of the strike, these 
agreements were collectively referred to as "modernisation.")* However, 
repeated attempts by the union during the same period to raise the low 
national basio rate had met with repeated rebuffs. By spring 1970, it 
became apparent that the employers• original hope that these latter 
negotiations might be rendered obsolete by the achievement of agreement 
on the former ones, was not destined to be realised. Given the lack 
of speed in the productivity negotiations,, the employers1 intention 
boomeranged, for a number of dockers realised that they could use 
frustration at the delay to bid up the price of the productivity bar-
gains: if the basic rate were raised at once, then the price of the 
new bargains would in turn have to bo raised in order to make it worth-
while for the dockers to drop their restrictive practices. Raising 
the basic rate would also benefit the 7000 dockers in the smaller 
ports who wore not involved in, and who would not benefit by, tho 
productivity agreements» 
From the employers1 perspective, this bidding-up made tho 
price of the productivity agreements much less attractive. It would 
also have had a rapid impact on wage-demends in a range of associated 
industrial sectors, including 50,000 ports ancillary workers, which 
made it unattractive to the new government which was bent on curbing 
wage-inflation, and doubly unattractive to tho employers. Explicit 
disavowals by the unions of any intention to push up piece-rates as 
well was not therefore received with any warmth by the employers; 
indeed the latter accused them of secretly planning to apply pressure 
to picce-ratc3 immediately following any upward settlement. 
In immediate terms, the ball was set rolling by a unanimous 
vote by the dockers' delegate conference toward the end of June for two 
weeks* striko notice to bo given the employers. Shortly before this 
period expired, the employers offered tho unions £20.00 guaranteed wage 
rather than tho £20.00 basic wage that had been demanded, together with 
an extra pound on the productivity agreement once it was in force. The 
two officials of tho Kransport and General 'workers1 Union most involved, 
its general secretary Jack Jones, and its ports officer Tim O'Lcary, 
endeavoured to call the strike off by recalling tho delegate conference 
to vote on tho offer. Their attempt was defeated by a massive show of 
feeling in the potts, and subsequently by the delegate conference vote. 
The Government then suggested an arbitration panel, but this was 
rejected by the unions and dockers on tho ground that its findings 
would bind thorn. Thon a court enquiry was set up headed by Lord Pearson, 
a high court judge. The employers, whose spokesman was Гг. Bill Tonge, 
chairman of the Kational Association of Port Employers, refused to 
negotiate in any way during the strike. A State of Emergency was 
declared by the government. Tho question of rising prices was very 
much to the fore, with the Government repeatedly threatening tho use 
of troops to shift perishable cargoes. The union leadership handed 
tho onus for decisions on moving perishables back to tho local 
leadership in the various ports. The court concluded, and both 
sides accepted its verdict and award. 
(i) The tolevision news coverage 
'The sample of news bulletin items from the three longest 
programmes on the three channolo (newsroom BBC2, Hews at 9 p.m. BBC1, 
Hows At Ten mi) amounted to 70,; of their weekday output from the 
24th June to the 3rd August. This sample was not randomly drami, but 
is sufficiently large for this not to be of any significance (since 
no statistical computation will be based on it). 
..'ithin this sample, coverage of the dock strike amounted to 
17/- of total output on each BBC bulletin, and on Hews At Ten; a 
total of J hours 58 minutes. The percentages aro of course arithmetic 
moans, with some bulletins devoting over 5O/S of their output to the 
strike, and others far less. Nevertheless, this very substantial 
allocation of air time does mean that the rather crude criticism 
sometimes levelled against television news, that it trivialiscs 
events by skating too rapidly over them, cannot be uphold in this 
case. 
What does emerge from on analysis of the presentation however, 
is the extraordinarily low incidence of explanation of the strike. It 
would be no exaggeration to say that beyond the recognition that the 
dockers had initiated the strike, and caused it in that sense, the 
television audience was most often left to imagine the causes of tho 
strike for themselves. As Table 5*i shows, only 16 causes were ever 
mentioned. The last five of these can barely be called •causes': a 
strike does not begin solely because of a unanimous vote for two weeks' 
strike notice, nor does it start on the grounds that it is not affoctcd 
by the (recent) election of a Conservative Government! Of tho remaining 
explanations, a few того represent the dockers' ease than tho employers' f 
but since the employers' case rested very heavily on what they claimed 
to be the implications of conceding the wage,dämö£id, their position was 
given very full coverage under the heading of Implications (sec below). 
Also, three quite important elements in the explanation (the danger 
of tho work, the already raised productivity, the mortgage-problem) 
wcro on Newsroom (21.7*70) which was of course the least watched of 
tho threo bulletins. Even though this was not a 100/a sample, there 
were nevertheless many bulletins within the sample which offered no 
explanation for the strike at all. This does mean the British public 
was given only the thinnest and moot occasional account of why this 
particular wage-demand was leading to this particular form of confront-
ation. Had thore even been a heavy concentration of explanation toward 
the beginning of the strike, this could have been talien for granted or 
alluded to later. Suoh was not the case. 
The effects of the strike, as noted by new3 bulletins, can 
moot conveniently bo divided into (a) impact on the domestic economy? 
(b) impact on the consuming public; (c) impact on particular interests! 
(d) employers1 view3 on tho financial implications they would face if 
they accepted the dockers* claim; (e) responses to tho strike, in terms 
of breaches in it; (f) tho response of tho State to the crisis. A 
glance at the contents of tables 5.ii a - f shows the huge dispropor-
tion between the attention given on news bulletins to effects, and the 
attention given to causesI Since cloarly the strike was having the 
most far-reaching effects, the vacuum in explanation of why the dock 
workorö had decided to be so disruptive could only be filled by ad hoc 
explanations in the viewing public !s mind. These explanations would 
bo moot likoly to bo of the kind already present in the culture of the 
socioty (8), and reiterated in much of the Press, аз the third section 
of thio chapter shows. Interpretations along the lines of selfish and 
mindless militancy wore enabled, though not compelled, by the аЬзопсе 
of any explanation in broadcast news. 
The vast majority of the effects of the strike that were 
mentioned were negative, either in the direct sense that they could 
cloörly bo seen to affect somebody or some interost adversely, 
or in tho indirect sense that they seemed genorolly undesirable. 
Apples or Ъшшпаз rotting in some ship's hold might not be visualised 
very easily as something one would necessarily have eaten oneself, 
but thero could be no doubt that to have them rotting was in general 
undesirable and wasteful. Insofar as the reasons for their rotting 
(once again) were only occasionally presented, undesirable consequences 
could be seen to flow from uncomprehended causes. Uncomprehended, not 
in general terms that people strike for more money, but to the extent 
that this particular sot of demands was not understood, and not able 
to be understood, from the media of тазз communication in broadcasting. 
The impact of the strike on the consuming public in the form 
of higher prices was a question which came to occupy more of the centre 
of the stage as the strike continued than did the dispute itself, (see 
Table 5*ii b). It was raised in three formss why are prices rising 
(and by how much)? Should thero be price controls? Should troops be 
used to shift perishable cargoes? The Minister of Agriculture denied 
repeatedly that wholesalers or retailers were hoarding or profiteering, 
and as repeatedly attributed any price rises to the law of supply end 
demand, or to wage-demands. The wholesalers and retailers argued like-
wise on the occasions they wore asked about price-rises. lie and tho 
Home Secretary also promised several times to institute price-controls 
over food if they thought it necessary; but in fact, as the demands for 
controls became more insistent, the Government turned increasingly to 
threatening tho use of troops to shift perishable cargoes if tho dockers 
persisted in refusing to do so themselves (see Table 5.ü Г(2)). 
This had the undoubted impact of shifting attention to those 
responsible for public hardship from wholesalers and retailors (especially 
the first), on to the dockers who were on strike. Whereas wholesalers 
and retailers - and clearly the first group is more significant than 
the second - were presented without question as subjected to the law 
of supply and demand, the dockers were presented as voluntary agents. 
So a direct link between scarcity and higher prices was presented as 
the responsibility of the strikers rather than аз the combined effect 
of the strike on the one hand, and decisions by wholesalers that they 
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safely could raiso thoir prices (with obvious effect on retail prices) 
on the other hand. There was also some hoarding by wholesalers, but 
this was only ventilated briefly in the media (mostly the Press). 
In fact, the Government must have known the use of troops 
was impracticable, not so much because of any violent confrontations 
between dockers and troops and their consequences, but because market 
porters in the TGVAJ were beginning to state their opposition to handling 
any perishables moved by troops, and because of the complicated and 
dangerous nature of non-containerised docking procedures. The fact 
that this latter problem was never so much as montionod raises an 
important point about the operation of tho British news media: the 
extent to which they are uncritical, despite the occupational self-
image of their staff as detached observers. The only rational ground 
for omitting reference to this problem would bo ignorance of it, though 
this would reflect badly on the efficiency of newsgathering procedures; 
if this problem was realised, the only conceivable reason for not 
mentioning it can have been not to embarrass the Government at a 
strategic point. 
The economic implications of the dockers» claim were frequently-
referred to, and as noted already constituted an important explanation 
for the employers* refusal to concede the claim or to negotiate about 
it. (See Table 5-ii.c.) They were noted to be at the top of the manual 
workers* pay "league", and to be guilty of demanding an astronomical 
number of percentage points (which wore variously calculated). The 
highest was 00;>, which »represented* the increase in tho basio rate 
from cloven to twenty pounds; that the percentage increase was accepted 
as a viable expression of the claim in the news media at times, suggests 
a serious lack of critical attention to presentation. They were also 
labelled as threatening the ruin of Dutch, Cypriot and Jamaican farmers, 
yet to bo augmenting the competitive strength of tho port of Antwerp; 
a rather contradictory set of accusations, although hypothetioally 
compatible with each other in economic terms. Whether they were 
accurate in economic terms io rather more obscure. 
However, the dominant implication mentioned was that by their 
strike thoy would injure the •modernisation1, scheme for the ports 
planned under phase 2 of the Devlin Report, and on tho verge of 
implementation. (Sec Table 5.ii.d) In actual fact there were many 
small ports which were not going to be affected by the scheme. It 
must also bo questioned, precisely what 'injury' were the employers' 
panel representatives talking about? Was this an implicit threat 
that the new pay-scales negotiated for the greater productivity of 
the new scheme would be thrown back into the molting pot? This seems 
unlikely, sinco the cooperation of tho unions wo3 essential for the 
operation of ouch a scheme; and further, since the soheme necessarily 
involved an ever-increasing number of redundancies, it meant the 
overall wage-bill would bo lower. It io difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the^ very pdsitive symbol of 'modernisation1 was being 
utilised by the employers in a manner which disguised the fact that 
tho larger the award from the current dispute, the less the eoonomic 
advantage from the now productivity scheme as a whole. This impression 
is reinforced by an examination of the precise content of the 'modern-
isation' scheme, one important part of which consisted of the intro-
duction of a two-shift system of working. Another element, just 
referred to, was the severance of large sections of the labour-force. 
This could only with some ingenuity be described as tho white heat of 
technological change; yet the term 'modernisation' Ьаз distinct 
connotations of that kind. 
Tho question of breaches in the strike was a fairly confused 
one. (Зое Table 5.ii.e.) A refusal to make exceptions for any cargoes 
might seem absurd intransigence on the part of the dockers; the extent 
to which the strike was breached by private initiative might be seen 
as an instance of tho verve and determination of those who had succeeded 
in doing oo. The complications are increased by the fact that some 
portö did make exceptions for some cargoes, nevertheless, the arguments 
for not m a k i n g exceptions wore never heard; and only those responsible 
for broaching the strike were interviewed about it. Thuo, to take 
two instances referred to in Table 5.ii.e, the public heard a Liverpool 
housewife (who also featured prominently in certain sections of the 
Kress) say someone had telephoned to offer to drop her in the Mersey| 
and it saw the littlo ships setting off from Ulster and then unloading 
at the tiny Portpatrick harbour. It also heard about carloads of 
dockers setting off to tip produce into the harbour in Ulster, and to 
picket the Scottish harbour. Whether these actions were or were not 
justifiable was left to the public to decide without reference to the 
arguments of the other side for keeping the stoppage watertight. 
The last set of effects of the strike that was treated by 
the news media was the actual and potential response by the State to 
the strike. This took various formss the declaration of the State of 
Emergency, the offer of an arbitration-panel, the eventual Court of 
Enquiry, the threatened utilisation of the Array to move cargoes, and 
the relevance of a new industrial relations law (see Table 
The theme which ran throughout all reference to tho role of 
the State in the dispute was the core assumption of its neutrality. 
This showed itsolf in various ways* A State of Emergency, for instance, 
in Britain involves the assumption of very wide end swoeping powers (9), 
involving tho utilisation of troops, the right to requisition all kinds 
of material, and so on. Clearly its adoption in peace-time has important 
implications for democratic rights and civil liberties, and there was 
something of a pother about it in the House of Commons, with a number 
of left wing Labour MP's criticising its adoption} but even this 
challenge was only fleetingly reported. It was quite simply accepted 
that it had been introduced for the single purpose of protecting 
essential supplies. On the one hand, it can certainly be argued that 
the lack of questioning about the State of Smergonoy accurately 
reflected the degree of consensus between the leaderships of both major 
political parties? but on the other hand, the corresponding omission of 
debate in the media reflects the extent to which fundamental issues 
about British society may not bo subjected to adequate public discussion. 
The chairmanship of the Court of Enquiry that was eventually 
set up was another point at which some very basic social assumptions 
wore taken for granted. Tho general secretary of/TUC, 2r. Victor 
Feather, was briefly floated as the possible chairman, but was 
quickly dropped because of his trade union involvement. Instead, a 
High Court judge was chosen as tho moot neutral person available. In 
actuality, the moderation and distaste for confrontation of kr. Feather 
was a natter of public record, and could barely have been questioned 
even in governmental circles. Conversely, the record of the Bench in 
court cases involving trade union affairs in Britain, is historically 
not one of unblemished impartiality; so little so, that in practice 
it has been normal for Trade Unions in Britain either to conduct their 
dispute outside court procedures if at all possible, or if court pro-
cedures were unavoidable, to enter upon them in all circumstances with 
a very low expectation indeed of a decision in their favour (1С-). 
The role of the Aroy as protector of the public, national: 
interest wa3 also taken absolutely for granted, in that its utilisation 
was presented simply in terms of avoiding the waste of foodstuffs 
together with action to control tho rise in prices. The relief of 
hunger, the avoidance of waste, concern for the housewife1s domestic 
budget, were certainly humanitarian concerns for which the Array could 
act as instrument; but tho additional consideration, of the extent to 
which tho Army might bo seen as the State breaking the strike at its 
strongest bargaining point was barely referred to, and only then in 
terms of the expression of opposition to the use of troops by dockors 
and market porters. The conceptual framework for interpreting this 
opposition, especially in tho absence of any real explanation of the 
tactical realities of a strike, was already present: the dockers and 
thoir allies were expressing their sectional interest, as against tho 
national, public interest. And this la3t might have to be •met* by the 
action of the Army. 
There were, lastly, not many references to the Governments 
intention to enact new industrial relations legislation, compared to 
the Press treatment of the subject; but the four references that were 
made uniformly stressed tho relevance of •reforming1 the c\Ä"rent legal 
position concerning industrial disputes. Once again, the State was 
presented ao operating neutrally on behalf of a harassed public. 
Part of the map of the docks disputo which was v e r y important 
was the degree of support or condemnation the strikers were seen to 
receive from outside the ranks of those involved or implicated in 
either •side1. (See Table 5*iil)« In explicit terms, apart from a 
statement by tho Prime Minister that the strike should not take place, 
and appeals by the Minister for Employment for them to return to work, 
most expressions of attitude to the strike as a whole (as distinct 
from the question of perishables, and other particular aspects of it) 
were favourable. Hot that there were very many, for the number of state-
ments only ju3t reaches double figures; and certainly no attempt was 
made to conduct an exhaustive investigation of sooial attitudes to 
the dispute. 
However, the degree of imbalance just noted must itself be 
balanced against two other considerations. First, there was a very 
high level of reference to the negative implications and consequences 
of the strike, which has also been noted. An enumeration of expressions 
of explicit support would be misleading taken out of relation to this 
fundamental trend in the treatment of the dispute. Second, that the 
treatment of one dimension of support for the strike was surprisingly 
thin. This dimension was the solidarity of West European port workers 
in Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden and France, and in the containerised 
English port of Felixstowe, with the dockers in London, Liverpool, 
Hull and elsewhere. This solidarity had been earlier predicted to be 
highly unlikely by news reporters, in the European case because of 
lack of identification with a foreign strike, in Felixstowefs because 
of its very high wage-levels and the absence of strikes there over the 
previous two years or so. When the reversal of this prediction 
occurred, it was noted in all three bulletins and then dropped. It 
was an instance of an important form of intor-Europeon cooperation, 
with perhaps significant implications for the future pattern of 
development of the EEC; yet presumably it did not fit into the 
definitions of the new Europe current among newsmen. 
The la3t part of the map of the dispute whioh I wish to 
discuss concerns the kind of people, and the kind of roles they fill, 
who are called upon to speak, (See Table 5*iv.) In my sample there 
was a very slight preponderance of speakers who occupied a role or 
took a position that would be known to be against the strike without 
their necessarily having to spell it out in so many words. However, 
this may bo due to the sample, and in any сазе there io little point 
in the assessment of fractions of "balance". What was concretely the 
сазе, however, was that there was only highly equivocal support from 
Labour Party spokesmen, their activity being confinod - at least in 
the media - to criticism of the Conservative Government's handling of 
the strike. It will be recalled that the Transport and General Workers' 
Union had never been particularly effective in its representation of 
the dockers; and that its leaders (Jones and O'Leary) began by endeavour-
ing to call the strike off. O'Leary said at a press conference at the 
time s 
"I confess that I must have slipped up to be in 
the situation I am in now. I ш more to the Right 
of any other dock leader since 1926, and yet it 
falls to me to lead a national strike." (ll). 
Even then those who in the official spectrum of British politics Speak 
for the trade unions and the workers, wore very weak in their advocacy 
on their behalf; and an objective assessment of the situation of the 
dockers, as supplied by Eollish and Wilson, leaves little room for 
counterposing a hypothetical sanity of the officials to a misguided 
ferocity on the part of the dockers. This raises the important 
question, which will be discussed more fully in chapter 7> of how tho 
adoption of "balance" in broadcasting can lead to the identification 
of formal opposition with significant opposition, and consequently to 
omission of the case for significant opposition. 
Equally important was the relative lack of opportunity given 
to ordinary workers or trade unionists in the docks to express their 
views to the general mass of British workers and trade unionists. 
Under a third of the appearances on tho dockcrs' "side" were by rank 
and filo members of the unions or the labour force; and similarly 
there was no opportunity at all offered to workers and trade unionists 
in other industries to comment on the strike or to address the dockers. 
The news media were used as vehicles for (sometimes conflicting) elite 
groups to speak to tho general public and sometimes to each other. 
They were novor used as means for ordinary members of the public to 
communicate with each other, or only rarely and very briefly. 
Having established how the television news media drew the 
contours of the docks strike, it is now important to move on to examine 
the particular role played by news reporters in mediating the events 
of the dispute to the public. The subjects of their questions, together 
with a sample of the precise wording of their questions, is reproduced 
in Tables 5*v* в end b. The sample consists of 40/ of the news bulletins 
in the overall sample. Questions common to the ВБС1 and BBC2 bulletins 
are taken together, except for July 13th when news of the strike*s 
projected postponement became available between the 7*30 p.m. and 8.50 p.m. 
bulletins. The importance of these questions is two fold. First, they 
reveal the news reporters* own definition of their role; second, they 
had some general influence on determining the "map" of the strike, 
insofar as most people can only be as good as tho questions they are 
asked allow them to be. 
What emerges with great clarity from the subjects and wording 
of the questions asked is that news reporters, together with current 
affairs presenters as will be seen, interpret their rolo as neutral 
between the two sides. This parallels the standard definition of the 
role of the Government in industrial disputes by industrial correspond-
ents, which is seen as "trying to umpire the disputes" (12). Given 
that both sides, but especially the strikers, are seen аз sectional 
interests, this "balance" effectively means that the reporters end up 
by asking questions which for them reflect the national interest; if 
they represent anyone, it is the nation, the general public. To this 
extent, their role and the questioning proper to it become part of the 
nan of the strike itself. The strike becomes defined in terms of a 
loose triad of interests, of which the most important and most 
affronted io the general national interest, of which tho State and 
the news media ore the paramount guardians» 
Evidence for this is soon in tho way such a high proportion 
of questions are devoted to how long the strike may be expected to last, 
arbitration and the court of enquiry as possible methods of settling 
it, the chance of its postponement or of a return to work, the damage 
to the economy, and whether the troops would be seen as hostile to the 
dockers1 interests or acting under orders for the public good. The 
proportion of questions relating to what might bo described as "industrial 
peace for the national good" is nearly 8Q$ of the sample. This is an 
important confirmation of standard cultural definitions of industrial 
conflict, notod in chapter 3» and an interesting illustration of the 
thesis advanced in chapter 7 that the practice of "balance" acts as a 
conductor for nationalist ideology. 
On tho othor hand, there is a hierarchical dimension to the 
triad, with the most hostile questions being addressed to the strikers, 
and with tho employers receiving very few hostile questions together 
with plenty of soope to state their case and condemn the dockers from 
tho working of the questions put to them. Inevitably this is a somewhat 
subjootivo judgment, and it is only possible to refer to the questions 
for any verification of its reasonableness. In Table 5*v.b, the questions 
the writer considers ixaplioitly hostile to the dockers' or unions' case 
have been asterisked, as have those which presented a favourable opening 
to the employors to condemn tho dockers or unions. Questions marked 
with a double exclamation mark aro in the writer1 о view hostile to the 
employers* case. 
It is nonetheless hard to find questions to employers with 
quite the ring of "Aren't your dockers concerned at all, Mr. O'Leary, 
about the damage that will be done to the country's есопоцу?", or to 
trade unionists with quite the deference of "But someone like Mr. Vic 
Feather or another prominent trade unionist presumably wouldn't be 
acceptable to you as arbitrator?" 
(ii) .?Tho, television current cu. airs coycyp^o 
Hew© bulletins, whatever their length, axe often olained 
by пени nedia practitioner» № ) to be their headline», in rress 
tcrsaj m& correspondingly, current « Г Ш » <шй docuaontory progresses 
are claimed to be the broadcast cedia equivalent of the nowepapor»1 
in»Me pee*« and feature articles. This contention haa ioportant 
implication» for the question of explanation, which haa already been 
stressed in tho content analyeio of ne*» bulletin© on tho docks etrike» 
It ie therefore ieportant to go on to analyse the current ali'airc 
content on the etrike, in order to discover how «ell the oleics reflect» 
the reality* since each current affair» itea 1» esore of en entire 
entity thfcn new» iteaa, tho content» of each of the »eve» ourroyed will 
bo #iven a separate previa in torn» 
a ehort 34 .Hour» item on June 24th looked at the possibility 
of a national dock otrike, and interviewed an Industrial correspondent 
fron the Sunday ffeleagflpft» Ее explained the strike nove in terse of 
шгшй nilitancy end volatility of British docker»! their chagrin at 
the ciecontinuation by the new Ccneorvative gorermeat of the proviouo 
fjovemtsent1» porta nationalisation echeaef end the view that the Left 
wa* spoiling for a fight "with сцуопе"* bat were dependent on tlje rack 
and file to translate their own trucalence Into action» He too argued 
that the productivity deal» would be ruined if the claia were set, 
that «any dookero would not benefit frco concession cf the present 
clain, and that thie aiUtancyr would only be used м evidence for the 
need of new indue trial relations legislation by the Conservative govern-
aent. It should be noted that there ie here no oriticis» of the 
employer»* or of the precise work-situation and •experience of dockers; 
but that the etrlko la explained in terao of ouatooaxy attitudes шаocg 
docker» seising in a rather haphaaiard fashion on to a particular pay 
claia, eoabined with the dockor»1 ignorance or insouciance of its real 
implication». 
By July 9 th* it was clear the etrike wao on. That evening, 
щ Щ & т sountod a studio discussion botwoen o'Lesiy, Tonge, Jack Jones, 
John Davie о (recently of the CBI, still at that point a backbench MP)t 
and Ian IHkardo (Labour Party ports1 spokesman)» O'Leary dwelt on 
the constant delays in negotiations for a better basic rate which had 
dragged on sinco they had been initially promised by the employers in 
1966, four years previously* Most of the rest of the programme went 
over ground mado very familiar by news bullotins (the threat to 
productivity, the dockers* already high rates of pay, the swingoing 
percentage increase the claim involved)» Everyone agreed the Govern-
mcnt should not interfere, but there wa3 a clash between Davies and 
tfikardo. The former claimed that wage-inflation was playing havoc 
with costs, that the issue must be faced squarely, and that the country 
was running itself into the ground. The pioture drawn was dismissed 
by lükardo as vaguely argued gloom, and he went on to say that the 
Conservative Government's principled hostility to nationalisation was 
no substitute for a rational policy for the ports. Apart from the 
revelation of reasonably predlotable contrary positions by some of tho 
notables involved, only 0,Leary,s point wont any way toward emphasising 
an important element in the strike-proneness of the dockers at that 
point in time. As explanation and illumination, as distinct from rapid 
sequences of assertion and counter-assertion, this item provided very 
little. 
On the eve of the strike, it was temporarily postponed. The 
24 Hours presenter 3aid, "Good evening. And I do mean good" as he 
introduced the programme - an interesting instance of the instinctive 
self-identification with the image of the national good characteristic 
of the profession. There followed however the fullest analysis of the 
strike available in the sample. It took the form of a historical 
introduction, in the first place, with the reporter recalling Ben 
Tillett and the 1809 docks strike, and the background of bad labour 
relations in the ports, together with the instinctive class solidarity 
of dockers. Ho then interviewed a delegate to the present national 
strike conference. In the interview the extreme insecurity of work 
before decasualisation in 1966 was disoussed, together with the much 
norc rtscent factors heightening insecurity amoisg dockers about their 
employment prospects. Cm the latter question, tho delegate instanced 
thb wey the company boards orming палу of the inner London docks frost 
Tower Bridge to Millwall rare en thus i as tic ally running down their 
docks and negotiating property development schemes on the disused sites 
(Tenge, chairman of the Employers1 Panel, being himself Involved in 
one such scheme as managing director of Hoy's TTharf by Tower Bridge)» 
Other factors underlying insecurity wore, according to tho delegate! 
tho developiscnt of eontainerisatlon, which required far less labour 
intensive methods than traditional handling; the planned reduction 
in the labour force over the next few years; and the tendency for 
employers to use non-registered labour against the specific provisions 
of the containerisation cgreemonts. The delegato concluded the inter-
view by arguing that in his view these considerations constituted 
abundant evidence for tho nocd to nationalise tho ports and to institute 
workers1 control» 
A studio discussion between Ian llikardo and Nicholas Scott 
(Conservative Party ports' spokesman) followed, in which läkordo 
claimed that nationalisation of the ports could be argued to bo 
neccooary on technical grounds alone* Scott said vital experts were 
always being threatened by docks disputes, and a very detailed look 
needed to be taken at the industry as a whole to try to avoid the 
repetition of this pattern in future years» The reporter ended tho 
itea by saying that the son1 о roal hope, which he defined as «modern-
isation1, was being threatened by their strike-decision. It could 
reasonably be said that this item did servo to illuminate tho dockers» 
perspectives on the strike, though for less the employers' • 
The next 24 Hours treatment of the subject consisted mostly 
of a port-by-port account of the strike's impact, it went on however 
to illustrate in the clearest way the universal acceptance of tho 
»national interest* position. On the one hand, a studio discussion 
between Jack Jones and Tenge had tho former attacking the latter for 
behaving irresponsibly toward the national interesti a reversal of 
tho more usual uoo of tho symbol. Jones was arguing that tho otrihorc 
had now a stronger case than the employers, because tho employers were 
being intransigent in a way which damaged tho national interest. The 
whole argument was grounded on the common acceptance of the symbol. 
And at the acme timo, the interviewer.1;s questions presented an especially 
explicit definition of the presenter1® role, as vocalist for the national 
interest, even extending to the ploa they fix on appointment to see each 
other for talks there and then on the air! (Soo the first of tho two 
transcripts in Table 5.vi.). 
Two days later, July 10th, there was a short 24 Hours piece 
by the presenter alone on the strike. It was mostly about the state 
of emergency that the Government had doolcred that day, but it argued 
in unison with the Government that it was only declared in order to 
protect tho essontialo of life, and furthermore that its provisions 
were one end all discretionary» All this was certainly one view} but 
the lack of any analysis of the potential miouso of that discretion 
enabled by the declaration of a state of emergency may be cone indica-
tion of the extent to which the British news media do not necessarily 
oncourare open debate on the operation of tho State. Tho TG.YU secretary, 
Jack Jones, was claimed in his absence to be the factor above all behird 
the deadlock« "the centre and crux". Explanation was again rather thin 
in this item. 
The final 24 Hours item in the sample was cast again very 
much in the mould of "embattled giants vs. the public good". It inter-
viewed one of tho highest paid dockers, at £50 о week, end verified 
continuing solidarity of the men and their wives. It then interviewed 
a shipping magnate (Sir Jiioholae Caycer) in his olegont end ocrvontcd 
hone, and noted the evident confidence of the shipowners in thoir 
futtro. Tho reporter then concluded his film by noting how the public 
was put to great inconvonicnce and hardship while solidly organised 
labour and solidly organised capital hammered at each other. The 
позsage was once again ono of identification by the reporter with »the 
public good* 1 with the further Implication that the dockers had the 
oeao reзоигсоз for conflict that the shipowners hod. Thio impression 
was powerfully reinforced by tho soloction of ono of the highest paid 
dockers for interview, along with his wife who explained during the 
course of it that they were having to go without their usual standard 
of living, ouch as steak, etc. The mass of dockers in the small ports 
in England, togethor with the majority in most other ports, wero noi/here 
near the income-level of tho interviewee. 
On the 18th of July, This Week also organised a confrontation 
between Jack Jones (TGWU), Lewis (chairman of the London Port Employers), 
the Sunday Telegraph industrial correspondent who had previously appeared 
o n M Hours, and a studio chairman. As an explanation of the strike, 
the item contained a particularly strange and confusing moments this 
came after the industrial correspondent had been asked to set the ball 
rolling by giving his account of the background to the strike. He did 
so with considerable lucidity, bringing the story right up to the 
present. He was then questioned about the immediate factors which had 
generated the present strike, and suddenly the ludidity vanishedi ho 
3tated that he did not know what it was about, but that it was totally 
irrelevant to many dockers I It Is reasonablo to surmise that this 
abrupt shift from confidence to confusion had the effect of largely 
cancelling out the degree of comprehension of the strike that had 
been built up for viewers of the programme by his initial presentation, 
in that he appeared to bo stating the virtual irrelevance of the data 
in it for understanding the current dispute. In addition, his shift 
served to reinforce the stereotype of the irrationality of the dockers 
(and perhaps even of strikes in general). 
The debate which followed between the four participants 
achieved relatively little else by way of illumination. Jonoo managed 
to explain the dockers1 case a little, in terms of the rate of prioe-
inflation, their repeated inability to got the employers to negotiate 
a new basic rate over the previous four years, and the more highly 
paid dockers1 solidaristic concern for dockers in smaller ports who 
would not benefit from the new pay scales under the productivity plans 
shortly to bo introduced in large ports. The studio chairman, as 
can be seen from tho questions in the Appendix, once again cast 
himself in what is now the familiar television role of public watch-
dog, though in this case it would be fair to say he attacked each 
side with equal vigour. 
Аз depth-investigations of the dispute, it cannot be said 
that these current affairs items - with one exception - took viewers 
significantly further in their understanding of its саизез than tho 
Hews bulletins. The extent to whioh tho greater time and latitude 
available in current affairs television is actually utilised in 
practice to perform tho role officially assigned to it, is therefore 
open to serious question, at least on the basis of those data. 
Iii. Press coverage 
^ • • " М М М М И М М Ш « 
(a) The Daily Mirror. Moving on now to Press coverage, and 
beginning with the Daily Firror. the editorial position on the docks 
strike will be analysed first. There were five editorials on the dock 
strike, on the 15th, 17th, 24th, 28th and 50th of July. The first was 
beaded: "The Dockst Peace - or Disaster?", and laid heavy stress on 
the "fragile" nature of Britain's economic recovery. It stated that 
every export, every ship that can be turned around, and "every last 
ounae of productivity", were vital* Modernisation was claimcd as the 
major objective for the industry itself, and was defined (simply) as 
a fair day's work for a fair day's pay. Interestingly, the technological 
overtones of •modernisation* were absent from its definition. Robert 
Carr, secretary of State for Employment, was complimented on having 
passed his first test as a new minister with flying colours; this was 
a reference to the temporary del^ - in commencement of the strike» 
The editorial on the 17th was headed "The Docks; A Way Out?" 
It strongly commended the "impartial" court of enquiry as a way for both 
sides to see reality. It argued it was a wrong strike for wrong reasons, 
and pointed out that both sides were in disagreement about the cost of 
the claim being met. •Modernisation1 would solve these problems 
according to the editorial, and was what ought to be tho subject of 
discussion. In any case, talking was the civilised procedure in 
disputes. The editorial went on to rofer to the wages jungle and 
lingering insecurity in the docks; to argue that the claim would mean 
an increase of 50^ on real earnings (the employers1 estimate); and to 
note the degree of intransigence in the employers* refusal to negotiate 
during the strike. 
On July 24th, the editorial concerned itself with tho impact 
of the otrike on food prices. It briefly stated that profiteering was 
not justified, that it (the Daily Mirror) was watching prices along 
with the housewife; and that the Government should keep control of 
prices and be prepared to act firmly if necessary. 
On the 28th, it commented on tho award from the Pearson 
enquiry. Headed "The strikes hustle - and hope", it pronounced the 
terms very fair, with the lower paid benefiting most, and with the 
inflationary time-rates that would have imperilled »modernisation1 not 
conceded. 'Modernisation* was once again declared to be the crucial 
goal. It complimented Lord Pearson, Carr, the employers and Jack Jones 
on the speed with which they had moved in tho enquiry, and publicly 
hoped for a quick end "to the strike that nobody wants". 
On tho JOth, when tho dockers had accepted the Court of 
Enquiry award, tho I.irror was full of praise for all parties to tho 
dispute. "Dock Strike - The Mirror's Honours Hat 1970" wa3 the head-
ing. It noted gravely that the UK's "fragile economic recovery" had 
been dented, but insisted that the strike could have lasted much longer 
had Lord Pearson not been so speedy and impartial, had Carr not actod 
fast and worked hard, had Jack Jones not mixed reasonableness ?d.th 
toughness, had the dockers not "fought fair" and shifted certain vital 
cargoes, had Tonge (for the employers) not dwelt on the paramount need 
for 'modernisation1. The settlement was in the Mirror's view a credit 
to everyone concerned, but it lamented that everyone couldn't "use 
their loaf" like that more often with the result vre should all be far 
happier and more prosperous. The editorial finally commented on how 
important it was for the impartiality of the judiciary never to be 
debased by politicians wishing to harness them for a particular purpose. 
In many ways, the Daily Mirror's editorial stance was quite 
akin to the TV Mews pooitioni one of reproach for both sides on behalf 
of the 'nation*; on© of overwhelming stress on tho merits of «modern-
isation* j one of continuing emphasis on the value of peace, of the 
orderly resolution of conflict, of setting limits to the degree of 
provocation engaged in by either side. The advice to the Government 
to act resolutely about rising prices of course fell outside the brief of 
broadcast news; but in every other reepeet, especially tho linkage 
•productivity-nation-peace*, it was very similar to TV Kews, and 
Current Affairs presenters' arguments. While not attacking tho dookers 
(at any rate In isolation from the employers) it of course did not 
back them or the employers. It might be argued however that since 
the •modernisation* schomo involved a substantial reduction in the 
labour force, the Error's stress on it implicitly favoured tho 
employers* interests to some degree. 
Three things stand out about the headlines (see Appendix)* 
The first is tho repeated use of the two words •throat* and •crisis*f 
tho second is that out of 64 headlines, 14 were about food prices; 
and the third is that another 8 were concerned with the use of troops 
to chift perishable cargoes. The constant use of the terms *threat1 
and •Crisis1 is symptomatic of tho rest of the presentation, and is 
of course a traditional source of some amusement in certain circles 
about the tendency of the Eress to sensationalise everything. To an 
extend therefore, it might be right to assume that there are standard 
cultural understandings which rob those dramatic expressions of some 
of their impact, nonetheless, the words do make it quite clear that 
we, the nation, are threatened, that our economy is in crisis as a 
result of the dispute, and therefore that we should be extremely 
concerned about its outcome and tho demeanour of those most directly 
involved. It is thus presented as an event with no implications for 
anyone beyond the general economic implications of any strike, partic-
ularly a major bottleneck in the ports* Ho one io afeked to identify 
with employers or dockers, but rather to see them as two sectional 
interests at loggerheads, in a sense split off and insulated from the 
majority of tho population, both by their intransigence and by their 
readiness to cause everyone else discomfort. The extent to which 
strikers causo themselves discomfort is rarely if ever brought out 
in media presentations of industrial disputes. 
The third of all items concerned with food pricos and with 
troops gives an indication of how as the strike moved on tho focus of 
the debate became more the principal effect of tho strike than anything 
olso. Explanation of tho background of tho strike was no more likoly 
in the Daily; Mirror than in television news and current affairs. Even 
tlic one occasion on July 17th when there was a large item on the 
outside pages headed "What the dispute is about - and why", the 
explanation was reduced to the disagreement between employers and 
dockers about the financial implications of the claim. 
(b) The Daily Express. Tho Daily Express editorial position was 
stated more frequently than the Mirror's. but more briefly (Ехпгезэ 
editorials are short by comparison)? on the 10th, 15th, 14th, 16th, 
18th, 20th, 28th and 50th of July. On the 10th, the editorial oompli-
mcnted Bobert Carr for not embroiling himself in the dispute early on 
in the interventionist manner characteristic of the recently departed 
Labour Government. It went on to hope he could bring all sides 
together on the docks questions, and that this would presage a major 
tripartite co-operation between Government, employers and unions on 
the new industrial relations legislation promised by the incoming 
Conservative Government. 
On tho 15th the editorial commented briefly that the dispute 
should be taken to arbitration since the way it wa3 dragging out was 
danaging everyone*s best interests. (Arbitration, of course, would 
have been binding.) V/hen the next day the dispute was temporarily 
postponed, the headline to the leader said "Now - build for tranquillity". 
It congratulated the participants rather prematurely on the way their 
good sense had prevailed, and then went on to argue the whole episode 
demonstrated the need for new industrial relations law so that such a 
breakdown could not recur. It added that the nation looked forward to 
this legal change with some anticipation. 
On the 16th of July, under the heading "The Crisis - and the 
Cure", the editorial commended Carr, Feather and even Jaok Jones, for 
their efforts to avert the stoppage which had now erupted into full 
life. The answer to the problem was stated to be independent arbitral 
tion - once again tho fact that this would have been binding wa3 not 
referred to. The editorial went on to argue how clearly the whole 
episode revealed the need for industrial relations legislation, 
especially for secret ballots and a cooling off period. Had there 
been on this occasion a secret ballot independently supervised, the 
nation could "at least" be sure tho strike-decision was "a democratic 
decision, democratically arrived at". This implied 3trongly that there 
was considerable doubt about the democratic nature of tho 80-strong 
delegate conference which had rejected Jack Jones1 personal attempt 
to avert the strike by recalling the conference to vote on the offer 
of £20 guaranteed wage - as though Jones1 own decision was to be deemed 
more 1 democratic • than theirs. Ho reason was offered for this contrast. 
On the 18th of July, there was a short first loader saying 
there was no justification for higher prices because of the dock 
striko. On the 20th tho Ехргезз headed its first leader "Time To 
Settle It How", and argued since there was bound to be a settlement 
some time it might as well be now before everyone's standard of living 
fell. • Modernisation' - which was not defined - was claimed to be in 
everyone's interests; so "tho fresh view, free of prejudice" of Lord 
Pearson's Court of Enquiry should be allowed to point the way to the 
solution. One of the fundamental assumptions always hidden in the 
•balanced view' Ideology is that every dispute can be reduced to some-
thing with the formal properties of a certain amount of right and a 
certain amount of wrong on 'each' side so that it should be settled by 
compromise rather than in terms of one side on occasion simply being 
right and deserving te win (though not necessarily to win the absolute 
zero-sum sense). 
In its editorial on the Pearson Court's award on the 28tfc of 
July, the Express hailed the award as a sensible compromise, noting that 
Jones thought it a significant advance and that it was also accepted by 
the employers. There being no longor any purpose in the striko continuing, 
the men should get back to work quickly as that would bo the best way 
to finance tho award. Tho heading was "The Way to Boace in The Docks". 
In its final thoughts on the subject on July 30th, under tho 
heading of "The Race For The Future", tho Express congratulated 
everyone as did tho l.ürror t С err, Jones, Feather and Pearson, for 
thoir cool and sensible approach; the dockers, for resisting the 
militant minority in their ranks. There was a favourable contrast 
to be dram with the melodrama characteristic of the previous Labour 
government's handling of major disputes. Tho future was in Felixstowe, 
containerisation, and 'modernisation'. 
The characteristic themes of the Express editorials were the 
welcome nature of tho new Conservative Government's approach to inter-
vention in industrial disputes, the need for a now industrial relations 
law to avoid industrial disorder, tho undesirability of strikes and 
the excellence of industrial peaco and harmony. 'Kodernisaticn* was 
also otresoed, though not with quite the insistence of tho Mirror. 
The main points to note about tho Daily Express headlines ore 
that ac against the 1,Error there were only 36 items (from the 19th of 
June to tho 31st of July). Y/ords like 'threat1 and 'peace' were very 
predominant in the headlines. Out of tho 36, 14 were about food and 
its price, and 4 about tho use of troop3 to shift perishables; once 
again, a heavy emphasis on the effects of the strike rather than its 
causes. The Express also took the opportunity on occasion to utilise 
the matter in hand to make a somewhat different point which its editorial 
position normally defined as important. For instance, "Housewives 
Force Food Erices Down" (July 24th), or "Customer Power Forces Prices 
Down" (July 28th), or "MF: I Told Soldier Sons To Disobey Orders" 
(a Labour MP with two sons in the Army, who said he had written to 
them urging thorn not to shift perishables), or "A reluctant dock 
striken 11 believe unions should keep their word'": both represented 
themes dear to the Express's heart, the balancing forces of a free 
mar Ice t and tho strong tendency to national disloyalty characteristic 
of the Labour Party and the trade unions. (This conscription of issues 
to illustrate other issues is a tendency for which the Daily Express 
is of course popularly fairly well renowned.) 
Tho emphasis in the Daily Express editorials on industrial 
•tranquillity' io effectively represented in the headlines. Essentially 
what happens in both the Z2Lrror end tho Express is that the conflict 
is formalised into an "argy-bargy bad", "tranquillity good" inferential 
structure. The whole drift of the presentation bee ото s "How can this 
conflict be ended?" rather than "\7hat is it about?" Within this format 
of course, зоте parties may be blamed more for its continuation than 
others, and the Express certainly tends to place more blame on the 
trade union side in the dispute than does tho Mirror« and correspondingly 
loss blame (if any at all) on the employers. But it 1з important to 
recognise that the Express strategy regarding labour and the trade 
unions is not one of constant vitriolic tirades (approximately of 
its readership is manual stratum so this is hardly possible), but 
rather of the encouragement of rational collaboration between the 
interests of Government, employers and unions. It is only when this 
partnership is absent or threatened that the Express attacks the 
unions, in practice then, with little or no exposure to the full 
background to the strike from the workers» or the employers1 perspec-
tives, the Express reader is presented with a most undesirable conflict 
which disrupts that harmony which ought to exist between reasonable 
members of the national community. When reason returns - with the 
ending of the strike - the editorial is quick to congratulate, amongst 
others, tho bulk of the dock workers for having resisted the »militant 
minority» who wanted further industrial action/unreason. 
A further dimension is offered by the Express's two items 
on attempted strike breakingt the Portpatrick harbour incident, and 
the Liverpool housewife (lira. Burrell) affair. Tho headline for the 
first was "Sow Sizzles Over 'Bacon and Egg' Run", and for the second 
was "Boss Burrell gets set up to send in her 'dolly dockers': 500 
wives sign up to get food unloaded." Certainly both breaches in the 
strike - the second never actually took place - wore exceedingly minor 
affairs. On the other hand, through presenting them as simultaneously 
admirable and amusing the Express managed to imply strongly once again 
that the principles involved in the strike from the dockers1 side were 
not sufficiently serious or admirable to justify the inconvenience 
and damage to the есопощу they were causing. 
(с) The Daily Telegraph. The Daily Telegraph produced editorials 
on the dock strike on June 19th and 25th, and on July 10th, 14th, 16 th, 
21st, 28th and 30th. The day after the General Election, in its third 
leader headed "Dockers and Doctors", the Telegraph warned that a dock 
strike was impending, along with pay claims from doctors, and unrest 
in the motor industry and British Rail. "The same old sharks are 
swimming balefully around" it claimed, (presumably a reference to the 
national economic difficulties), and the dock strike in particular 
could lead to a threat to the balance of payments, reminiscent of a 
few years previously when Ray Gunter (then Minister of Labour) had 
talked about "Communist conspiracies" and ?filson about the economy .been 
having blotm off course. "Is this really a picture of a well-ordered 
society?", concluded the editorial. 
The first leader on June 25th, headed "Dockers* Ditch", 
hinted tho timing of the dispute was not entirely unconnected with the 
change of Government, but went on to make the point that the legacy 
of insecure dook employment and even some rather anachronistic 
employers, were partly responsible for tho volatility of the dockers. 
The position had been greatly improved over recent years, and looked 
like being vastly improved under the now productivity scheme and the 
containorisation development} these advances were threatened by the 
strike and therefore, said the Tele/graph. this stoppage must be 
resisted by the employers. Wage-inflation at 12-145^  could not be 
allowed to continue j and the whole episodo showed the urgency of new 
industrial relations law. "The prize - faster economic growth and 
much higher living standards - is enormous*" 
On July 10th, when tho strike was first called, the first 
editorial was headed "Dock Challenge". It said the first national 
dock striko since 1926 would be a grave threat to the economy and a 
challenge to the new Government. It would wreck the modernisation 
schemes, damage British docks• competitiveness and inflate shipping 
costs. To avoid wage-inflation, to protect •modernisation*, tho 
Government should Ъо ready to use troops for essential supplies and 
should hasten to reform industrial relations. 
On tho 14th when the strike appeared to have been called 
off, the Telegraph's first leader congratulated the Government on 
avoiding its predecessor's interventionist approach to industrial 
disputes as a method of reducing union intransigence. Tho proffered 
settlement (by the employers) was presented as being absolutely as 
far as they could possibly have gone 5 to have increased basic rate 
would have "messed up" the progress toward a sensible pay structure 
by "jacking up" all the rates? to have held entirely firm would havo 
been to risk "literally immeasurable" damage to tho economy, "with 
innumerable orders lost in the future". 
By tho 16th of July tho strike was back on again. Under the 
heading "Emergency in the Docks", the first leader outlined the sharp 
refusal of tho strike delegate conference to reassemble until the 
employers had raised the basic rate. The Telegraph noted that the 
employers refused to do this because of its impact on every other pay-
rate; and claimed that the dockers, as second most highly paid manual 
workers in the UK, had no pay grievance. Already earning averagely 
£35 a week, a £20 basic rate would give them £50 a week. The strike 
was to be explained partly in terms of the past bad labour relations, 
partly in terms of poor negotiating procedures. But it could not bo 
justified J the failure of the unions to control their members would 
receive little sympathy from the trade union world, and still less 
from the public. A long strike would damage the docks and the econoayj 
and an inflationary surrender would have even more damaging long-term 
consequences. The Government and tho employers were right not to 
budges "How is tho time to stand firm". 
Discussing the introduction of a State of Emergency, the 
second leader on July 21st labelled it "Reserve Powers Only", and said 
it was of course to be hoped that troops would not have to be used 
because of their effect on strikers' determination, and in any case 
because the strikers might still agree to shift food and medical 
supplies. Nevertheless, it was right to arm oneself against an 
emergency. The editorial wont on to castigate lire. Castle, the 
previous Secretary of State for Employment, for herself castigating 
in Parliament thoso who were looking for a showdown - "(whatever that 
moans)", said the Teloryqph - with the dockers. Tho Telegraph claimed 
there was widespread public support for employers who stood up to 
"indefensible" wage claims« wage claims were in the long run more 
"expensive" than a damaging strike, and the assumption of emergency 
powers by the Government was a tangible indication that it realised 
this truth. 
When the TGV/U national leadership decided to recommend to 
local ports that they decide for themselves whether or not to shift 
perishable cargoes, tho Tole/rraph first leader (July 23rd) stated 
"Dockers Relent". It noted that individual port3 might still decide 
otherwise, and that the decision was taken in the "wake of Kir. Hand-
ling's ultimatum", but also reaffirmed its view that the изо of troops 
would harden attitudes. On the other hand, against this last consider-
ation wa3 to be weighed the impact of tho strike's continuation on tho 
balance of payments, Britain's export position, and on EEC opinion, 
it concluded that both the EEC negotiators in Brussels and the pro-
Conservative voters at the reccnt election, would be united in 
anticipation of Stato measures to prevent powerful unions from holding 
"the rest of the community, including other unions, to ransom". 
After the Pearson Court of Enquiry had produced its conclu-
sions, and the day before the strike delegate conference reconvened, 
the Telegraph's first leader greeted tho Pearson recommendations with 
considerable reserve. The dockers, it said, "have not gained as much 
as they hoped, but more than they could reasonably cxpect"i they were 
to receive a 5Qa bonus in advance of 'modernisation', when they were 
already £10 a week ahead of the national average for manual workers. 
There was insufficient evidence of productivity in the docks to match 
thi3, said the leader-writer. "Or to put it in tho vernacular, should 
the 46,000 dockers on strike repeatedly bo allowed to have both the 
penny and the bun?" Kuch of tho trade loot in the previous two weeks 
had probably gone for good; invisible exports like marine insurance 
had Buffered; and all for a settlement which looked as though it was 
only buying a temporary respite in exchange for more trouble later on» 
This was on July 28th» 
On July 50th, even though it bargained with tho possibility 
that individual ports might maintain unofficial action, the first 
leader expressed relief that the strike seemed to be over. It noted 
again that dockers earned £10 a week more than the national manual 
workers' average. But it still stressed the ambiguity it thought an 
inherent in the settlement: either it was/end to the feelings of 
insecurity of employment, and to that extent a good foundation for 
•modernisation*; or it might turn out to have been "yet another mile-
stone in the long appeasement of substantial wage claims for which 
there is offered no specific quid pro quo." 
The same secular theology and demonology characteristic of 
the Daily Express is also to be found in the Daily Telegraph editorials 
on the docks strike, only perhaps even more so. 'Modernisation' and 
productivity are the ultimato goals, threatened by tho intransigence 
of the dockers, and even by the flabbiness of tho employers and the 
Government; though this last point was made in a reasonably muted 
style. The whole episode the Telegraph held to be proof positive for 
tho desperate need of an industrial relations law to avoid such 
disasters in future. Thero was also to bo found skulking in tho 
shadows the sinister influence of the Left, far more dangerous than the 
mere tergiversations and incompetence of the Labour .Parliamentary 
opposition. Since the dockers were already earning well over tho 
national average for British manual workers, they did not need any 
more money, and therefore apart from their industrial strength there 
wa3 no reason to pay them того - particularly in view of their low 
advances in productivity. The only reason fof not using troop3 till 
the very last moment was the adverse effect this could have on the 
dockers' attitudes to their employers and to the strike. 
The editorial position of the Daily Telegraph may therefore 
be characterised as being quite unequivocally pro-employer and pro-
Government, especially insofar as in the particular instance of the dooks 
strike they were prepared to blazon their new badge of courage as a 
signal for the rest of industry to stand firm and to hold the line. 
The only concessions made to the dockers* case were either tactical 
(e.g. the utilisation of troops) or historical (the tradition of 
insecure employment). The social class readership of the Telegraph 
perhaps renders the degree of *balanco* achieved even by the Express 
not really necessary. At the sane time of course its arguments are 
more detailed and complex in its editorial columns, and to a more 
highly educated readership are therefore more satisfying on the grounds 
of representing a careful presentation, than the 'less serious* papers* 
Headlines in the Telegraph are generally of a very sober 
variety, and at least on industrial relations tend not to have quite 
the barbed nature of some of the Telegraph*s headlines on race that 
will be analysed in the next chapter. Out of 102 items with headlines, 
22 of those headlines contained the familiar words •threat1, 'challenge', 
•crisis', •chaos•, •emergency* or *peace*. 20 of them, increasingly 
as tho strike proceeded, were about food supplies and pricos. 8 were 
about the use of troops to shift perishable cargoes. What may be also 
of interest io the number of headlines where the dockers are presented 
as the people with the whip-hand over the situation, and therefore 
implicitly as responsible for its origination in isolation from any 
other factors. This was particularly turo of the headlines to the 
editorials! "Dockers1 Challenge", "Dookers* Ditch", "Dockers Relent", 
"Up to the Dockers", "The Dockers Accept". But essentially, the 
Telegraph headlines, like the Mirror and the Express, concentrate on 
the hore^and-now of the dispute, or its day-to-day developmentsf and 
relatively little on its background. All too often, the more recital 
of a pay-claim and its rejection (or concession only in part) are held 
sufficient to explain the situation referred to. So an atmosphere of 
ultimately inexplicable crisis is developed, with an enormous vacuum 
increasingly generated where an explanation sufficient to the gravity 
of the occasion should be provided. In the ease of CT programmes, the 
vacuum is never really filled at all; in the case of the Daily Telegraph 
it is filled to a greater extent, but by explanations which underline 
the irresponsibility of the strikers as the major cause of the stoppage» 
(iv) Conclusions 
Summing up then the results of this content analysis of the 
major media output on the 1970 national dock strike, perhaps the most 
important general conclusion is that the output demonstrated how the 
maps drawn of an industrial dispute vary between the centre and the 
right, in political terms. The tendency, even in the Daily Express 
to an extent, is more toward the centre in those media surveyed with 
tho one exception of the Daily Selearaph. On the other hand, not only 
has the very considerable common area of discourse and coverage throughout 
the sampled media to be recognised, but also the implicit bias in this 
coverage and discourse against rigorously analysing the real implications 
of the •modernisation1 schemes so often referred to on the docks labour 
forco. These implications, which were common currency among trade 
unionists with any connection with the ports industry in 1970» same 
to fruition in a very public manner in 1972 with another national 
docks strike precisely over the consequences of •modernisation1 and 
containerisation. Even members of the Government, including the new 
secretary of State for Employment at that time, went on public record 
as admitting the genuine grievances of the labour force in the docks. 
Only the lack of knowledge and background characteristic of 
the coverage ; only the ritual reassertion of the merit of 'modernisa-
tion1; only the inbuilt assumption that conflict is bad and should be 
avoided or terminated as speedily as possible; only these factors could 
make possible the huge flow of semi-informative information that poured 
out of the news media about the docks strike. It was information 
without an accurate core, but superficially impressive through its 
volume. 
Certain major symbols or myths also spanned the entire coverage 
in this sample of news media output. Bredominant among these was the 
ideology of 'the nation'. This turned up in various formst in the 
definition of the employers and the strikers as sectional interests; 
in tho repeated appeal to tho national interest, to the public, to the 
community at large; in tho continual reference to tho oconomy as a 
resource and a structure affecting every British person in the вате 
way; in the definition of the State (troops, industrial relations law) 
as the instrument of 'the national interest1; and last but not least, 
in the visual ritual of tho 'balanced' interviewer/presenter/newscaster/ 
reporter (see chapter 7)* It can also be argued, returning to the 
•modernisation' discussion a moment ago, that the universal acceptance 
of •modernisation' as the public good represents an operational decision 
in favour of the classic approach "What*s good for General Motors is 
good for tho Ш Л " (14). Only tho Telegraph quite unequivocally stated 
that the employers' own progress economically was coterminous with 
universal British economic progress; but the readiness to take tho port 
employers' definition of the meaning of •modernisation* at facei^ value 
amounts to arriving at the same destination by uncritical means. 
This raises the further point, about the extent to which tiis 
British news media encourage public debate about significant issues. 
There is little doubt that compared to the new3 media in many other 
societies, they do encourage public debate. At the same time, it is 
necessary to analyse this question in relation to the development of 
public knowledge in Britain, and not only relative to the development 
of the media in various societies. It would bo possible for the British 
news media to claim they sufficiently encouraged public debate if 
a) their screens and columns were not dominated by elite figures; 
b) if it were not regarded as axiomatic by many journalists that formal 
structures of interest and opposition coincide with significant opposi-
tion; and с) if the level of explanation they provided were of a more 
meaningful character. These issues will bo discussed more fully in 
chaptor 7* 
(1) Soe D. P. Wilson, Pockers (Fontana Books, 1972)i and П. Ksllish, 
The Bocks After Devlin (Heinemann Educational Books, 1972)* 
(2) Report into Decasualisation and Causes of Dissension (НМБ0 1965t 
Cmd 2754). 
(5) See D. F. Wilson, op. cit», chapter 1, "The nature of casualism". 
(4) M. Hellish, op. cit.. ohs. 5 and 4» 
(5) П. Hellish, op. oit.. pp. 44-45» 
(6) Do., ch. 4* 
(7) D. P. Wilson, op. pit., pp. 168-71» and ch. 10? it. Hellish, 
op. cit,. oh. 20. 
8) See chapter 5» sections ii and iii. 
9) See Halsbury's Laws of England (Butterworth 1954» 5rd ed.) 
vol. 7» PP* 262-5• 
10) k. W. Wedderbum, The Worker and the Law (Penguin 1965). 
11) Quoted in D. F. Wilson, op. cit.. pp. 275-6. 
12) J. Tunstoll, Journalists At Work (Constable 1971)» Р» I65. 
15) See for instance Donald Edwards, BBC Hews and Current Affairs 
(BBC Lunchtino Lectures, birst Series, 2\ 12th December 1962), 
P* 5« 
[14) A famous statement by Charles E. Wilson, cone time president of 
General Motors, and first Secretary of Defence in the Eisenhower 
cabinet from 1952. 
Appendix to chapter 5 
(i) Television news coverage 
Table 5.1.a - causes of the dock strike« 
LOY; basic hits smaller ports* dockers 2 
5th presentation of claim, and all 
procedures exhausted 1 
Too many different pay-scales in different ports 1 
Basic rate too low for mortgage 1 
Dangerous and skilful work 1 
Dockers had raised productivity 1 
Low pay-scales an indignity 2 
Employers had rejected claim for £20 basic 1 
Employers sticking, because industry could not 
afford claim (= £53 average), and actual earnings 
were £35 average, and never under £16 l 
Unanimous vote for 2 weeks' strike notice 3 
Not tho new Tory government 2 
16 
Table 5.i.b - explanations of later developments: 
Jack Jones1 summoning of delegate conference 
on eve of strike due to his anxiety about 
strike pay (Tilbury dockers * chairman) 1 
Employers no right to keep present basic 2 
Decision by dockers to reject £20 guaranteed 1 
(caused strike) 
4 
Table S.ii.a - impact on domestic economy 
Strike damaging threatening economy 15 
How much trade loet for ever? 2 
Cost of total strike still to be assessed 3 
More damaging than 1966 seamen's strike, 
which 'caused* devaluation 2 
Impact on £ 5 
Shares fall 1 
Shares have millions wiped off value 1 
Swiss bankers gloomy about economy 2 
England may as well put up shutters now (Swiss Banker) 1 
£250,000,000 a woo к. hold up X 
Striko has by finish hold up C750ti X 
265 ships stranded X 
I.oraalcy will toko several weeks X 
Cars {» 1/6 UK exports) threatened by only 
2 - 3 weeks* supplies of steel X 
of Iniports, 10 - 20/> exports still neve 2tt 
Trade figures distorted for sons tine to com 1* 
40 
Tablo 5»ii»b - impact on consuming publio 
• (a) Food prices 
Butter unaffeotcd Xt 
Beef do. Xft 
Beat do. Xfc 
Maat about to rite 3 
Food in general about to rice 3 
Fruit about to rise 4 
Bananas dumped at С000 tons 1 
Do. 1 
12 nillion bananas dumped 1 
20 million do» X 
Dutch tomatoes, destined for UK, dumped 2 
Prices significantly up A 
23 (b) Need for price controls 
Demanded by «ЯГО 1 
Inposoible under Tories (Labour HP) 1 
tfrice controls pronisod if necessary by Hose Secretary 
and Agriculture Minister 4Л 
Want the publio to be fed (Kin. Agrlc.) 4 
Do* (Home See* ) 1 
400 recent pries-rises due to wage demands (PA) 1 
Eric® control и blcck narkot «• poor suffer (ш) ,., ,1... 
13 
* » implicitly not against dockers1 strike-action. 
Table 5*ii.c - impact on particular interests 
(1) General domestic commercial 
Damage in terms of steel and cars 3 
Iron, steel, paper, chemicals, cars ? 
£2,000,000 apples threatened 
Bananas at £l^ nthreatened 
Do. at £750,000 
Grapes threatened, once at £300,000 2 
Some importers facing ruin 2 
Farmers and exporters badly hit 1 
Hauliers losing £5m a week 1 
Many haulage firms will collapse, have lay-offs l 
Jobs of banana-packers threatened 1 
Tough for wholesalers 1 
Wholesalers & retailers have lost £fm _ r 1 18 
(2) Shipowners, employers arid dockers 
Shipowners losing £300,000 a day 2 
Shipowners loot £5m аз result of strike 2 
Employers facing new wage-bill of as result of 
settlement} TGV/U paid out £-Jm:m strike pay 2 
Dockers may think modernisation + related pay-
rates + employers* final offer worth more than 
strike (reporter on evo of 3 t r i k e ) 2± 
why strike when shortly new pay-scales with 
modernisation-scheme? (Lord Bearson) 1 
Destroying our savings (docker + wifo) & 1 
Strike may last longer than thought thro* union 
wealth, tax relief, state benefits (reporter) 1 
Dockers enjoying new overtime rates as backlog cleared 3 
14 
(3) External interests 
Antwerp port will gain 2 
Bad for Dutch farmers and smaller D. ports 2 
70,000 Jamaican banana-jobs at risk 1 
Threat to Cyprus есопощу, whore grapes are crucial export 2 
Guernsey food supplies running out 1 
8 
Л - implicitly not against dockers* strike-action. 
Table %ii.d - implications of dockers1 claim, ..c defined by o-.: >loyers 
J fir о at to productivity + modernisation scheme 12 
fop of manual leacue, already £10 over av. 3 
-ould к av. weekly, On annually 4 
-Urnings already up 50, in 4 years 1 
Involves 80;. rise 1 
„Gge~bill increase of 50/-' (employers)j of 
L. (unions) - opposing viev;s quoted by reporter 2 
23 
fable 5*ii.e - responses to the strike in terms of breaches in it 
1 elands шб oil excepted by dockers 5* 
Cross-channel ferries continue (BR) 34 
kewhaven handling Cyprus grapes 3* 
,.ull st;/s perishables1 price to be aonated 
to a charity before they shift them 5* 
Barry refuses to shift perishables 2 
Liverpool to. 2 
Avonr.outh handling fuel oil for hospitals »> 
„orth shields handling f i sh 1& 
Tilbury handling perishables 1« 
3out limp tor* refuses to handle perishables I 
x-ortsnouth alone in supplying auornsey Ш 
Лпtwerp dockers vri.ll not show solidarity 
with Br i t i sh dockers (reporter) 2 
Ulster formers shipping food i n v i a -tortpatrick 4 
Liverpool housewife organising students and 
house vriveo to shift с er goes, in the spirit 
of world war I I 1 
29 
« 
Table - the response of tho State to tho crisis 
(l) State of emergency 
It exists 5 
Sweeping powers, but electorally irresponsible 
to oppose them in circumstances (Callaghan) 1 
Prematurely enacted (Jack Jones) 1 
(2) Potential изе of troops 
Ministry of Defence continuously revising 
its aotion plans 3 
Troops available 24-48 hrs. notice 1 
Will troops be used to clear perishables? 9 
Either dockers shift p's or troops do 3 
When Antwerp dockers last struck, Belgian 
govt, immediately drafted them into army and 
sent them back under military command 
Opposition to use of troops (unions, workers) 
Harket porters won't handle troops1 goods 
(3) Court of enquiry 
It exists ^ 
Roqaest to dockers to return to work (Pearson) 1 
Arbitration only way out now (reporter) Z. 
Feather unsuitable as chairman 1 + 15 
(4) General 
Relevance of industrial relations law 4 
Employers should be leant on (Castle) 1 
Heutral, won't leanf will dockers please 
resume work (Carr) 
Jack Jones 3hould recall delegate conference P 
(to end tho strike)? we will not negotiate ? 
during it (Tonge) 
Table 5*ill - condemnation and support for the dockers, from 
outoido thoir o?m ranks. 
Should not strike (Heath) 1 
roderniced Felixstowe is strike-free (reporter) 1 
Employers inflexible & rigid (Tribuno MP's) 2 
Won't handle goods shifted by troops (porters) 2 
Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian, Swedish, French 
dockers refuse to handle diverted cargoes 3 
Felixstowe joins in strike 3 
12 
Table 5*iv - those called upon to speak. 
In all, 54 different people, in a total of 142 appearances. 
Tonge 17 
Agriculture I.Hniotor 11 
Carr 8 
Handling Ö 
Lewis (London Porto chairman) 1 
Retailers, wholesalers, export executives, 
Liverpool housewife, etc. (23 people) 28 
Other Conservative government representatives 
Total no. of appearances» 76 (*= 31) 
Jock Jones 19 
O'Leary (TGwTJ) Ю 
Total no. of appearances* 29 (» 2) 
Other Labour Party spokesmen 16 (- 7) 
Rank and file workers and unionists 21 (" 14) 
Total no. of appearances» 66 («= 23) 
Table 5.v.a - the subjects of the questions asked by media personnel. 
How long will the strike last? 
Desirability of arbitration? 
Court of enquiry? 
Return to work during enquiry? 
Temporary postponement of strike 
Will Jones reo all the delegates? 
Permission to local ports to shift perishables 
Degree of solidarity? 
Condition of the negotiations? 
Damage to econoqy? 
Reaction to the use of troops? 
Unreasonable nature of claim? 
Miscellaneous remainder 
Impact on ports' wage structure 
25 10 
8 
7 
6 
5 
6 
4 
9 
12 10 
7 18 
Table 5»v.b - sample of the wording of these questions. 
When asterisked A the questions are in ray- view implicitly 
hostile to the dockers1 or unions* case} or presented a favourable 
opening for the employers to condemn the dockers or unions. Questions 
marked with Ji are in my view hostile to the employers* case. 
July 9th BBC «•ммшмнмвммиямммвот 
(to O'Leary): й "What is it that would enable you to call the strike 
off?" A"But wages have been going up, and the employers soy that dockers* 
earnings now average £35 a week, and that this application is really the 
hidden form of a large pay-rise?" £"The employers do say that the basic 
rate has little bearing on earnings?" й"Aren't your dockers concerned 
at all, Hr. 0*Leary, about the damage that will be done to the country's 
ooonorqy?" fc"How long are you prepared to allow an all-out btrike to 
continue?" 
(to Топке) t "Иг. Tonge, the unions give the impression that a national 
dock strike is now inevitable} do you see it as bound to take place now?" 
"And onco it gets under way, how long do you think it might last?" fc"Can 
you spell out just how damaging it might be?" "Can you say what shipping 
will still take place?" £"The intervention of the DSP - you*re going 
to see them tomorrow, both sides separately - can this provide some kind 
of solution, do you see arbitration as bound to take place?" (U,Bi it 
is necessary to recall that decisions by an arbitration-panel would have 
been binding on the unions.) 
July 9 th ITII 
(to O'Loary)J "Is the strike how inevitable?" "Presumably the Govern-
ment will now intervene in some way - do you think there's anything 
they can do?" &"The employers say that if they gave in to your claim 
it would mean that the average dooker would earn probably over £50 a 
week - do you agree with that?" "If the strike does go ahead end if 
after some days the Government moves troops in to move food-cargoes, 
how would your members react?" 
July 10th ITII 
(to 0»Leary)> "Is there any sign of a peace formula?" "But you're 
still hopeful are you that a dock strike can be avoided?" ü"What 
about the possibility of arbitration - is this a starter?" A"But you 
wouldn't be bound by the findings of any arbitrator?" 
(to Tonge)i "And you're prepared are you to accept a trade union 
nominee as an arbitrator?" Ä"But someone like Uv* Vic Feather or 
another prominent trade unionist presumably wouldn't be acceptable to 
you?" A"If the unions didn't accept arbitration, can you see any other 
solution which will prevent a dock-strike next Tuesday?" 
July 13th BBC1 
ill nffL J?^ ) th° ***** really Postponed?" "Can you say what 
ГГ3 ' * V / U 1 y o u b0 recommending that the delegates accopt 
the offer?" i"Do you personally think it's a good one?" i"lf it 
ceemed as though tho employers refused to budge on the question of 
raising the time-rato, Fr. Jones, if they haven't done and you have 
somo other solution, do you think it'll be enough to persuade tho 
docker s that this is acceptable?" "Mr. Jones, this has been a long 
hard grind of negotiations - some people might allege it's been 11 brink-
manship on the part of both sides - whether it's that or not, do you 
think that these negotiations mi$it now lead to peace in the docks?" (to Tongq)« "Is this a climb dov/n?" "Was it really necessary to have 
this 11 eleventh hour brinkmanship business?" 
(to Carr)t "Would you say in any way that you've leaned on the enroloyers 
to buy out this spot of trouble?" "Is this an inflationary offer - or 
will it not prevent modernisation in the docks from going ahead?" 
July 16th. ITN (strike back on) 
(to Jack Jones)? "Are you surprised at the men's decision?" "Unless 
tho employers do increase the basic rate, io there any point at all in 
recalling the delegate conference to have a chance to call off tho 
strike?" "And no other compromise vrould ....?" "Do you think the 
strike could be a long one now?" 
(to gonge)» "Could this gap be bridged?" "Kow Kr. Jones says there's no chance at all of the strike ending unless you're prepared to increase 
tha time-rate: aro you prepared to do this?" 
July 18th, 
(to Jack Jones)t *"What about the not "condition", but good background 
to (the court enquiry), that the men should return to work?" &"So the 
strike will go on while the enquiry meets?" "How what about tho prospect 
of troops moving into the docks?" "You feel that a state of emergency 
shouldn't have been declared either?" 
(to Toпде): "!tr. Tonge* what's the employers' reaction to a court of 
enquiry?" "Do you think it's a likely method of finding a solution?" 
A"It does mean of course tnat the strike goes on in tho moan time?" 
&"Iou would have liked Jones to call another delegate conference 
and have asked the men to go back?" 
July 18th. ITH 
(to Jack Jones): ü"It's not worth recalling the delegate conferonoe 
because of this?" "Are you opposed to the use of troops in the docks 
to move food cargoes?" "But you don't think there'll be any rough 
stuff do you in the docks if troops move in?" 
(to Tonge)» "ZSr. Tonge, what's your reaction to the setting up of a 
court of enquiry?" A"The unions say okay to the court of enquiry, but 
they're not going to call off the strike in the moon time?" "The 
unions claim you're refusing to negotiate with them?" ll"Are you 
refusing to negotiate while the strike is on?" 11"Are you going t
8tick to that, if tho otrike goes on for three weeks or so - are you 
going to stay in your office and refuse to negotiate?" 
July 22nd« ITH 
(to Jack Jones)» "What exactly is an essential food - for instance 
are bananas or grapes or any fruit - are they essential foods?'1 
i,fIow Southampton for instance have already unanimously decided not 
to handle perishable goods - do you hope they111 ohange their minds 
when they get your letter?" "Even if troops do unload perishable 
cargoes, would they be handled in the markets?" "In other words, 
even if troops were used to unload ships, they wouldn't get these 
goods sold in the markets, because they wouldn't be handled thero?" 
&"3)o you really regard this as as far as you could have gone, or could 
you have given a more definite lead to the port workers in the indiv-
idual ports?" 
July 29th. ITH 
(to Jack Jones)» "fas the effort worthwhile?" fc"And you don't think 
you'd have got this without a strike?" "Although you haven't quite 
achieved what you came out on strike for, do you think there'll be a 
united return to work?" "Even on Merseyside?" 
(ü) Television current affairs coverago 
Table 5.vi - a sample of two sustained interviews on the dock 
strike from current affairs programmes. 
U ) 24 Hours, 15th July 
"Have you made any progress Ur. Tonge?" "Hone at all?" "You 
said earlier today that now the strike is om we've got no one 
to negotiate with - as I said Иг. Tonge, Lr. Jones is here in the 
studio, and he's already said that he's going to ask the employers 
to sit down and negotiate further* so would you like to say some-
thing to him directly now?" 
"A very fair offer Hr. Jones - what do you say to that?" "Could 
1 put the question to you Гг. Jones which I've just put to IJr. Tonget 
you've seen Mr. Robert Carr today and had long talks at the Ш ? -
do you think that any advance was made toward a settlement?" "Ied 
like to come back to that in a moment, but you see you зеу you don't 
want to hurt the есопощу - you're bound to, this of course is your 
strength - is that not so?" 
"Гг. Tonge, may I put this question to you; you see Kr. Jones finds 
you inflexible? he's said that you've said you won't oontinue 
negotiations v/ith the unions till they call off the strike; you 
won't meet him tomorrow if the strike is on; isn't it in the 
national interest to go on talking?" 
"How Mr. Jone3, I must put the question to you: the employers have 
said absolutely adamantly, firmly, there can be absolutely no 
negotiations until resumption of work; wouldn't it be more sensible 
to return to work and continue negotiations on the present offer -
as you suggested at the delegates' meeting today?" "...but it 
wasn't your personal opinion this morning?" 
"Do you deny completely Mr. ТопдэНг. Jones' accusation that you've 
been dragging your feet - I don't moan you personally, but your 
side?" "You deny this?" 
"Well 'quick' wasn't the word you were using this morning, you 
said that you're prepared for a long strike if need be - how long 
is 'long'?" "But how many weeks might that be? How long can you 
stand it? - how long can Britain stand it? - how long can the 
economy stand it?" 
"what do you say to that (I5r. Tonge)? - can you convince them?" 
"Gentlemen^  could 1 be presumptuous enough to make a suggestion 
that you do make an appointment to meet each other tomorrow? 
Kr. Tonge? Would you like to do it now - fix it up on the air?" 
"Do either of you feel you've moved an inch tonight? In any 
direction? Do you Mr. Tonge?w 
"V/oll, I do hope you'll make that telephone call tomorrow Mr. Jones." 
(2) This Week. 16th July 
"Would you accept that (the dockers have no case) Er. Jones?" 
"But the fact remains of course Lfr. Jones that the majority of 
the dockers are not on £11 a week and that "But what is 
the average wage of the dockers?" 
"i?r. Lewis, can I come to you for a moment; have you in fact 
refused to budge at all oinoe 1967?" 
"ffhile we're on the subject, just for a moment, may I ask you 
lir. Jones whether in fact you can confirm that an agreement has 
been signed as part of phase 2 of Devlin on this agreed rate of 
- £34*10.0 in the London docks?" "So why are the London dockers 
on strike?" "Why do you have to изе the sledgehammer of a 
national strike to deal with what is by your own admission a 
local problem?" 
"Lr. Lewis, can I just put it to you for a moment? now picking 
up what lx9 Jones has said? now the dockers have submitted claims they say, seven times in the last 18 months to you, and they add 
that you have in fact offered them nothing. How last Monday you 
come up with this offer» why the delay?" 
"But the faot remains, do you see, that it seems to me that every 
time that there's a major change in the system of Britain's docks 
it has to take place in an atmosphere of crisis? now do you feel 
that by delaying your decision to make an offer till last I.onday 
this was helping phase 2 of Devlin to go through?1' you not 
feel that you waited too long - that tho patience of the dockers 
ran out?" "l!r. Lewis, what is your bpinioh of the dockers' case?" 
"Gentlemen, can we go back to the docks for a moment, because if 
what matters 2Sr. Lewis is tho modernisation programme, are you 
prepared to increase the basic time-rate of the dockors in those 
ports that won't benefit from tho modernisation programme?" 
(iii) *res3 covers :o 
(a) Daily Mirror 
P-'** -vOGi. J'ZilbÜ ЖШаТ (20.6). ШДТН ill TS HIS FIMÜT CRISIS, ВОСШЗ 
i'Vxi iiATloIiAB SffilKS (24*6). DOCKS t IffiflMJII OF ЛСКЖГЗНТ (25.6). 
«ew crisis as dockers clash over pay deal (1.7). TROOPJ READY TO r.OVE 
UiTO TxLi BOCJLS. Miff SfiÄDS BY AS STRIKE THREAT GROWS. A SECHST РШ? 
oAVE FUCB SUP; LIES (9.7). ШШ1ВТШ CALLS TAIi.3 IK DOCKS CHI SIS. 
w-u^ w.o Л1Ш BOSSES i&f TODAY (10.7). ЖАТШ? ACTS AS BOCK TAU'S 
FAIL (11.7)* HOISS FADE AS DOCKS PEACE BID SHAGS 01. 
TnCTiCS Bf EMPLOYERS Ji CRISIS TALKS (13.7)» BOCKS STRIKE IS OFF 
i>Al OfPBR (14*7)» FBAaS OF BIO Ш 7 STRIKE BY BOCKURS. TO1I01 
ClilSFii PACE А ВлТТШ ШгМ Jäl DIAL. 30,000 ШЯ DEFY «STAY AT «ДЖМ 
Ciibb (15.7). The docke - peace or disaster (15.7)* BOCKSi A STATS 
OF EKLRGKb'CY. PORT CHIEFS SAY STRIKE COULD LAST А К0ШЕ. QtB^ i MAY 
ВИ .»SIJPL TO wIGK А И Ш Ш ' 1 0 1 , mm OP RISS и; HliGES. «Troops 
for docks1 talks» Strike threat to trade balance* (16.7)* LOCKS* 
i^T PRICES GO The docks I a way out. DOCKS STRIKE 13 SET Pffi 
КС 3. INQUIRY CHIEF TO BE 1ШШ1 TODAY. ilEAT ТШ IlSPUTS 13 
/J3t.IT ... АХШ WHY (17.7). BOCKS* Uli Oil ÄffiMS 01 TROOPS. STRIKE 1Ш 
ш т т IF A:LTIY irOVBS IK. HttCSS ЗНСШЛШ*T RISS, SAYS IHRISTER (18.7)* 
Troops in docks? Vital reports by ministers today* Cabinot crisis 
team fcet survey on food prices (20.7). The dock striko * why Ted isn't 
too dismayed. BOGUIRS GST TUC BACKIIiG. SURPRISE ОТ III THE BIG 
SVIilKE. IIP tells Of plea to Ms sons. (21*7 )• « Ш Ш TM FOOD1 ИлД 
TO DOCi-^3. MAU^ LIKG HUNTS I TROOPS CO I I IP BIXOIB REFUSE. Bosses 
are wernod of docks setback. Tho losers. HP'S 0ШЕ AS PRICES u0&* 
SUPPLIES OP FRESH ИГОХТ ÄUMIBG OUT (22.7)» UBLOAD FOOD CALL BI 
BOCKERJ1 те,-lows* CLAMP URGED Ol 'üKAT PROFITS. Щ Ж Ж Ж WARKED OF 11ШJlTSTiPIABLE• RISKS (23.7). BOCKS STRluEl FOOD PRICES - imSBuim 
A H D Qwmuz^T. Л tine to talk ... DOCKERS II; SGG-RUI; B A T T L E , FOOD 
TIГРЕХ* II:TC HARBOUR. (24.7). AIRLIFT BRI17GS 11 T I S F O O D . HUSH TO 
Ж Ж « i.'YTHINC THAT Ciffi FLY*. TRADERS И «BEAT DOCK STRIKE1 BIB (25.7). 
DOCK JEW II RG»f OVER AIRPORT JOBS (27*7). Ш» SET POE KKD TO DOCK 
STRIKE. The atrikei hustle - end hope (23.7). BAKAiiAS OVERBOARD. 
UNION III • B H D BOCK STRIKE« GALL (29*7). £20 FOR DOCKERS SETS OFF PAY 
НШЕ. игш: CHIEF »ШШЗ OF ORB CLAIÜS. Dock Strike i the liirror's 
honours list for 1970 (30.7). та® AFTER FORT SAYS U S TO GO BACK 
FLAK (31.7). 
(b) Pally Взгогоэв 
Pay crisis threatens port plans (19.6). 'All Out1 crisis at docks (24.6). 
Dockers get a £20 a week peace offer (30»6)# Porto warn dockers 1 £20 our best offer (1.7). TROOPS READY TO HOVE IK ON DOCK STRIKE (9.7). 
DOCKS: IIIITISTER STEPS IB (10.?). DOCKS 1 LET Ш TRY FOR PEACE, SAYS 
iEATHER (11.7). DOCKS 1 MORE HOPEFUL» 2 All PBACE MOVE DRAMA (13.7). 
DOCKS: LAST GASP REPRIEVE (I4.7). DOCKS STORM OVER 'V/ORK ON« PLEA (15.7). 
DOCKS: CABINET ACTS ON FOOD TODAY. STRIKE OFFICIAL. STATE OF EMERGENCY 
THIS WEEK? WHAT IT MEASS TO YOU (I6.7). FOOD PRICES WARNING. »WE'LL 
ACT TO CURB DOCK STRIKE INFLATION», MINISTER. LABOUR ROW OVER CRISIS 
M S (17.7). КО SHOP PANIC. 'SQUARE DEAL' PLEDGES ON FOOD. TROOPS 
WAIT TILL MONDAY FOR DOCKS MOVE (18.7). HOW SIZZLES OVER 'BACON AND EGG' 
RUN (20.7). HOARDING ROW GROWS* UP: I TOLD MY SOLDIER SONS TO DISOBEY 
ORDERS. %stery lorries at a lonely quay - but it's all business as 
usual. (21.7). TROOPS * DECISION DAY. FOOD PLAN TO DOCKERS (22.7). 
UNION PEACE MOVE Ш FOOD SHIPS (23.7). HOUSEWIVES FORCE FOOD HIICES 
DOWN (24.7). DOCK STRIKE« PROBABLE RESULT 'Ш MONDAY'; MEANWHILE 
PRICES MARK TIME. A reluctant dock striker: 'I believe unions should 
keep their word.' (25.7). GROCERS WARN: SOIE STOCKS LOW (27.7). 82 MSN 
I.IAY END THE DOCK STRIKE TOMORROW. CUSTOMER РСШЗН FORCES HIICES РСШ 
(28.7). FEATHER STEPS IN AS DOCKS HOPES RISE. Boss Burrell gotc set 
up to send in her 'dolly dockers'. 500 wives sign up to get food 
unloaded (29.7). BATTLE TO SAVE THE FOOD. DOCKERS BACK ON MONDAY (3О.7). 
(o) Daily Telegraph 
Strike chaos threat to dockyards (19*6). Dockers and doctors (19*6). 
NATIONAL DOCKS STRIKE CHALLENGE TO TORIES (24.6). Threat of first 
national dock strike since 1926 (24.6). DOCKERS CHALLENGE (24.6). 
Dockers' Ditch (25.6). Docks face dilemma over pay deal (27*6). 'Last 
chance' move to find docks peace (30.6). £20 minimum offer may end 
docks strike throat (1.7). Struggle for docks power (2.7). COCK PEACE 
MOVE BY PORT GROUP (3.7). DOCKERS' DEAL POSTPONED (4»7). Dock strike 
warning of crippling cargo delays (7.7). DOCK STRIKE NEARER (8.7). 
SOLDIER DOCKERS PLAN DISCUSSED (9•7). London docks plan at stake in 
union talks (9.7). CRISIS TALKS TODAY ON DOCKS. £5 STRIKE PAY FOR 
TRANSPORT ISN (10.7). Dock Challenge (10.7). TUC CHIEF IN DOCKS PEACE 
MOVE. TALKS AT IfflUSTRY HAKE NO PROGRESS (11.7). Good-tempered aid in 
docks dispute (11.7). STRIKE WILL HIT EXPORTS (11.7). DOCK STRIKE PEACE 
HOPES FADING. DEADLINE PASSED IN MIDNIGHT TALKS (13.7). DOCKERS CALL 
OFF STRIKE. VOTE TOMORROW ON PAY OFFER (14*7). Dock respite (14.7). 
GLASGC.7 DOCKERS VOTE TO STRIKE (14.7). 29000 DEFY PEACE CALL IN DOCKS. 
CRISIS TALKS TODAY: 159 SHIPS IDLE (15.7). STRIKE Y/1LL I,SAN STEEL 
RATIONING (15.7). 5-WEEK STRIKE RISK IN DOCKS. 2000 TROOPS COI.ÜNG 
BACK FROH ULSTER (I6.7). DEADLOCK COMPLETE (16.7). M3AT PRICES TO 
RISE AFTER A Y/EEK (16.7). REPORT TO CABINET BY MAUDLING (16.7). 
Shipo fall victim to strike bound London docks (16.7). Emergency in 
the docks (16.7). 200 SHIPS CAUGHT IB POET BY STRIKE (16.7). STATE 
OF EMERGENCY FOR BOCKS. UNIONS REBUFF CARRi FOOD HIICES PLAIT (17.7). 
CARR'S BACK TO WORK CALL FAILS (17.7). Bockers» earnings up by £25 a 
week sinco ond of war (17*7)• Carr renews plea to unions to halt dock 
strike (17»7). Bookers show grim resolve as emergency is declared (17.7). 
Tho Queen returns to crisis (17*7). ARMY READY TO GO INTO THE DOCKS. 
LORD ffi ARS Oil WILL HEAD ENQUIRY (I8.7). QUICK REPORT WANTED (18.7). 
EMERGENCY P0>7ERS III FORCE (18.7). DOCKERS DRAW £116 AFTER 98-HOUR WEEK 
(18.7). MINISTER WARNS FOOD PROFITEERS (18.7). Need strikers be 
subsidised? (I8.7). STRIKERS ANXIOUS TO KEEP TROOPS OUT OF DOCKS (2О.7). 
liüNISTER TOURS MARKETS (20.7). POLICE DEFEND BACON А1Ф EGG FLEET (20.7). 
Docks dispute leaders have a quiet weekend (20.7). Butchers fear meat 
scarcity (20.7). MP TELLS ARMY SONS TO DISOBEY (21.7). STRIKE HITS 
lELIXSTOffB (21.7). HOARDERS STOCKPILE CHANGES (2U7). Dock strike 
powers »are solely to protect nation1 (21.7). Reserve powers only (21.7). 
Union militants v. moderates (21.7). DOCK Р0Ш BACKING FOR MAUDLING 
(21.7). DOCKERS GIVEN FINAL CHANCE TO ШУЕ FOOD (22.7). S^AT HIICES 
ARE STILL RISING (22.7). Agreement before work, say dockers .(22.7). 
Minister faces price •cave-in' attack (22.7). Soldier sons defy MP en 
docks order (22.7). UNION LOBBY BY RELUCTANT STRIKERS (22,7). DOCKERS 
ADVISED BY JONES TO HELP ШУЕ FOOD (23.7). Dock strike costing drivers 
their jobs (23.7). Fair shares plan for oranges (23.7). Dockers relent 
(23.7). MP SAYS ARMY SONS WERE NOT INTERVIEWED (23.7). KAUDLING WARNS 
DOCKERS (24.7). DOCKERS HJSH EGG LORRY IN HARBOUR (24.7). Paaio buying 
makes sugar scarce (24.7). Dockers beat up driver, says onlooker (24.7). 
How over threat to use troops in docks strike (24.7). Ships wait to 
enter paralysed docks (24.7). DOCKERS REJECT PLEA TO HOVE FOOD CARGOES 
(25.7). Night airlift at Luton to beat strike (25.7). 46000 tons of 
food hold up (25.7). Fishermen 'ready for dockers' (25.7). SHOPS 
RATION SUGAR AFTER PANIC BUYING (25.7). £2 OFFER TO DOCKERS LIKELY. 
PEARSON EMPHASIS ON PRODUCTIVITY (27.7). FOREIGN PLAUES JOIN AIRLIFT 
(27.7). Christmas turkeys in danger through docks strike (27*7)* Winter 
coal supplies threatened (27.7). Banana boats plea to dookere (27*7). 
'Bacon and egg run' watched by pickets (27.7). DOCKS UNIONS IN TOUCH-
AND-GO PEACE VOTE (28.7). £320,000 BANANAS DUMPED (28.7). BELGIANS 
MAY END BAN (28.7). Pearson formula gives extra £2 a week (28.7). 
Hope for peace this week (28.7). Up to the dockers (28.7). DOCK STRIKE 
MAY CONTINUE (28.7). PEACE HOFE GROWING IN DOCKS. PEARSON PLAN WINS 
KEY UNION VOTE (29.7). More banana cargoes face dumping (29.7). 1 Ifettieoat docker' threatened (29.7). DOCKERS TO RETURN ON MONDAY. 
WARNING TO UNIONS OK LOCAL CLAIMS (30.7). FRUIT WORTH £730,000 MAY 
ROT (30.7). The dockers accept (30.7). She dockers' dilemma* what 
the docks' settlement leaves unresolved (30.7). DOCK THREAT BY MILITANTS 
RECEDING (31.7). Lower food prices are on the way (31.7). 
Chapter Sixt The coverage of race relations 
Following the last chapter's coverage of the 197 0 national 
docks strike, this chapter will concentrate on the coverage of material 
under the general heading of 'race relations' over the same period? 
June 19th to July 51st, 1970. There is no single issue which dominated 
tho news media output in the same way related to race, as there was to 
industry* Nevertheless, an analysis of the ТУ output over this period, 
as of the Ргезз output (in the three newspapers selected), does show 
certain frequency patterns. The three issues which together took up 
most of the time and space devoted to race relations were immigration 
(which without exception meant black immigration), domestic race 
relations, and the debate about providing arms for South Africa's 
government. In the case of the Press, therefore, content analysis 
will be restricted to investigating the kinds of coverage these three 
areas received! in the case of television, tho net will be cast a 
little wider. The television and press coverage of each topic will 
be taken together, and not separated as in the last chapter. 
(1) 1 Immirxation 
(е-) Television covora^ e. As con be seen from Table 6.i on 
TV" coverage appended to this chapter, out of 37 items and 118 minutes 
of air timo, on British race relations, 28 of the items and 79 minutes 
of the air time were devoted to black immigration, rather than to the 
relationship between racial groups as such in British societyt 76$ of 
the itcm3, or 67^ of the air time. 
Beginning then with the questions of British internal race 
relations and black immigration, it is quite clear from this sample 
that for the TV news media the most important componont of British 
race relations was the immigration question. Insofar аз in this study 
interest is less in single acts of (mass) communication than on the 
continuous maps of social life drawn by the ongoing output of the news 
media, this heavy weighting in the material on Britain is very signif-
icant. It demonstrates that whatever the mode or modes of presentation 
of these items might hove been, the effective definition of tho aro a 
of moot concern in British race relations was immigration* Whether 
you were "for" it or "against" it was a further question? but that It 
was the nub of the question, was not in doubt. 
Hartmann and Husband found in thoir survey of tho British 
Bress betwoen i960 and 1969 an identical picture, that immigration 
was the major category of news about black people. They conclude that 
the Press has continued to project "an image of Britain as a white 
society, in which the coloured population is seen as some kind of 
aberration rather than as "belonging" to the society" (1). 
It may reasonably be argued that this characteristic of news 
presentation on television represented a very considerable victory for 
the view reiterated in one wing of British politico that whon it came 
to "immigration" (that is, black people), "numbers are of the essenoe" 
(2). It raises the further question of how for Enoch Powell in 
particular has succeeded in grasping a similar relationship with the 
news media that Senator Joseph EoCarthy managed to achieve in the 
United States (3). In other words, once it was clear following Powellfs 
speech on block immigration in Birmingham on April 20th 1968 that 
sections of the public were prepared to take overt action (stoppages, 
marches) for and against his position on this subject - that is to 
say, that he and it were undoubtedly "news'1 - then both ho and other 
politicians expressing those views gained a place in tho public 
political spectrum which they had not enjoyed previously (4). 
Onco again, the study by Hartmann and Husband elicited data 
which support this analysis. Even among schoolchildren they discovered 
a keener awareness of Powell than any other politician. In their 
newspaper survey, they found that over 1968-69 one-sixth of all news-
paper items on British race relations had some reference to him. As 
they say, 
"It seemed as though once Powell and his views 
became incorporated into the frame of reference 
within which race in Britain has come to be 
reported the press found it difficult to mention 
the subject without bringing Powell into it" (5)» 
The result has been arguably that despite the personal distantiation 
of quite a number of journalists from Enoch Powell on this subject, the 
categories employed by both him and the news media have been virtually 
the same, with oonsequent powerful reinforcement of Iiis definition of 
the situation. This is discussed further in chapter 7> section iii. 
(b) Press coverage. The Bally Mirror had no editorials during 
this period on the subject of black immigration. It had 9 items, as 
against tho Daily Express* 20 and the Daily Telegraph*s 46. Five of 
.^ fcrror headlines (quoted in the Appendix) concerned illegal immi-
gration, and apart from the first front page one which appeared to bo 
presenting the illegal Indian immigrants as a form of contraband 
s^eized', 'swoop1), the headlines seem fairly straightforward (6). 
The Daily Express editorials on black immigration appeared 
on June 27th, July Jrd and 21st. On the first occasion the Express 
attacked what it labelled the "ploy" of British citisens of Asian 
descent living in East African countries to gain admittance by being 
shuttled about tho world's airports for a few weeks in the confident 
expectation the UK would eventually give way and let them in. It 
argued that travel firms and airlines carrying them should be warned 
they would be refused facilities in Britain If they continued to do so. 
Shis was certainly one interpretation of the plight of this virtually 
stateless category of persons created by the 1968 Commonwealth Immigra-
tion Act (7) j though there was complete omission of consideration of 
their plight or of tho impact of being in transit for weeks at a time» 
On July 3rd, after 40 illegal immigrants from India had been 
found by police in a cellar in Bradford, the Express labelled the 
traffic slave trade and said it had nothing to do with polioy on 
immigration one way or tho other} that it was a humanitarian issue; 
that people should not be compelled to travel long and devious journeys 
at extortionate prices| and that the police of all countries should 
unite to end this exploitation. To claim the traffic had nothing to 
do with immigration policies was not entirely accurate, since in the 
presumptive absence of tight immigration control laws, they would not 
havo had to enter by that route in the first place. Since they were 
also able to find work, it can hardly be claimed either that laws 
against black immigration reflected the particular labour needs of 
the economy at that period. The July 21st editorial, headed "The Heal 
Quarry" sounded more or less the same note, stressing it was the 
organisers and not the immigrants who were being rightly hunted in a 
massive police operation. The traffic was again designated as a 20th 
century slave trade. 
14 out of the 20 Express headlines were concerned with illegal 
immigration, and presented it in extremely dramatic terms» 1 swoop', 
•ghost ship hunt', 'smuggling racket', 'immigrant hunt swoop', 'migrant 
alert', 'Pakistani smuggling plot', 'police clamp on migrant coast' 
(щу italics), 'channel police link to foil immigrants', «СИ "sailors" 
swoop on boatload'. There was also a reference on July 2nd to the 
'Black Hole' in which the immigrants were found. Hartmann and Husband 
(8), rightly in this writer's view, comment on this headline that the 
likely effect of such a headline is to encourage readers to link past 
colonial relationships to Inaions, with present race relations in 
Britain. But perhaps the most alarmist headline of all was, »Illegal 
migrants 'pay with drugs'. To unite illegal black immigration with 
the much-feared and little-understood phenomenon of the spread in 
Britain of dependence on dangerous drugs, seems heedless of the likely-
impact on public anxiety of such allegations. 
The two Daily Telegraph editorials on black immigration 
appeared on June 29th and July 7th. The June 29th one was the fourth 
leader, and was entitled "Sense About Immigration". It was by way of 
an authoritative notice of a series of essays published by the Institute 
of Economic Affairs, called Economic Issues in Immigration. The editorial 
began by noting that "cant and bigotry" of mafcy varieties had character-
ised the British discussion of immigration into Britain. It instanced 
the backfiring of the Alf Gamett character-series on BBC T? as a spur 
to racial tolerance, and the uselessness of supposing that without open 
discussion the issues will disappear, as failures of liberal attitudes 
on the raoo question. It therefore welcomed the book as a "dispassionate" 
study of the economic impact of "mass immigration" (my italics). It 
noted that the theory of labour shortage was kicked downstairs by one 
author as a total fallacy, and that this calm study concluded the net 
effect of immigration "was not encouraging". It found the "most 
impressive" arguments to be in one chapter, which argued that compensa-
tion to East African Asians refused the admission guaranteed by their 
passports should be debited against aid to the East African country 
in question! "hardly more than justice, surely", claimed the editorial. 
It also noted that "the general theme seemed to be that we had acquired 
a large migrant population in a fit of absent-mindedness", and that one 
of the economists had argued for the reconstruction of Britain's 
citizenship laws. 
This very last point raises most sharply of course the whole 
tenor of the editorial, which seemed to argue that on a rational view 
tho admission of black migrant workers had been most ill-advised 
(ал implication being perhaps that it ought to bo rectified)» Why 
the premises of particular economists should be assumed "dispassionate", 
and in particular how citizenship law could properly bo handled by an 
economic modol, was left unstated. It was possibly significant that 
another book on the economics of immigration published about the same 
time did not receive the same treatment, although referred to briefly 
on the inside pages of the Telegraph (July 2nd), which conversely 
argued that immigrants had made a once-for-all positive contribution 
to the British economy* What should not be overlooked, however, was 
the general assumption that economic arguments were a legitimate level 
at which to place an overall minus-sign or plus-sign against the presence 
of black people in British society. 
The July 7th editorial concerned itself with illegal immigra-
tion, and was headed "Gatecrashers". It estimated on the basis that 
one hundred illegal migrants had been discovered in the previous six 
months, that detection for most orimes was a little under 50$, and 
that It was likely to bo lower than average for this particular offence, 
that perhaps 6000 people had illegally entered over the previous decade. 
The numbers did not matter, said the editorial} but the profit made out 
of extortion, the threat of blackmail, the loss of citizenship rights, 
should be stopped. "They ore our new helots", said the Telegraph. 
There appears to be a disjunction between this position of 
editorial rectitude and humanitarian horror, on the one hand, and the 
definition of the subject in the columns on the other. The heading 
alone - "Gatecrashers" - tells quite a different story; and if all 46 
headlines of the Telegraph in the sample are analysed, the discrepancy 
becomes still clearer. «Asian queue-jumpers1, «police seize "smuggled 
Indians" boat«, «international gang', 'police step up hunt', 'European 
check on Asians', 'menaced by blackmail', 'protection link', '2000 
Indians smuggled in', 'migrants plot' (my italics) 'immigration controls 
"inefficient"', '68 more', '3000-a-year illegal entry!, 'world ring', 
•stronger action on immigrants', 'police talk of migrant register', 
'doubt cast on migrant figures', 'coast blockade for immigrants' 
(щу emphasis), «4 countries tackle immigrants1, 'Indian "tourists" 
flooding into Bavaria', 'Bavarians and Indian "invaeion"' (my emphasis), 
end finally 'Big increase in Special' » 
It is clear from this what a wafer-thin gap exists between 
condemnation of exploitation of illegal immigrants, and concern at 
the efficiency of an international operation in increasing the numbers 
of black 'invaders'» In the 'Telegraph as in the Express the headlines 
betray a drift into a laager or siege mentality» 36 out of 46 Telegraph 
headlines arc about illegal immigration, either via smuggling or by 
ohuttlecockod East African Asians. Tho whole focus, despite one disavowal 
in the editorial in each paper, is on the migrants themselves. The 
significance of this focus, and its relation to the ideology of the 
nation, is rsomething which will bo discussed further on. 
However, it is worth making one remark now, before proceeding 
to the next section on domestic race relations. It might be argued that 
the volume of material on (blaok) immigration was generated by a sudden 
wave of illegal immigration; and that consequently the weighting 
toward this topic in the treatment of British race relations by tho 
news media was accidental or occasional. This view is effectively 
contradicted by two considerations. Firstly, the findings of Hartmann 
and Husband, cited on page 176. Second, by the astonishing ratio 
between tho amount of attention and the numbers actually involved 1 as 
already noted, the Daily Telegraph was active in its condemnation of 
illegal immigration, yet estimated that fjerhaps 6ООО people had illegally 
entered over the previous deoade (amounting to 0.0001^ of a population 
of 50 millions). If any index were needed of the importance of black 
immigration in tho dominant media analysis of British race relations, 
it is this ratio of media space to immigrant numbers. 
i i. Bore о tip, race relations 
M -gelcvioiott соуегшго. living on to the coverage of doaeoti© 
raco rol&tiouo that did not deal with black immigration - the minority 
remainder - it is moat convenient to oonccntr$to on just fivo topics. 
(Those inoludod along with iteaa on oxtomal race relations under tho 
heading iäooQllanooua in Sable 6#i wore subjects like a 10 sccond shot 
of irinco Charles talking to vom Africans at the С oronasal th Secreta-
riat, soma English Jews daubing Soviet Hussion promises, the threat to 
tho life of a keinen athloto (source uncertain) coapoting at the 
Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh, and so on.) The five significant 
topics were three items in the Ku»o on the shock of the norsr Conservative 
Minister of Housing at finding 32 '.Yost Indian tenants in a oinglo Brixton 
house, on tho annual report of the Community Eolations Commission, aid 
on a march by West Indians on Caledonian Eoad police station in London| 
together with two curront affairs items, ono on racial discrimination 
by private employment agencies, the other on the difficulties suddenly 
encountered by a white man whose skin had been darkened by a kidney 
ailment. In their various ways, all those items wero important tests 
of the presentation of race relations in tho British news media x 
housing, employment and the polio« are all key institutions in British 
race relational the Community Relations Commission ie one of tho two 
major administrativ« agenoios sponsored by Government in the raos 
relations area; and the opportunities for a white person to experience 
English life as a blaok person, without tho escape-route afforded by 
temporary pigmentation, aro virtually non-existent. 
The threo news itess wore oxtroaoly short, occurring on 7 
different bulletins end taking up only 10 minutoe of air time between 
then. (The contrast with the ti&o allocated to black immigration is 
once again inosoapablo. ) Tho presentation given to roter Walker» at 
that stage the now Conservative Minister of Lousing, аз ho expressed 
shook and anger that peoplo could be forced to live in such crmped 
conditions, fell into the oatogory of rolaying without questioning. 
In other words, virtually any person who had any experience at all of 
housing in inner London boroughs over the previous 20 years (quite 
apart from any earlier period), knew that such conditions existed and 
in certain words were commonplace. To have condemned the conditions 
(as he did) was one thing? but surprise ill became the Minister of 
Housing. This information had been made available intermittently in 
tho new3 media for a decade or more? and his own officials could have 
given it to him from the Miner Holland Report or the Cullingvrorth 
Report (9). Neither on the Hews nor elsewhere on television was there 
evidence of the independent questioning role that for most journalists 
represents the perceived stock-in-trade of their profession. 
The annual report of the Community Relations Commission was 
discussed on TV Hows by its then chairman Frank Cousins, who was soon 
to re tiro from his post. He enunciated one standard view on the nature 
of British race relations. In this case the component elements of the 
definition of the situation were as follows» the real race problem in 
Britain consisted of those politicians who like Enoch Powell inflamed 
people's prejudices? the link between violent attacks on Pakistanis 
and tho 'skinhead' phenomenon was unfair to the 'skinheads', since it 
was only a minority of hooligans within that group of young people who 
wore actually guilty of these assaults? and the alienation between 
black poople and the British police force could be ascribed to the fact 
that only a tiny proportion of black people actually entered the force. 
Now one of the moot standard characteristics of a situation 
of racial conflict is that there are at least two definitions of every 
situation. In this instanco, commonplace views which diverged from 
the above included the view that Powell was helpful by ventilating a 
live issue which had been 'swept under the carpet', or that ho was only 
able to have his effect Ьосаизе of the virulence of British racism in 
the first place. Some people denied that the phenomenon of 'Paki-
bashing' was only to be connected with 'skinhead' assaults? rather that 
there were assaults, some of them by 'skinheads', on Pakistanis. Views 
on the relation between the police force and black people also included 
one that no problem existed at all end that qualified black applicants 
never presented themselves? and alternatively, that black policemen 
and policewomen would be treated as renegades by their reference groups. 
None of these alternative interpretations was presented to the public % 
and further, no black person was asked to speak about any of the three 
points raised. In tho same way that tho coverage of the docks strike 
gave little prominence to the views of ordinary people as compared to 
tho various elite figures involved, so here there was the spectacle of 
tho white head of a government agency in charge of »community relations* 
speaking on bohalf of black people in an apparently authoritative 
manner. 
Certainly the reporter's questions gave no hint that what was 
being discusood was hotly contested in the country among the people 
referred to (10)| on the alienation of the black population from the 
police, he asked "This view of the police is obviously something you'll 
havo to tackle - how do you propose to do it?" The whole drift of the 
question presupposed, not that there was any truth in the allegations 
of harassment and worse common among blaok people in Britain, but that 
it was a view whioh had to be tahkled. There are strong implications 
in the phrasing of the question of irrationality to be conquered. It 
may bo said then that the reporter on this occasion was very much a 
party to tho impression of the bulletin-item that disagreement on these 
components of race relations was confined to powellite politicians, 
•skinhead'-haters, and anyone who could not understand the value of 
having "several hundred" black policemen and policewomen (Cousins). 
Given that this item wa3 so rare an opportunity for the British public 
to understand more about the real complexities of British race rela-
tions, its limitations were considerable. 
The two bulletins (BBC and ITH) which covered the march by 
West Indians on the police station in Caledonian Road, Islington, wore 
quite different in stylo. Hows At Ton simply rehearsed tho charges 
against some of the participants in the march: obstruction, abusive 
words, wilfäl damage, assault on a police officer. It added that in 
the courtroom there had been shouts from the gallery of "fascist pigH, 
and some Black Power salutes. The bulletin offered no explanation of 
why the march had token place, nor were any of the participants inter-
viewed for their versions. 
By contrast, the BBC at least had a relatively well-informed 
white journalist who lived locally and had some contact with the problems 
of the area, to present his view that a common pattern in the neighbour-
hood was for the general frustrations experienced by Blacks and Whites 
alike to be ventilated on each other, rather than on their real sources. 
This was not an explanation of the actual march, nor did it necessarily 
represent the local Blacks* views on the situation} but at least it 
offered some possible illumination on the general background to tho 
occurrence, which was completely absent from the ITH account. It thus 
represents a departure from the того usual news items on race relations 
which have been surveyed so far. 
The two current affairs items (both 24 Hours), on racial 
discrimination in private employment bureaux, and on a man in Poole, 
Dorset, whose skin had turned brown after a kidney disease, were both 
important because quito atypically for the news media as a whole they 
raised the question of whether the problem in British internal race 
relations is primarily constituted by black immigration or white racism. 
The piece on employment bureaux centred around the Conduit chain in 
London, Y/here a group of former employees who had been dismissed for 
publicising the managements unofficial discrimination policy, confronted 
the Conduit managing director. It was an important item, because it 
became apparent that the management had even gone to tho point of i33uing 
a written and official statement of policy against racial discrimination, 
as a prophylactic against prosecution under the Race Relations Act. 
The ineffectiveness of that legislation to cope with the subtle and 
pervasive practice of discrimination in employment agencies waa thoroughly 
ventilatod, against the protests of the managing director. 
The Poole man with the kidney complaint, George Tonkin, 
described how after his skin had changed to being brown strangers had 
accosted hin in the street and called hin 'wog1! how in a club that 
he had entered to play опоокег» а menbor rofused to pley against hin; 
and how ho suspected that conbinod with his kidney-ailment, his new 
skin-colour was making it almost impossible for hin to get a job after 
having recently loft hospital» Ho and his wife (who was interviewed 
with Mm) admitted to going out together only in hie osrf in order to 
avoid tho stares people gave to an apparently oixod-race couple* His 
wife, painfully, confessed to her own racial prejudice, and the personal 
torture that being identified as tho wife of a black man inflicted upon 
her. ir. Tonhin stated plainly that ho had had not tho slightest notion 
of how much racial prejudice was rife in English society, until his own 
involuntary changc of colour. Tho very significant statement that was 
being ncdo about British raoe relations was somewhat defused by the 
interviewer, who instead of developing those implications chose instead 
to ask thea what they now thought of racial intermarriage. Given the 
groat infrcquency of racial intermarriage in Britain, its occurrence 
mostly in certain highly specific status categories, and its peripheral 
connection with tho roal fabrio of British roco relations, this question 
must stand as a clear instance of tho oisdireoted redetermination of 
tho course of a discussion by a proeontor who had apparently littlo 
awarenoos of the social realities with whioh ho was dealing. Neverthe-
less, those two itoms togothor constituted an unusual chcncc to under-
stand, race relations in Britain from a "non-imigration" perspoctivo. 
(b) Jfresa caverwo* Doneetic racism was discussed in. 0:10 M k 
rirror editorial on Juno 24th. Entitled "Colour Unconscious", it was 
a conraent on tho Annual Report of the Community Relations Commission 
(already nentioncd in tho 77 analysis), and effectively accepted the CRC1 
definition of the racial situation. It argnой that what was needed to 
overcome racialism wee "colour-blindness", and claimed that the solution 
ley in tho hands of black and whito young people, who woro mostly- free 
of colour prejudice. Attacks by 'skinheads» were explained in terms 
of thoir proclivity for assaulting anyone defenceless. The grounds of 
racial prejudice were stated to he the feeling by Whites that their 
jobs and living standards wero threatened, or the feeling by Blacks 
that they didn't have a fair chance. Schools and community relations be 
councils wore declared to/vital agencies in combatting both prejudice 
and the enoch powells who would always bo with us. If they did not 
manage to fulfil this role, violent conflict would plague British 
society. 
Precisely the kind of liberalism which would enrage the 
В ally Telegraph's leader writers, this definition resembled the BBC 
item on the Report in owing very little to the realities of life either 
among tho young (black and white), or in schools or community relations 
councils. There was displayed in the editorial an inbuilt assumption 
that schools are islands of raoial understanding and harmony, and that 
the community relations councils are effective in promoting that harmony 
further (ll). And, with the CRC Report, the significance of attacks 
by 'skinheads' on Pakistanis was muted by the statement that vicious 
hooligans will exercise themselves on any target, and are not simply 
racialist. Why this should be a sign of hope for the future was not 
explained. 
Out of 15 other items on domestic racism, it is hard to find 
a clear pattern. The three outside page items were about demonstrations 
against white South African participation in the Wimbledon tennis tourn-
ament, a white English policewoman marrying a Kenyan Asian constable, 
and tho Caledonian Road police station demonstration. Two items on 
medical incompetence by Commonwealth doctors, a reference to tho high 
coot of a murder case involving Pakistanis, and a report of a whito 
businessman in court that he had been pilloried and threatened by 
Ш-chael X and some of his associates, might bo thought unfavourable 
elements in the map drawn of black members of the society. The . 
headlines were favourable to the Community Relations Commission 
(2 references) and the Race Relations Board (1 roference). 
It would be fair to oay that the Mirror's position on race 
relations was one in favour of harmony and assimilation, and hostile 
to anything that threatened that harmony, whether Powell's speeches or 
the Caledonian load police station demonstration. The item about the 
police marriage which received such prominence did so not only out of 
rarity value, but perhaps even more so for its significance as a potent 
symbol of assimilation at a particularly sensitive location in the 
social structure. The Mirror's capacity for explanation or critical 
comment (in the case of Peter Walker and the Brixton tenants, or the 
Caledonian Road affair) was however as weak as that of TV. 
Tho Daily Express had no editorial at all on domestic racism} 
to a certain extent this analogue with the absence of a Mirror editorial 
on immigration during the period of the sample gives a clue to the 
difference in emphasis on race relations between the two papers, the 
Mirror being less concerned with black immigration and more interested 
in the internal situation, and the Express the reverse. However, these 
distinctions should not be made too much oft tho Express had 25 items 
on domestic race relations, only one less than its items on black 
immigration. 
The allocation of prominence was identical t the three front 
page items in the Expross during the period were the Wimbledon tennis 
demonstration, the marriage of the two police force members, and the 
Caledonian Rood affray. On the other hand, there was a markedly greater 
tendency to report highly unfavourable items in the Express. To the 
Ш-chael X story and two references to the incompetence of foreign doctors, 
were added no fewer than 5 references to two murder cases involving 
Pakistanis (identified аз such), 3 references to violent crime by black 
youth, and another one to tho Caledonian Road episode. The Express 
approach to racial harmony may be gauged from two headlines! "Head-
master ends race hatred in tho boxing ring", and "Learning English with 
an Eton accent". The map drawn for readers of the Express would be 
likely to serve to reinforce any hostile prejudices they already held 
against black people. 
Tho Sally, Telegraph editorials appeared on June 24th, and 
July 1st, 3rd and 20th. The first, headed "Tennis and the Demos", 
began with a nod in the direction of condemning harassment of block 
immigrants, but spent most of its space on Peter Hain arid the threat 
of demonstrations against white South African participation in the 
Wimbledon tennis tournament. It argued that it had not been the 
merits of the case, which were "obscure and debatable", that forced 
cancellation of tho South African crickot tour, but the threats of 
disruption. It argued that if the conspiracy laws were not sufficiently 
well framed to prevent this recurring, they should be reformed. 
On July 1st, under the heading "Colour Obsession" the 
Telegraph attacked tho annual report of the Race Relations Board. The 
Act itself, it stated, was to a great extent "silly and potentially 
mischievous"? and so was the latest Annual Report, which actually 
lamented tho low number of complaints against discrimination that it 
received. In the view of the Telegraph, this could lead to a situation 
where "some official could go round bawling to every coloured immigrant 
that he should examine all his failures in life to see if colour may 
not be the cause." The ability of the Board to initiate its own 
complaints could well maintain colour consciousness beyond its natural 
life, complained tho editorial, and "will contribute nothing to 
integration". 
On July 3rd, under the heading "Walker Appalled" it commented 
on the Housing Minister's visit to a multi-occupied house in Brixton. 
The indignation expressed by Walker struck a different chord with the 
Telegraph to tho theme of race relations. Indeed, it explicitly denied 
that this form of wretched accommodation was due to exploitation by 
landlords, black or white. The root cause of tho problem, which a 
Conservative goverment would be ready to tackle at source, was "the 
general shortage and misallocation of houses". The answer to the 
problem lay not in rent restriction, itself a major contribution to 
the problem, but in "a ftoer market in housing, with subsidies more 
sensibly distributed." Effectively, the desire to defend landlords 
against attack overrode the raoial consideration of tho story} the 
editorial even compared landlords end immigrants as people who oould 
not win, either by bolng crammed together and tolerating it, or by 
о vie ting people, or by getting good housing (respectively). 
On July 20th, the editorial surveyed racial excluoiveness 
around the world, with particular attention to Kenya, under the heading 
Hiiot so much race as ..." It argued that in Kenya, despite unpleasant 
and racialist overtones in the opposition to non-nationals, the desire 
of Kenyan nationals for a "place in the sun" when colonial rule had 
been over for some time, was entirely comprehensible and legitimate. 
It went on to argue that some "moral indignation" about the plight of 
those Asians who had their promises reneged on "(for whatever empirical 
reasons)" would be much more in place that protests against apartheid 
in South Africa about which we could do nothing. 
Out of the Telegraph's 45 headlines on internal race relations, 
only two reached the outside pages, and then neither in very great 
prominence. The one was recording Powell's record majority in the 
General Election, the other the Caledonian Road affray. 4 items 
covered post-election arguments by defeated Labour MPs that powellism 
had contributed to their defeat} and another 4 were on a murder case 
involving Pakistanis (already mentioned). The headlines on this last 
issue were quite unnecessarily race-relatedt 'Ко body murder QQ tells 
of Pakistanis1 lies', 'body in sea story by Pakistani', 'Pakistani bore 
no sign of torture, court told', 'Pakistani in plot to hide wifefs 
body gets 10 years'. A further 13 headlines were related to the Community 
Eolations Commission or the Race Relations Board, which clearly formed 
a topic-area of special interest for the Telegraph (and of special 
hostility as well). Tho Peter Simple column in particular specialised 
in biting attacks on the 'success story* of the race relations industry, 
as the one major growth area in the British economy, it alco violently 
attaoked the Race Relations Board for attempting to institute totalitarian 
thought control to prevent us thinking what (racialist) thoughts we 
wished, and described the regret expressed in the RRB'o Annual Report 
at the low number of black people complaining against discrimination 
to it, as "Think Bigot!" Lastly, it was clear that the Tele/sraeh on 
this and other counts, rejected any objections to Kr. Powell -
especially to his right to state his views as and when he thought fit. 
The prominence given to his record majority by itself is no special 
indication of this, since other papers and TV bulletins did the samef 
but the next headline, quoted in the appendix to this chapter, is to 
a quotation from the Kew York Times accusing Powell of deliberately 
encouraging racialism, and Heath of failing to counter its "Progress 
of a lie" (in the Wa^ r of the World column). And tho sudden elevation 
of a member of an obscure immigrant association in Wolverhampton to a 
quite prominent and large placing on the inside pages calling for 
Powell to head a new "race ministry" seemed calculated to try to 
dampen tho public imago of the (obvious) reaction to Powell among 
black immigrants, as unfavourable. It seemed to be predicated on the 
argument that if one immigrant can be found to say he is wholeheartedly 
behind Enoch Powell, then the charge against the latter of being a 
racist is unfounded - presumably because the black population is 
divided on this issue. 
In general, the stance of the Paily Telegraph on domestic 
racism was to oppose it in declaratory terms, while considering that 
any of the governmental actions against discrimination contributed 
directly to its persistence. The image of the world in these editorial 
columns and elsewhere is of one in whioh order and decency are perpet-
ually being threatened and played havoc with by interference in standard 
social processes. The very existence of widespread racial discrimina-
tion was discounted in essence by the assumption that few complaints 
to the Race Relations Board meant that few people actually had grievances. 
It is an assumption of the most extraordinary complacency, and lack of 
contact with the reality of the situations integration wa3 defined as 
meaning no complaints. On tho other hand, in tho items on housing and 
kenya the editorials did betray an awareness of some of the economic 
and political realitieo which lay behind the stories in question. 
She fact that the issues were concerned with nationalism in the 
cace of Kenya, and with tho position of landlords in the case of 
housing, may well have helped toward the Tele/Graph's 'supra-racial1 
analysis* 
Iii. The sale of arms to the South African regime 
(a) Television coverage« The nearest issue to the docks strike 
in terms of being a continuing saga was tho final race-related topics 
tho question of whether the British government would or should sell 
arms to the South African government. This accounted for § of all the 
items in this sample (of race-related items), and 28$ of the air time 
given these items. A summary of the overwhelming impression given by 
tho media items on South African arms would be one of vociferous 
opposition for no very clearly defined reason to a policy predicated 
on vital British self-interest. 
The map of the opposing sides in this debate was drawn in 
the following way. African leaders and students were presented as 
opposed to the sale of arms on 21 separate occasions. Tho official 
Labour leadership was also noted on 15 occasions to oppose the deal* 
on the unolaborated grounds that the sale would put Britain the wrong 
side of the 'colour line*, that it threatened the Commonwealth and 
the United Nations, and that it would damage Britain's political and 
economic interests. These reasons were presented rather as slogans 
than as articulated arguments. The public dissociation of the United 
States government £тош the British government's intention to sell arms 
was only referred to once. 
% contrast, the bulletins were very full of reasons for the 
policy. The argument that the overriding consideration was defence of 
British trade-routes against Russian interference and even attack, was 
presented no less than 24 times. Over and above this, it was claimed 
several times that they would be used for external defence only - a 
sophisticated argument which took in the general argument against aid-
ing a repressive regime to subdue internal opposition, and apparently 
met it. The Foreign Secretary went on record on one occasion as saying 
arms might be sold to South Africa with the proviso that they were only 
to be used externally? and on another occasion, as claiming that trade 
with South Africa enabled Britain to exert a christian civilising 
influence on the policy of apartheid rather than seeing it disintegrate 
amid the shambles of a bloody and protracted racial civil war. Reither 
of these statements, despite their contentious nature, was questioned 
or challenged in the news media} yet it cannot be said it would have 
been difficult to find people to do so. 
Other reasons mentioned in favour of the arms sale were that 
France already sold arms to South Africa, and on two occasions that her 
trading position on arms had been enabled by Britain's decision to 
discontinue arms sales in the early days of the 1964-70 Labour govern-
ment. The implication was both that if Prance could defy UN resolutions 
so could Britainj and that if there was money to be made, why should 
Britain sit book and watch it go to her competitor? 
Criticism of the premise that the British and South African 
navies, oven if combined, would be able to act as successful deterrents 
to tho Russian navy, was only voiced on two occasions j and the South 
African Government's use of some of the armaments most likely to be 
sold in recent counter-insurgency operations was never mentioned. Hor 
was the definition of Russian international polioy questioned. It is 
fair to say therefore that although the opposition's existence was 
very frequently referred to in TV Lews Bulletins, the reasons for its 
existence were rarely and weakly presented - in contradistinction to 
the reasons for the policy, which were often presented and barely 
questioned. The 'Commonwealth', the United Uations, the 'colour line', 
undefined political and eoonomic interests, were all sufficiently vague 
or frequently challenged (in the case of the first throe) to be quite 
inadequate simply as assertions. Lastly, on the news bulletins, there 
was never any representative of any southern African liberation group 
asked to give their views on the sales at this point there was a 
complete lack of 'balance'. 
There were five current affairs items on tho sale of arms, 
on Panorama (July 20th and 26th), and on 24 Hours (June 24th; July 20th 
and 22nd). The two Panorama presentations were very different. One 
was filmed in Zambia, a country whose government had declared itself 
totally hostile to the sale of arms to South Africa. It had some 
dramatic action shots of students marching to the British High 
Commission, to protest and to pull down the Union Jack? together with 
some 3hoto of the Zambian police attacking one of the demonstration 
leaders. (Subsequently they turned on the cameraman.) After this, a 
spread of black end white 2ombians, including students, businessmen 
and church leaders, were interviewed, all of whom declared themselves 
totally opposed to the sale. Their reasons varied from the threat to 
multi-racial values, and the economically more prosperous proposition 
that black Africa presented, to the threat South Africa constituted to 
the countries to its north, and to its internal policies. All these 
claims were, for better or worse, unsubstantiated, and therefore 
remained assertions rather than cogent arguments. 
The other Panorama item was a studio discussion between Lord 
Caradon, Duncan Sandys IIP and a professor of war studies. The presence 
of the latter was indicative of the dominance of the defence aspect in 
the organisation of the debate, although questions were only asked of 
him first, before tho discussion between Sandys and Caradon. Tho 
professor took most pains to distinguish between the conventional view 
of Russian interest in the Indian Ocean (the power to blockade the 
West's oil supplies), and the actual Russian intention in expending 
its naval resources in that part of the world. In his view, as 
regarded the African side of the question it was primarily the political 
penetration of black Africa that interested the Russians. The discussion 
of Soviet Russian foreign policy only took place on this one occasion} 
during the rest of the presentations in this sample, it was either 
taken for granted as threatening to Britain's interests; or it was 
dismissed by the opposing position as of less weight and interest than 
the support given to the South African regime by Britain. 
In the discussion which followed, it cannot bo said that this 
early momentum was sustained. Sandys' arguments for soiling arms to 
the South African government were stereotypical, even though delivered 
with much energy. Oil was at stake; Communism was menacing; the arms 
v/ould be used for external defence only. In addition, Sandys claimed 
there were no democratic African societies* on the contrary, they 
were violent, racially prejudiced against Indians and Arabs, and pro-
Communist. He wont on to claim that in general there were some people 
who would not allow it that Blacks were capable of any wrong, and that 
Britain was always being made to stand in the dock and was never allowed 
to point an accusing finger in return. He also insisted on his own 
principled opposition to apartheid. 
Lord Caradon was in a wo ale position to speak against this 
policy, since it was known that the Labour government of 1964-70 had 
maintained the supply to the South African regime of spare parts for 
previous armaments, and that it had also been responsible for some joint 
defence contracts with the French government for helicopters and other 
strategic military material, for sale to South Africa. In addition, 
his response to Sandys* vigorous assault was merely dismissive, with 
no attempt either to meet Sandys on the latter*s own ground, or to 
shift the ground. What was almost inexplicable, except within the 
confines of the British news media assumption that political reality 
is to be located somewhere along the spectrum of Conservative and 
Labour opinion, was the selection of Caradon as spokesman for the 
opposition to tho sale of arms. In fact of course, it io a powerful 
illustration of that assumption at work. 
A rather more serious contribution was made by the first of 
three Hours;-items on the subject. On June 24th, there was a dis-
cussion between the Conservative IIP Patrick Wall, fairly well known 
as a defender of the southern African political regimes, and Abdul 
ItLnty, general seoretary of the Anti-Apartheid Eovement, and a South 
African Indian by birth. Although a dialogue of the deaf, at least 
some fresh points were made in tho discussion which could have increased 
the level of public information. Wall built his case on the Cape sea-
route and the Russian threat} the fact that the UK resolution forbidding 
arms sales to South Africa was non-mandatory} that the arms whioh were 
proposed for sole would be for external use only, and could be sold 
with that proviso} and that both Prance and Italy successfully sold 
arms to South Africa as well as trading with black Africa (hence 
negating the argument about economic interests north of the Zambezi). 
I,£lnty pointed to the illegal occupation of South west Africa 
(Eamibia) by the South African government, to their substantial presence 
in the continuing British colony of Rhodesia, and to Vorster's public 
threat of military strikes against Zambia and Tanzania. Ho argued 
that the political significance of being a necessary link in a defence 
network was more desirable to white South Africans than the particular 
arms themselves, but was also able to quote the South African chief 
of staff's endorsement of the proposed weapons as suitable for counter-
insurgency warfare. He claimed the sale would weaken the effectiveness 
of tho Щ1 as an international organisation, and that the confrontation 
building up in the whole of southern Africa would be likely to escalate 
eventually into a global affair, with many countries drawn in on either 
side. He noted lastly the close connections between the Conservative 
Party and British business firms with South African interests} an 
index being that these firms had contributed a quarter of a million 
pounds to the Conservative Parly's 1970 Election fund. 
The other two 2£ Hours programmes (July 20th and 22nd) were 
interesting in different ways. Quite unusually and atypically they 
both had representatives of southern African liberation movements on 
to speak about the South African arms question. One was from the South 
West Africa People's Organisation (SV/APO), and the other was from the 
Pan African Congress (РАС)} these two appearances made up of all 
appearances of liberation movement spokesmen during the writer's 
entire survey of 1970. The SWAPO representative told the audience how 
South African planes had bombed his area in reprisal for guerrilla 
activity, which had clear implications for the argument that the arms 
would only be used externally. The РАС spokesman, on the other hand, 
was there to discuss a film he had made on the repression and exploit-
ation of black South Africans, which again had implications for the 
argument that arms sales would in various ways help to prop up the 
regime. 
Once these spokesmen wore on the air however, they faced 
rather misdirected questioning by the presenter. The questions to tho 
PAG film director are reproduced in Table 6.Ü. They illustrate with 
great olarity tho tendency for presenters to cast themselves in tho 
role of impartial middleman between evonly balanced opposites, in the 
role of chairman of a properly conducted and reasoned debate in which 
the facts are presented in an orderly and peaceful fashion, and viewers 
are supposed not necessarily to have made up their minds beforehand on 
the ultimate merits of the case. \7hen this cultural understanding is 
not realised, or breaks doш, аз it did on this programme, it io fas-
cinating to observe the result. The presenter effectively defined the 
РАС spokesman, Mahomo, as a hopelessly incompetent proponent of his 
case, and so took over what he condidered to be the real case against 
apartheid and expressed it in his own way, virtually excluding Mahomo 
from the discussion. On the other hand, it was necessary in arguing 
the black South African case in the presence of a black South African 
(who had made a film about it), to moke some reference to his presence. 
Tho presenter therefore harnessed Mahomo to his argument about there 
being a global tendency tc racial assimilation rather than apartheid, 
with the consequence that the South African regime was swimming against 
the secular tide; whereas the whole drift of liahomo^ film, End of a 
Dialogue, is contained in its title and was the flat opposite of what 
tho presenter was saying. One might also instance this occasion as а 
demonstration of the incapacity of someone only at home in contemporary 
English culture to come to grips with the harsh divorce of South African 
political alignments as compared to the relatively muted clash between 
English political parties: the myth of neutrality and "balanco1 is 
hard to sustain in these altered conditions. 
In the case of tho SV/APO interview, the questions were simply 
uncomprehending of the realities of the situation. Instead of focussing 
on the contradiction between South Africa1 s declaration of non-aggression 
against her neighbours, and her occupation of South West Africa, the 
presenter asked why во little was heard of the southern African liberation 
movements. He went on to ask why all the 15 million Africans in South 
Africa could not do more to help themselves, and then to query whether 
S7AF0 had any "dramatic plans" for the near future. The tone of the 
former question, and the unlikelihood that the latter would be answered, 
rendered this rare interview rather uninformative. 
(b) Kress coverage. The Daily Ilirroy came out unequivocally 
against the sale, in an editorial dated July 21st and headed "Midsummer 
Madness". It admitted that the sale of агтз had been part of Conserva-
tive election policy, but argued that it flew in the face of the United 
Kations, that the Ш А was deeply concerned about it, that at least four 
East African countries were stunned and appalled, and that even 52 Con-
servative Шз were opposed to it. The editorial accused tho Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Hume, of being deliberately confusing by 
saying at different times that the decision was definite, that It was 
not finalised, that arms would be for maritime dofonce only, that 
consultations were continuing with all interested parties, and that the 
Government was in fundamental disagreement with tho South African's 
regime's racial policies. It also warned that the policy amounted to 
a provooation, even an invitation, to young demonstrators, and that 
had it not been for this they were running short of issues about which 
to demonstrate. It said the pledgo was a major political blunder, and 
should now be forgotten* An analysis of the Mirror's headlines shows 
an exceptionally dear correspondence between this editorial position 
and the stories on the subject. 
The Daily Express carried two editorials directly on the 
South African arms issue, and another four closely related to it. On 
June 27th it simply pointed out that the Conservative government had a 
mandate from the electors on а о 1 early communioated pledge to sell arms 
to South Africa. On July 21st, the editorial stressed the vital nature 
of the Cape sea-route for Britain, and said both governments should 
define their terms and negotiate a sale. It added that the Foreign 
Secretory had made it quite clear he would supply arms, but not to 
support apartheid» 
Two of the four other editorials were concerned with Mauritius, 
one with Uganda and its then President Obote, and one with Labour Party 
policy on arms for South Africa. On July 17th, under the heading 
"Banger Signal", the Express noted the new arrangement by the Russians 
to be allowed facilities for fishing fleets in the Indian Ocean island 
of -Mauritius. It stated that this was how the takeover of Egypt had 
begun, and said it lent added significance to Hume's warning about the 
Cape sea-route. On July 20th, it castigated Lon Williams, former 
Labour Party general secretary and now governor of Mauritius, for 
letting the deal through, and said he should not be reappointed at 
the end of his term. 
The editorial on Uganda was entitled "Influence!", and asked 
how Britain could possibly be influenced on the sale of агтз to South 
Africa by this "savage, spiteful and preposterous" regime. It was 
commenting on a recent law which threatened jail for life for anyone 
throwing an egg at the President, and tho repatriation of all UK oitisena 
resident there if arms wero sold to South Africa. The editorial on tho 
Labour Party was entitled "Humbug!" and commented on their special 
correspondent Chapman Pincher's discoveiy that Labour had negotiated 
a 30/t share in the production of a helicopter which was to be sold to 
South Afrida, and which would be easily utilisable in counter-insurgency 
» 
battles. The Express commented that it showed the hypocrisy of the 
Labour Party in trying to prevent Britain from defending its sea-routes. 
The headlines make an interesting contrast with the Dally 
IHrror's on the same subject. ?<hereas the lirror1 s tend strongly to 
quote opposition from various quarters to the arms deal, the Express 
headlines pay much more attention to Russia and Mauritius (5 items), 
to France as a trading competitor (5 items), and to the quality of the 
Labour Party's principles in opposing the sale ($ items). Opposition 
is only mentioned once from Africans ("Zambia mob tears down Union Jack") 
and once from ТОГО. (By and large Express readers know that its editorial 
policy on the United Kations Organisation is very unenthusiastic.). 
tDaily Telegraph editorials on tho South Africa arms iocue 
appeared on June 22nd, July 2nd, 11th, 21st and 24th. The first was 
a very general overview of the probable new directions of Conservative 
policy, but mentioned as part of this tho fact that 
"Ideological nonsense in our foreign diplomacy can now bo 
dropped out and a clear view taken of British interests. 
There io no longer any need for a sham attitude towards 
South Africa and Rhodesia to placate now Commonwealth 
countries, some of whom are bent, it seems, on sequestrating 
British assets. Arms that will serve the strategic interests 
of Britain neod no longer be withheld from tho South African 
and Portuguese forces. Our foreign policy is no longor 
about some egalitarian theory of nation and race. It is 
about national safety and interests." 
This decisive posture at the outset of the new Conservative 
administration was vigorously maintained. Under the heading "Arms 
and Africa" on July 2nd, tho Telegraph claimed that tho distinction 
between arms for external and internal use was valid, and that the 
Cape was a key area in the global conflict between Communist and non-
Communist nations. Britain's consequent interest in its defence should 
not be obscured by "ritual" protests from black African leaders, 
especially when the possible loss of trade with black Africa is set 
against tho fact that much of it is the product of foreign aid in the 
first plaoe. Also, "Conservative disapproval of apartheid i3 a well-
established fact." The Labour administration had pursued the alternative 
policy of refusing arms, but trading as intensively as possible. 
The same heading was reproduced on July 11th. Here tho 
American opposition to the sale of arms, for reasons connected with 
its black minority and its URO position, was discussed. Tho editorial 
contrived to imply that this opposition was due to realpolitik rather 
than principle, and would not necessarily mean veiy much in practice. 
It also said that the negotiations should not be hurried over the arms 
sale, and that a revision of the letter of the Simons town Agreement to 
match the original spirit in which it was framed (as demanded by the 
South African Minister of Defence) was desirable. The editorial 
concluded by reminding tho readers that Rhodesia was highly relevant 
to the whole business, presumably as part of a tight defence network 
in southern Africa, 
On July 21st, the editorial commended Hune for moving 
slowly, saying tho issue was becoming more important than it deserved, 
The Labour Party was presented as wanting something to attack, and 
rather regretful that its quarry was not clearly in view. If Tanzania 
and other countries left the Commonwealth, they would be the only 
losers* The argument of the former Defence Minister, Healey, that 
selling arms to South Africa would augment Russian influence in Africa 
was argued to be out of touch with the realities of African politics! 
African countries were said to be only too well aware of the implica-
tions of Russian military aid. The support of Hew Zealand and 
Australia, "two countries which care about sea communications", was 
noted. The firm intention to sell, combined with the delay in offering 
specific materiel while consultations took place, was accepted as 
reasonable. 
But by July 24th, the Telegraph was becoming irritated with 
what it saw as the Governments vacillation and ambiguity on the arms 
question. It surmised angrily that Tanzania's decision to leave the 
Commonwealth if the deal went ahead was delaying it, and argued that 
it y/ould clear the atmosphere if sucjh a challenge wa3 met. The South 
African government's desire to revise the Simons town Agreement was not 
in its view sufficient to delay a firm announcement. It objected 
strenuously to the "mess", and hoped that if reports that Zambia, 
Uganda and Tansania were setting up a "vetting group" were true, ouch 
an arrangement might provide a viable solution to the hitch. It 
headed the editorial "Fog over Africa", 
The importance the Telegraph assigned tho issue is indicated 
by tho fact that 22 out of 55 of the items were on tho outside pages; 
the Express, which took a similar position, had only 6 out of 25 of its 
items on the front page (tho Mirror only had 11 items in all), 17 out 
of the 55 теге about the opposition to the dale, from the Labour Party, 
African and othor Commonwealth countries, the United States, some 
Conservative ПРз, the anti-apartheid movement and Peter Hain inside 
Britain, the Churches, and from the Uli, There were only two references 
to French involvement, the first clearly focussing on the French 
competitörsi "French ready for 5, Africa arms 1 duel' with Britain". 
Trade reasons wore mentioned twice; Russian influence was mentioned 
four times, as well as twice in editorials. 
The Express and the Telegraph shared a united position in 
strong support of the sale. The lack of emphasis both placed on the 
US government's public disapproval was an interesting reflection of 
their determination the arms sale should not be deflected if at all 
possible. In fact during this period, the Express simply did not 
mention the fact. 
This is perhaps only one instance however of the major 
characteristic of discussions of the South African arms issue either 
on TV or in the Press (including the Mirror, which was opposed to the 
sale). That characteristic was the absence of most of the real 
questions: it was presented as national interest vs. humanitarian 
concern against apartheid. Nowhere was this more lucidly stated than 
by the presenter in the Panorama discussion between Sandys and Caradon* 
after the former's violent expostulation against opposition to the 
sale, he asked "Well even accepting lrx* Sandys' arguments shouldn't 
we as senior members of the Commonwealth listen to what the Common-
wealth has to say?" And earlier he had asked, "Do defence and 
economic arguments outweigh the moral arguments against supporting an 
apartheid power?" 
The strong economic bonds linking the UK with southern Africa 
(both directly, and at one remove through British domination of the 
economy of Portugal), and tho overall relation of arms sales as part 
of the 'good will' between trading nations to this, was never brought 
out in the public discussions surveyed. Nor was tho strong represent-
ation in the new Conservative Cabinet of British firms with South 
African interests, with several Cabinet Ministers having previously 
held a total of 52 such directorships between them. Only once, in the 
24 Houro discussion between Minty and Wall, waa the £i million donated 
by ouch firms to the Conservative Party's election fund mentionedi on 
important index of the strength of the link. let all these data were 
available for any research assistant to discover (12). 
Similarly, the planning that was beginning to take place to 
develop a South Atlantic Treaty Qrganisatioh to match НАТО, in which 
South Africa and a number of Latin American countries would be major 
local participants, was never mentioned (13)* As also, the foreign 
policy drive of the South African regime for international favour, and 
the great importance of Britain as a lever to recover a 'respectable* 
image, was left out of account! the degree of success in this latter 
attempt would in turn be important in negotiating South African 
interests in the United States, where it was well known that the State 
Department favoured good relations with black Afrioa while tho Pentagon 
favoured good relations with South Afrioa. 
Because of these lacunae, the Conservative Governments 
position was left virtually unchallenged, except by apparent emotions 
the syllogism was "we all abhor apartheid? but communism is worse than 
evon that? therefore we will supply arms for external activity only.'1 
The categorisation of news output on the docks strike as " somi-inforaative 
information" applies with equal force to its output on the South African 
arms issue. 
iv. Various topics in the televioion coverage 
The remainder of the television items are very diverse, and 
can be placed together only loosely in a category of •external race 
relations1. There were 5 documentary or current affairs items (on 
Black Australians, Indian society, Biafra and mercenaries), and 5 news 
topics (riots in Hew Jersey, Rhodesia, MaoLeod as Colonial Secretary, 
an alleged army madsaore in Malaya, and a Canadian Indian chief's 
protest to the Queen). In terms of the self-understanding of the 
British, every one of these topics had its potential or actual contrib-
ution. Properly or badly handled, each topic was a component of the 
overall map of the world and of Britain's place in it, which was drawn 
for the British public by television during 1970. The cnntrality of 
some items is greater than others, but they all have a role. 
In the case of the two documentaries on India, and the current 
affairs item on tho former Biafra, the potential significance was related 
to the image of Indians and Africans living in Britain that white people 
hold. The British definition of who Indians and Africans ore is partly 
related to their role here, partly to the historical traditions moulded 
from colonialism and slavery, but also partly to what little is known 
or supposed of the current condition of their countries of origin. In 
the case of Biafra, this last factor was of course further complicated 
by the presentation of Higeria and the Civil War over the previous four 
years at very great length in terms fairly reminiscent of the Congo 1 
the television treatment of the confusion and suffering in the after-
math of the war in early 1970 bad boon especially graphic (14)» 
The Panorama item on Biafra (July 1st) concerned itself with 
the efficiency with whioh relief supplies were being channelled through 
to Ibo areas j and with the fate of the Ibo leader who had negotiated 
and signed the surrender with General Gowon, a Major General Philip 
Effiong. The desperate situation in whioh many Ibos found themselves 
was portrayed by means of the writings of a pro-Federal Nigerian 
journalist, Tai Solar in, who had publicly attacked the Federal Govern-
ment for its harshness and inefficiency in the administration of relief 
programmes; by means of reports of relief workers, v/ho claimed 
supplies were being deliberately delayed; and a Catholic priest, 
who caid 2. million Ibos were on the edge of starvation. An О Ш Ш 
director was also quoted as saying tho situation was very dangerous. 
Effiong's teenage daughters were interviewed in Britain ooncerning a 
letter he had smuggled out to them from the prison in which he was 
being held. Both were clearly not only upset, but also afraid for 
their father1 s fate. Of its kind, this report was in many ways a 
model of attacIcing journalism, oven though the only solutions offered 
were getting back the Catholic relief workers who had boen expelled 
from Iboland for their support for Biafra (the priest), and the lifting 
of censorship by the Higerian government (the reporter). (An unstated 
implication could have been interpreted as the need to bring back some 
Europeans.) But tho programme had a tone and cutting edge to it, 
certainly justified by the human suffering to which it drew attention, 
which were very uncharacteristic of reporting about Britain from the 
angle of vision of the oppressed. Additionally, a by-product of this 
attack was that the item fitted fairly snugly into the social definition 
of Africans as cruel, inefficient and deceitful which is both a part 
of English cultural tradition historically, and is maintained to а 
largo extent by various media in present-day sooiety (15)* (it may 
be necessary to add that this is not a covert way of saying Africans 
never perpetrate cruelty, inefficiency and lies; but that the nature 
of the stereotype is to imply Africans are culturally prone to these 
forms of behaviour in a way Europeans are not.) It is very necessary 
to recognise that a single item con communicate two distinct messages 
on different levels (or more); in this oase on a current information 
level about Biafra in mid-1970, and on a more general stereotypical 
level about •African1 culture and personality. It 1з also unproven, 
but highly probable, that many English people have &o very clear 
differentiation between Africans and West Indians - the latter being 
far and away a larger group within British society. To the extent 
that this is so, items like this one on Biafra have an implication 
that reaches beyond Africans in Britain. 
The two documentaries on India in the sample came from 
quite different sources. The first, on June 24th, was scripted by 
the Indian poet Dom I'oraes, who lives permanently in England. The 
documentary fooussed exclusively on the various sooial divisions in 
Indian society. Religion was investigated, with special attention to 
the split between Hindus and Muslims? politics was discussed in terms 
of the fragmented Congress Party, and the fragmented communist parties* 
The L'orth-üouth division was mentioned, along with regional and linguistic 
conflicts in general; and distinctions of caste, and the existence of 
various 'tribal' groupings were referred to as well. Naturally, it is 
no more possible to present India satisfactorily in a 50-minute docu-
mentary than it is to present Europe? it is still the case that аз a 
single offering the exclusive focus on social divisions and fragmenta-
tion which characterised this documentary gave as grossly unbalanced 
a definition of India as the same approach would have provided if 
applied to Europe. Oddly, too, the one division whioh the programme 
never dwelt on wa3 the very substantial cleavage between rich and poor 
in India. Certainly, the programme gave no impression at all that 
Ina la (and so Indians) had anything to offer the world or Britain but 
a cockpit of warring groups. Interestingly, after the previous item 
on Biafra, Horaos' soript claimed that India's troubles were "like those 
of any emergent African nation". Whether 'Third World chaos' 1з the 
best heuristic device for understanding Africa, Asia or Latin America, 
or whether it might not be best understood as a form of ingrained 
social contempt blurring accurate analysis of these societies, must'remain 
an open question hero. 
Tho other documentary on India, on July 29th, was one in a 
series by tho French film director Louis lalle, who had spent a very 
long period in India with the encouragement of the government filming 
Indian social life at length. (The Indian government later considered 
Halle's films highly undesirable, and the serial showing of them on 
BBC2 during the summer of 1970 led to a temporary rupture of relations 
between the BBC's Delhi office and the Indian government.) The film 
will not here be judged in relation to tho series of which it formed 
ono part, hut in its own terms; as tho series was shown during the 
summer holiday months, many people may have seen only one or two of 
the series anyway» 
The film was a very leisurely look at Indian religious commit-
ments, depicting with some skill and sympatic the patterns of involvement 
and enthusiasm which could even carry Halle, the western atheist onlooker, 
along in their wake for a time» It then moved on to take a fascinating 
look at Indian drama and dance; at the various attempts at diffusion 
of contraceptive techniques; and at зоше of tho components of the 
linguistic dispute between Tamil and Hindi, Although the uppor middle 
class audience of BBC2 documentaries was probably not greatly illumina-
ted in ito understanding of tho specific background of Indian migrant 
workers in Britain, there is no doubt that in terms of both time spent 
and sympathetic understanding, this 1 lalle film was far superior to the 
Koraes' documentary» 
The news bulletin items on Iain MacLeod's tenure at the 
British Colonial Office (following on his sudden death), on Rhodesia, 
and on an alleged massaore of Chinese villagers by British troops during 
tho Malayan Emergency, were all important in terms of the linkages 
between Britain's colonial past and present and their implications for 
racial cultural perspectives. All the items were very short, and so 
must do duty as samples or indices of how tho British news media would 
handle a wider range of issues concerning colonialism which did not 
happen to emerge during the period of tho sample. 
when MacLeod died, the TV lews bulletins carried television 
film of his political career. Certainly the aspect of it which had 
drawn most party political debate in the past, had been his period in 
office as Colonial Secretory after the 1959 General Election, at the 
time of Harold MacMllan's "Winds of Change" speech in South Africa. 
His and Mac Lilian's success in getting under way a huge programme of 
rapid decolonisation against tho opposition of the majority of the 
Conservative Party (16) was certainly the policy with which he was 
most associated. It had coincided with the debaclo in the Congo, and 
was associated also in the public mind with the general image of 
Africans as demanding independence, Britain conceding it against her 
better judgment, and the Africans not knowing v/hat to do with it once 
they had been given it. (The extent to which decolonisation was a 
recognition that Britain could not afford the colonial administration, 
and did not want the embarrassment of being publicly ejected from 
colony after colony, has never really penetrated public consciousness 
in Britain.) 
Tho presentation of his role in decolonisation did nothing to 
assist a fuller understanding of the processes which led up to it. For 
instance, tho Sambian High Commissioner in London appeared to declare 
what a good negotiator MacLeod had proved himself to bo during his own 
country1s independonce-talko. Lord Butler appeared on Newsroom» and 
argued that as events had turned out, one of MacLeod's moot controversial 
administrative actions during his tenure (the release from prison of 
tho Llalawien nationalist leader, Br. Hastings Banda) had been clearly 
justified. Given the worm relations then existing between the Kalawian 
and South African governments, and the correspondingly frigid relatione 
between the Ilalawian and other African governments, this view could in 
no sense be said to bo universally accepted. The reporter in the flews 
At Ten item 3aid ITacLeod had helped to put an end to white domination 
in Africa, presumably referring to colonial domination; in so doing, 
he was necessarily glossing over the continuing and developing European 
and American economic hegemony in Africa (17). The generally bland 
nature of the item3 was crowned by a clip in Hews At Ten, which showed 
IJacLeod at a Conservative Party conference declaiming on the subject 
of the brotherhood of man....a powerful indication of the interpretation 
of decolonisation in term3 of British 'nicenoss*. 
The six news items on Rhodesia were extremely 3hort, and only 
two points need be made about them, though both are important. Thoy 
reflected the 1970 television output on Rhodosia closely in that no 
black Rhode3ion, certainly not from any nationalist liberation group, 
appeared on then, (in my survey of 1970 as a whole, аз already noted, 
representatives of southern African liberation movements appeared 
precisely four times.) The other point was that in two (BBC and ITIl) 
bulletins on June 19th the political implications of the Conservative 
victory for Rhodesia were briefly assessed. The BBC bulletin quoted 
lan Smith, the Rhodesian Front premier, as saying the election was 
essentially irrelevant to Rhodesia and there would be no more Fearless-
style talks on independence. The ITH bulletin quoted the Rhodesia 
Herald, organ of the more pro-Commonwealth section of white Rhodesian 
opinion, as editorialising about the "elation" that there would no 
longer be need for the spectre of an independent Rhodesia, given the 
change in tho British government. The corollary of never (or hardly 
ever) asking black Rhodesians for their views on the progress and 
future of their country, is items like these which also assume 
(without having to state it explicitly) that the only Rhodesian 
opinion which matters is white Rhodesian opinion. The majority^ 
opinion or opinions in that society are implicitly discounted} another 
instance of a gloss over a highly significant rift. 
The "Malayan massacre" as it came to be labelled in the 
Press, concerned the alleged shooting in cold blood of about 20 Chinese 
villagers (including women) in Malaya by British troops during the 
communist insurgency from 1948* story had first come to prominence 
in The People earlier in 1970, and was based on the sworn affidavits 
of four of the soldiers involved. There was also still living a 
Chinese man who had miraculously survived, although wounded. Earlier 
news bulletins in 1970 had interviewed the man, and filmed him pointing 
to the spot just outside the village where the shooting had taken 
place. This story •broke1 at the same time аз the story of the % Lai 
massacre by US troops in Vietnam, and other similar events in the 
Vietnam war. It therefore raised the question - though none of tho 
news media did so - of the character of the Malayan Emergency operation 
by tho British army, and tho IdLnds of behaviour actually characteristic 
of British troops in colonial situations. Tho issue was referred to 
the Director of Public Prosecutions to decide whether there should be 
a trial of thooe involved. The items which fell into this sample all 
recorded that the DPP had produced a negative verdict. Although some 
protest was raised by some backbench MP's in the House of Commons 
against tho decision to waive a trial of those involved, this did not 
find its way into the television news accounts of the DPP verdict. This 
instance serves as another example of tho relatively uncritical stance 
of the British news media vis-a-vis at least certain institutions such 
as the military, and certain features of British history, suoh as 
recent colonial history. The US media, at least in certain cases, 
present a much less uncritical front. 
The reporting of black disturbances in Ш cities during 1967 
and 1968, which in general simply utilised American film of the inci-
dents, was strongly criticised in the USA by the President's National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (18). In particular, the Report 
of the Commission attacked the de facto communication of tho events as 
black-white confrontations rather than as black social protest against 
their social conditions t a classical instance of the news media 
assuming that pictures of rioters v. police explained themselves. Tho 
fairly heavy utilisation of American film of these disturbances during 
I967 and 1968 certainly had a considerable impact in Britain on public 
consciousness about 'race'* Roy Jenkins, at that time Home Secretary, 
introduced the second Race Relations Bill to the House of Commons at 
the time of the massive Detroit disturbance which devastated large areas 
of tho city, and pointed precisely to that devastation as the principal 
argument in favour of the Bill (the Conservative opposition at that 
stage was opposing the Bill). And Powell, in a speech in Eastbourne 
in November 1968 which received wide publicity, predicted that by the 
year 2000 "there would be several Washingtons in England....With the 
lapse of a generation or so we shall at last have succeeded - to the 
benefit of nobody - in reproducing in England's 'green and pleasant 
land' the haunting tragedy of the United States" (19). (Washington 
had been the scene of a fierce outbreak of protest earlier that year 
following tho assassination of Martin Luther King.) The tendency, 
following the coverage, was to identify the presence of Blacks in a 
white community or society, with likely violence and disruption - tho 
correlation was conceived in almost chemical terms, as though tho two 
physiognomies found themselves reacting against each other independently 
of their will. In this context, the two short nows bulletin items on 
one such disturbance in New Jersey were very much an unreflective and 
unreconstructed continuation of the same line. There was simply footage 
of a street confrontation, without even an explanation of its immediate 
origination, let alone its general background. 
The relation of the nows items on the Canadian Indian chief, 
and of the documentary on Aboriginal Australians, was clearly not so 
central to British perspectives on British race relations as the items 
which have already been examined, nevertheless, the extent of racism 
in the white Commonwealth, the treatment by Canadians and Australians 
of the descendants of the original inhabitants (as it happens, non-white) 
of their territories, does have a bearing on the interpretation of 
Britain's place in the world. Since most of Canada and Australia has 
been settled by British migrants who have retained substantial economic 
and cultural links with Britain, their oppression of indigenous minor-
ities might be thought to throw some light on British colonising 
traditions and not merely on themselves as an aggregate of individuals. 
This bearing was not brought out by any of the item3 under 
considerations the fact that the Canadian Indian chief used the Queen's 
formal visit to embarrass the Canadian government for its severe neglect 
of the Indian minority was presented very much in terms of a disruption 
of protocol involving the Queen. And the plight of Black Australians 
(the title of the documentary) was seen as the result of white Austra-
lian complacency and lack of concern? though in many respects as a doc-
umentary, it was a well-produced piece of Y.rork. It was timed to 
coincide with the celebrations of the first landing of Captain Cook, 
which the Queen attended? but that initial link was the nearest the 
programme reached to a connection between the Australians and the 
British. It might seem that the lacuna which is being discussed falls 
fairly into the category of one of tho many things a documentary 
producer might or might not have chosen to cover; and certainly from 
ono perspective such a judgment is correct. It is mentioned here less 
in relation to this particular documentary than in relation to the way 
this documentary was in line with so much else in British television 
in that it does not enable the British public to comprehend the full 
significance of their colonial history for their own present (20)4 
The last item to be briefly discussed before moving on to 
the major continuing story of the sale of arms to the South African 
government, is the item on white mercenaries (2£ Hours. July 30th). 
The relevance of this item lay in its treatment of a role which in 
many situations is viewed with contempt, which became particularly 
controversial during the Congo crisis, but which also may be invested 
with an aura of tough daring. Essentially, the item was an interview 
with "Colonel" Llike Hoare, living in South Africa at that stage, who 
had been a prominent figure in the Congo conflict. The drift of the 
interview was to try to discover the kind of personal qualities which 
lay behind an internationally fomous mercenary» This in turn determined 
the questions, which were in no way abrasive; and only some of the stills 
flashed on the screen of sceneö from the Congo fighting, while Hoare 
was talking, gave any lie to his straightforward, bluff, realpolitik 
presentation of the function of white mercenaries in contemporary 
African politics. This explanation was along the following linest 
Ojukwu couldn't afford me$ wo saved the Congo; there were lootings and 
summary court-martials followed by executions, but no atrocities; we 
were fighting against •savages' mostly; these artificial frontiers 
have to be maintained for future prosperity; many Africans see us as 
a quick way of staging a coup. The stills by themselves did very 
little to contradict what he was saying, but at the most questioned it. 
The opportunity for white British people to understand the role of 
white mercenaries in Africa, and their actual behaviour, could not be 
said to have been
v. Conclusions 
it iD more difficult to sun up the basic patterns of 
reporting on raco relations, since only the South African arms issue 
was anything like a continuing saga, and the data are more fragmented 
and occasional than the docks strike. Taking however the three main 
questions raised at the end of the last chapter, on the quality of 
information and explanation, on the role of tho ideology of tho 
•nation*, and on the Itotion of tho media as a forum for significant 
public debate, the following points may be made. 
The material on the South African arms sale has already been 
criticised for its concentration on a very few points, and its omission 
of many important aspects of tho affair. Given that of all the items 
on raco relations it was the most extended, this oritioism is a very 
serious one: there should easily have beon scope for treatment in the 
necessary depth in terms of its allocation of air time alone. After 
this, it io no longer possible to excuse some of the other items1 weakness 
in this regard simply in torms of their brevity - and in any oase, 
brevity or length in column-inches or air-time represent a particular 
decision or series of decisions about the importance of a topio. 
As prime examples, the riots in Hew Jersey, the Housing 
Minister»s •shook» at West Indian multiple occupation, and the fracas 
at the police station in Caledonian Road, all lacked the necessary 
explanation and information to make any sense of them, beyond explana-
tions already conventional in the culture of British society. Any real 
analysis of racism in British society began and ended in this TV sample 
with the two items on the Conduit employment agencies, and George 
Tonkin (though in the case of the latter it has already been seen how 
the opportunities of the item were missed by the presenter). Items on 
the Community Relations Commission, the Üalayan massacre, Rhodesia, 
MacLeod, were extremely bland and presented no real hint of the sharp 
divergence of views existing on these topics. 
In the ftress, the Express and Telegraph and Mirror offered 
no more explanation of the background to these events than television, 
despite the greater number of т;огаз available to then in that medium, 
ilaturally, being much freer in principle to ехргезз their own editorial 
positions, they did oo in tho presentation of news items. This present-
ation obviously had a material effect on the kind of information and 
explanation available to their readers. The Mirror might be said in 
general to have a relatively »liberal1 approach to the issue of race 
relations, being against the sale of arms to the South African govern-
ment, and giving much 1езз prominence to black immigration as on issue 
than the other two newspapers. The Express and Telegraph combined 
total support for tho arms sale with an extreme emphasis on block 
immigration, and items on internal race relations which put black 
people in an unfavourable light. Yet on an issue like tho Caledonian 
Hoed police station march, the headlines of all three papers give a 
remarkably similar impression of tho occurrence. 'Black Power' lien 
Storm Police. Injuries As Demonstrators Mount 'Siege' Over Arrests 
At Funfair (the Express). Lächaol X In Police Siege (the Telerraoh). 
Hob Haid Police HQ - 11 Held. PC's Hurt In London Battle. 'Siege 
After A Funfair Swoop' (the Mirror). Only the Mirror did not make it 
immediately clear that this was a race-related item; but all three 
papers, in using the word 'siege' alone (apart from other terms like 
•storm police', 'injuries', 'mob raid',ч'PC's hurt', 'swoop', and the 
references to Black Power and Michael Lhb latter only marginally 
involved), fell into the familiar pattern of -ail tho action, none of 
the explanation'. Precisely because all three papers thought the 
confrontation so significant (the Telegraph the least of the three), 
the absence of a real explanation for the confrontation was all the 
more stark. 
The Telegraph, of course, having some claim to bo a serious 
paper, tended on a number of issues to offer more detailed analysis 
and explanations than the other two. The analysis of the housing 
shortage and multiple occupation, and of afrioanisation policies in 
kenya, were examples. Yet by and large, these explanations wore tied 
entirely to a particular political position on the right \/ing of the 
British Conservative Party. They did not however form merely one 
among several voices in a pluralistic and competitive free market in 
ideas. On tho contrary» of those members of the British public who 
read a serious type of newspaper in 1970 tho Telegraph accounted for 
rather more than half of tho dailies (taking the Times. Financial Times, 
and Guardian as the other serious dailies (21). V/horo there was 
anything like detailed explanation to be had, therefore, in the main 
British news media, it was most likely to be culled from the Daily; 
Telegraph. 
The ideology of the •nation* appeared in two main forms in 
this sample of material« on black immigration, and on the South 
African arms issue. Since both were predominant among the race-related 
items, tho appearance of the ideology of tho 'nation1 at this point was 
especially significant. The prominence given to black immigration in 
the discussion of domestic race relations was founded on and imbued 
with an essentially nationalist perspective. This is at ito very 
clearest in tho headlines characteristic of the Express and Telegraph 
treatments of the subjects words like •invasion' and 'blockade' are 
symptomatic of the whole stylo, and imply a nation faced with aggressors, 
with a foroi^ n threat. But the overall tendency to define what is 
worth talking about vis-a-vis race relations in Britain as black 
immigration was characteristic of the television treatment as well as 
the sections of the Press surveyed! and this again imjüiqs strongly 
that it is the point of entry which is significant. Once again, 
foreignness, the "large alien wedge" (22), the moment at which it is 
clearest that black people in Britain are not part of British society, 
the fulcrum indeed of tho powellite presentation of the 1озие, itself 
a fundamentally nationalist one (23), is the dimension of British 
race relations which receives far and away the heaviest emphasis. 
Questions of racial justice and discrimination, of racist cultural 
traditions derived from a colonial history, of the labour needs of the 
British economy, scarcely if ever emerged. 
Similarly» tho South African araa issuo was presented 
primarily in terms of Britain's national colf-in terest in defence, 
and to a looser extent in recovering some of her foreign trade with 
South Africa from franco» She national ©elf-interest of the black 
Africen states who opposed it was barely mentioned* quite apart from 
the other gapa in presentation already noted. 
As regard о the public debate role of the nowo media» ouch tho 
same points made about the coverage of industrial relations can be sad© 
about tho coverage of race relatione! primarily, the absence io notable 
of ordinary people1 & expression of their views» as is tho dominance of 
elite figures* views. Tho interview with i-Yank Cousins» the white 
head of tho CEC, talking about and on behalf ef black people in Britain, 
without much accuracy and moot importantly without their personal 
representation» was a olear ease in point* The absence of spokesmen 
for southern African liberation groups on the TV bulletin items about 
th© arma sale» their treatment on the two current affairs items where 
they did appear» and the utilisation of Lord Caradon as spokesman 
cgainat tho sale, were other oases in point* Their absence from tho 
Caledonian Road items was yet another» without mentioning their absence 
from tho wholo of the presentation of black immigration except as the 
subjects of photographs* And even the Bfiifa ffi.rr.or« whioh certainly 
set out consciously to bo »fair1 to black people in Britain» and to bo 
hostile to discrimination end other attacks on thoa» in no sense acted 
as a vohiclc for them to communicato their various views and opinions 
to tho white majority* This meant that a vital element in th© public 
form of debate was completely missing» which rendered tho debate on 
race relations a debate qbout. rather than T?lth, the black subjects* 
(1) P. Hart толп and C. Husband, The IIaas ?«To3ia and Raoial Attitude a 
(Davis-Poyntor Ltd., 1973)I table 7*2 and p. 146 in the SSRC 
Report version. 
(2) B. Smithies and P. Piddiok, Enoch Powell on Immioration (Sphere 
Books, 1969), ch. 6. 
(3) "But though they feared him, it was not intimidation that caused 
the pross to serve as the instrument for L'cCarthy's rise. Rather 
it was the inherent vulnerabilities - the frozen patterns of the 
Ptross - which McCarthy discovered and played upon with unerring 
skill. "Straight" news, the absolute commandment of most mass 
media journalism, had become a strait jacket to crush the initiative 
and independence of tho reporter.. •. .LTcCarthyism demonstrated that 
public opinion when incessantly nagged by the instantaneous commu-
nications of the mass media and prodded by the pollsters is not 
capable of rendering зиге verdicts on matters of groat complexity. 
Rather it io a bastardisation of the democratic process to imagine 
that what captures the public interest because it is repeatedly 
and distractingly called to its attention must be considered the 
mandate of the public will". D. Cater, The Fourth Branch of 
Government, (Houghton tELfflin Co., 1959), РР* 73*74* 
(4) From an interview conducted with a television journalist, at that 
time a member of the BBC TV news staff, it is clear that tho then 
head of TV Hews, John Grist, argued exactly in this manner. 
5) Hartmann and Husband, op. cit., (SSRC version, p. 146). 
6) £0., pp. 24-25; also in Race XII.J, "The macs media and racial 
conflict", pp. 272-3. (7) В. Steel, Ko.Entry (Hurst 1969). 
(8i Loc. cit. 
(9) Miner Holland Report on Housing in Greater London (НШО 19б5)| 
Cullingworth Report, Council Housing» purposes, procedures, 
priorities (НЕБО 1969), especially ch. 9. 
(10) D. Humphry and G. John, Because They're Black (Penguin 1971)» chs. 
3, 12, 13J D. Humphry, Police Power and Black People (Panther 
Books Ltd., 1972). 
(11) On schools, see M. Maxwell, Violence In The Toilets (Hew Beacon 
Books Ltd., 1971); and B. Coard, How the Y/est Indian Child Is Fade 
Educationally Sub-normal in the British School System (Now Boacon 
Books, I97I). On community relations councils, see M. Hill and 
R. losaoharoff, Community Action and Raoe Eolations (OUP 1972)I 
and 1. Katznelson. Black Ifen - \7hlto Cities (OUP 1973)» Part III. 
(12) A detailed analysis of the economic links between Britain and 
South Afrioa was produced in the Sunday Times Business Review by 
Potor Kellner and Denis Herbstein, on April 18th 1971? a further 
expose by Adam Raphael in The Guardian of low wages paid by 
British firms to African employees in South Afrioa appeared in 
larch 1973. Work was also being done which culminated in the 
publication of The South African Connection, by R. First, J. Steele 
and C. Gurney (Temple-Smith 1972). The first two writers aro 
practising journalists. 
(13) Рог a detailed arid documented analysis, see A. Minty, South 
Africa's Defence Strategy (Anti-Apartheid, 89 Charlotte Street, 
Y/l, 1969). 
(14) One television news reporter with extensive experience in this 
field, interviewed by the writer, stated1 "••••one tends only to 
gather the stories one knows the office will like» And these fall 
into veiy simple patterns. They like disasters wherevSr they 
occur; they like particularly wars showing that anyone whose skin 
is not white is capable of irretrievable savagery." 
See oh. 2, n. 6; and oh. 5, n. 3. 
D. Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics (OUP 1971). 
P. Bouhdiba, "La sooiologie du ddveloppement aftica^n", Current 
Sociolo/ay 18.2 (1970); S. Amin, L'Accumulation a l'Echolle 
Mondiale (id. Anthropos, 1971, 2nd od). passim. 
The Kerner Report (Bantam Books Inc., 1968), ch. 15. 
See B. Smithies and P. Piddick, op. cit.. pp. 73-77. 
Unfortunately, the ВВС-Time Life series, "The British Empire", was 
not part of the sample. It is not the writer's judgment that if 
it had been, this verdict would have been alteted. 
(21) W. Fletcher, "Britain's National Media Pattern", in J. Tunstall 
(ed), Media Sociology (Constable 1970)f pp. 79-91» Table II. 
(22) Quoted from a public spooch by Lord Radoliffe, "Immigration and 
settlement« some general considerations", printed in Race XI. 1 
(July I969). Tho words quoted occur on p. 39, and have been 
widely diffused by Bnooh Powell amongst others. 
(23) T. Nairn, "Enoch Powell and the new Right", Hew Left Review 61 
(Kay-June 1970), pp. 3-27J 15. Banton, "What do you mean by 
racism?", New Society 341 (April 10th 1969). 
Appendix to chanter б 
Table 6.i - tho coverage of race-related items on television, 
June 19th - July 30th, 1970. 
1) 
ii) 
jw Ul ^ 
iv) 
Themes 
'Immigration1 
Domestic race relations 
(Conduit, Tonkin) 
Domestic race relations 
(Walker, CRC, police) 
Arms for South Africa 
India 
Black Australians 
External race relations 
(Biafra, mercenaries) 
External race relations 
(MacLeod, Rhodesia, 
Malaya, US riot, 
Canadian chief) 
Miscellaneous 
Frequency 
Hews 26) я Curr 2) 
Curr 
Hews 
Hews 34] 
Curr 5, 
Docu 
Docu 
Curr 
News 
Time Allotted 
28 
2 
39 
2 
1 
2 
18 
27mJ 
52m, 1 hr# 19m 
29m 
10m 
Й •lla 
1 hr 4Qa 
5Cto 
32m 
15m 
99 
22 
7 hrs 26m 
10m 
121 7 hrs 36m 
Table 6.Ii - the interviewer's questions 
24 Hours. 22nd July on apartheid in South Africa, in relation to 
the mooted arms sale. 
"IS?. Ilahomo, I just want to ask you very brieflyi do you stand by that 
extract from that film and everything we heard in it?" "Good, fine..." 
"Dr. de Villiers, you've seen that extract from the filmi now is there 
anything you would like to question in it whioh you....?" (de Villiers 
talks about 'you boys'). 
"Mr. Mahomo, would you accept Hr. de Villiers' apology to you - he has 
apologised to you for that - would you accept that so we can get on with 
the argument about the film?" "Do you want to answer that L!r. Eahomo?" 
"I think you've made your point ISr. Hahomo - oould you let lir. de Villiers 
go on?" 
(Mahomo quotes infant mortality statistics) 
"Is the statement true or not true?" "Could I just read you this 
statistic, which is from the South African Institute of Race Relations -
you've got that? - Professor John Heid, professor of physiology at 
Matal University, says that almost 50^ of black children born in South 
Africa die before the age of five* this is a fact?" 41r. llahono, we're 
talking about facts at the moment| no, you're talking about opinions -
and 1 must ask fcr. de Villier3 - I'm sorry, but time is - it's very 
interesting, and I must ask !2r. de Villlers - I'm sony, I must ask 
Ш , de Villiers if there are any more things that he feels aro basioally 
untrue about the film that we saw?" 
"I don't think anything was said about housing - oh it was, about 
houses, slum conditions, yes..." "Gentlemen, I don't think that . 
over these particular facts we're going to get any greater agreement 
between you twoj oould I therefore pass on to some things which, 
I Jr. de Villiers, a lot of people in this country do find incomprehensible 
about apartheid; for instance the pass laws. I understand that all 
blacks have passes, and that they have - as was noted in the film - to 
carcy a pass-book showing work, status, tribal origin, police-record 
and tax-reooipt. So why do these people have to have passes wherever 
they go, and why ere they arrested If they don't have them? Why cannot 
black people in South Africa join a trade union and why can't they have 
tho right to strike?" "But Mr. de Villiers, surely you've seen enougk 
in that filmj surely you know enough of what is happening in world 
opinion about South Africa, to make you realise why the world takes 
the view of apartheid that it doe3?" 
"Will you let Mr, do Villiers answer that?" "The point I think Mr. 
Mahomo is making here is that you are perhaps living on borrowed time* 
and I think the point he's making which a lot of people do feel is that 
the tide of history at the moment is working perhaps in a shrinking 
world towards a greater mingling of the races j and are you not possibly 
in South Africa going against the tide of history?'1 "They don't have 
sovereign power though io they (in the 'Transkei)?M "Let sa ask you 
this lastly Jr. do Villiersi if you abandonod apartheid tomorrow and 
all that it implies and many things that I haven't had time to mention 
hero, it would really surely be a matter of time would it not before 
the blacks of South Africa roally took over every thing?" 
'limitation1 г 
40 INDIANS SEIZED IK CID SWOOP ON CELLAR. HUNT FOR SMUGGLERS AFTER 
SECRET LAUDING (2.7)« Immigrants smuggled by world gang, court told 
(3*7)* Immigrants will be put on probation (4.7). '1 took nigront3 
to Britain1, says skipper (7.7)» Well here's one solutions trespassers 
will not be prosecuted (8.7)* Pilot says, I was asked to snuggle 
Pakistanis at £500 each (11*7)• Drive to halt the immigrant 'slave 
trade1 (23.7). Comings your friendly local immigration officer (30.7). 
Torlos plead for Asians in Kenya (27*7)* 
The Daily Express 
Tories face Asians' poser (22.6). Maudling lets 98 "locked out1 Asians 
come in (27.6). ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS SWOOP. 40 FOUND III «BLACK НОЕВ' (2.7). 
MIGRANT GHOST SHIP HUNT. SOfcEV/HSRE AT SEAt THE KEY. TO ASIAN SMUGGLING 
RACKET. Police in immigrant hunt swoop on boat in harbour. Slave 
Trade. (3.7)» Germany orders probe into migrant smuggling. Illegal 
migrants 'pay with drugs' (4*7)* Migrant alert г coast hunt for 400 
in boats (6.7). German trawler skipper tells polioei 'I took Indians 
to Britain.' (7.7). The law 'catches' a party of friendly Sikhs. Six 
•cellar' Indians to stay behind. (10.7). Man named Uncle in Pakistani 
smuggling plot (11.7). Immigration figures down 3ft£ (14«7). POLICE 
CLAMP ON MIGRANT COAST. The real:.quariy (21.7). Channel police link 
to foil immigrants. Powell to asks expel these coloured men (22.7). 
CID • SAILORS• SWOOP Oil BOATLOAD (25.7)- Tory group urges 1 «let in 
more Asians1 (27*7)• 
The Daily Telegraph 
Immigrant arrivals cut in April (19*6). Short-permit Asians • expect 
to stay' (19.6). Heath victory spurs Asian queue-jumpers (22.6). 
Immigrant wins case against Asian (26.6). BAN ON 96 ASIANS LIFTED 
(27.6). BMA wants exam for foreign doctors1 entry (27.6). Cell to 
help Asians back to India (29.6). Sense about immigration (29.6). 
40 MIGRANTS HOLD (2.7). POLICE SEIZE • SMUGGLED INDIANS' BOAT (3-7). 
International gang •smuggle1 immigrants (3*7). Police step up hunt 
for ringleader (3.7). LABOUR WILL FIGHT TOUGHER CURBS ON IMMIGRANTS 
(3.7). EURDH2AN CHECK ON ASIANS (4.7). Indians »six weeks at German 
restaurant* (4.7). Fishermen on Indians charge remanded (4*7)• 
IMMIGRANTS MENACED BY BLACKMAIL. «PROTECTION' LINK WITH SMUGGLERS 
(6.7). 2000 INDIANS SMUGGLED IN VIA GERMANY (6.7). INDIAN POLICE 
RAID TRAVEL AGENCIES (6.7). Indian «principal1 in migrants plot, say 
police (6.7). Shuttle trip by Asians ends in jail (6.7). GERMAN 
ADMITS BRINGING INDIANS TO BRITAIN (7.7). How illegal immigrants 
get job3 (7.7). Gatocraohcrs (7.7). Immigration controls 'inefficient* 
(8.7,'. 68 more Indians smuggled in, say Germans (8#7). 3000-a-year 
illegal entry of Indians (9*7)• Germans say •Harry* was master-mind 
(9.7]. Big rise in deported visitors (9.7)» 6 •cellar1 Indians as 
witnesses (IO.7). • Y/orld ring* of immigrant smugglers (11.7). £500 
offer to fly in Pakistanis (11.7)* 36 pc drop in migrant intake (14.7). 
Tory call for stronger action on immigrants (14*7)• Recall raoe group 
plea to Maudling (I4.7). Doors trap for illegal immigrants (18.7/. 
Bail for throe men in immigrants case (18»7)* Passport to Britain for 
1000 Indians (20.7). Police talk of migrant register (20.7). Doubt 
cast on migrant figures (20.7). Police set up coast blockade for 
immigrants (21,7)» India accuses Britain on migrant laws (21.7)* 
4 countries tackle immigrants (22.7). Indian •tourists* flooding into 
Bavaria (24.7). Bavarisns and Indian «invasion* (25*7). BIG IICREASS III SPECIAL ВШШСН (31.7). 
Domestic raoe relationsi 
Powell storms in. Enoch routs his rivals - end his majority is doubled 
(19.6). POLICE GUARD Oil THE CEIITRE COURT. Llan was led by a slave 
collar. Businessman tells court1 coloured men mocked me at Michael X 
houso (22.6). Colour unconscious. Raoe report accuses I/IP's who whip 
up hostility (24.6). A daft speech (Benn). The evolutionary stakes 
(the race board needn't worry 1 ites just a lesson in biology) (26.6). 
Sacked s the doctors who could not speak English» BMA backs a tougher 
exam rule (27.6). Race board bid to end sneers. »Let us bar silly 
complaints' (1.7). Shook for a minister - 32 people in 7 rooms (2.7). 
POLICE GIRL CYNTHIA WEDS PC PROM KENYA (10.7). Doctor is quizzed on 
•hit and miss* medicine (11.7)* The £200,000 cost of hunt for the 'no 
body* killer. Husband sent to jail for ten years (23.7). George goes 
sick - and runs into a colour bar (24.7). KOB RAID POLICE HQ - 11 HELD. 
PC'S HURT IN LONDON BATTLE. »SIEGE AFTER A FUNFAIR SWOOP» (28.7). 
The Daily Express 
Headmaster ends race hatred in the boxing ring (19.6). POLICE GUARD OH 
TENNIS STIRS AS WIMBLEDON WAITS FOR DEMO. Michael X and the man in a 
•slave collar1 (23.6). Politicians como under attack in race report. 
Missing wife's spirit 'went abroad» (24.6). Help mo save these »twilight 
kids1. says doctor (26.6). Vanishing wife »thrown in water» - court told 
(25.6). Test these foreign doctors - BMA (27.6). Migrant boys »forced 
into crime» (30.6). Race board seeks urgent probe into tho case of the 
jobless (1.75* New housing minister visits London's »appalling slums» 
(2.7). Town's housing list goes on 'probation' (7*7)* Heath refuses 
probe into Powell charge (8.7). ROMANCE IN THE FORCE ... POLICEWOMAN 
CYNTHIA BECOMES BRIDE OF CONSTABLE YUNUS (10.7). Widow's death due to 
shotgun medicine, says coroner (11.7). Son wins legacy despite adoption 
clause in will (22.7). 4 stabbed in Soho (23.7)* The vanishing lady -
strange quest for truth without a body (23.7)* Water melon man: how a 
white man whose skin turned bromi lives with a race problem (24.7)» 
Bodies In chimney murder probe (25.7)* Pakistani couple face double 
murder charge (27.7). 'BLACK POWER' i&SN STORM POLICE. INJURIES AS 
DEMONSTRATORS MOUNT 'SIEGE' OVER ARRESTS AT FUNFAIR. Learning English 
with an Eton accent (28.7). Black Power salute at police 'siege' court 
(29.7). How the Black Phantoms terrorised a whole suburb (30.7). 
The Daily Telegraph 
POWELL'S RECORD MAJORITY (19.6). Progress of a lie (19.6). Candidate's 
colour 'lost labour votes' (20.6). Powell io blamed by Miss Lee (20,6). 
Dingle Foot blames defeat on racialism (20.6). Powellite tag refuted 
by Cannock MP (22.6). Michael X gang put slave collar on me, court told 
(23.6). More hostility to coloured, says Cousins (24.6). No body murder 
QP tells of Pakistanis' lies' (24.6). Tennis and the demos (24.6). 
•Body in oca1 otory by Pakistani (25.6). Success story (25.6). Protest 
on Lyons Sikh beard ban (26.6). Powell should head race ministry, soys 
immigrant leader (29.6). Race Board would welcome more complaints (1.7)* 
Thought control (1.7). Colour obsession (1.7). Housing minister appalled 
by 32 in Brixton house (2.7)* Immigrants ere 'help to economy' (2.7% 
Immigrant women face mental illness through 'purdah' (3*7)• Councils 
blamed for crowding (3*7)* Clot killed attacked man, court told (3*7)* 
Walker appalled (3*7/* Brixton's slums (3*7). 'Don't blame me for over-
crowding1 , says migrants' landlord (4*7)* Few landladies accept student 
rule on race (6.7). Council soraps 'unlawful' housing rule *7»7)* 
Pakistani boro no sign of torture, court told (7#7)* Immigrants 'failing 
to complain of jobs Ь1аз' (8.7). Think bigotl (8.7). Former staff chief 
attacks race body (9.7). Workers told to heed Race Relations Act (16.7). 
Students show 'Powellist' colour bias (17#7)* 'Exercise rights', says 
Race Board chief (17.7). 'Hair' accepts race board advice (18.7). 
'Black only' job policy in many lands (20.7). Hot so much race as.... 
(20.7). £2CG00 for race board Urdu film (21.7)* Pakistani in plot to 
hide wife's body gets 10 years (23.7). Welshman looks like Pakistani 
(24.7). Attack on immigrant 'senseless' (24*7)* Help for 'colour bar' 
wife (27.7). Inquiry order on Indians' sick certificates (30.7)« The 
teenager and mixed marriages (30.7). HICHAEL X IN POLICE SIEGE (28.7) 
Arms for South Africa? 
Vorster seeks arms again (2.7). Out of tune (14*7)• STX2RH BREAKS Oil 
FOR SOUTH AFRICA (15.7). South Africa warning by Tory HP's (17.7). 
DEMOS BID TO STOP ЛРЛ53 FOR VORSTER. MILITANTS PLAIT ACTION AGAINST 
FACTORIES (20.7). GO-AHEAD FOR SOUTH AFRICA ARMS - BUT WHEN? CENSURE 
BID BY V/ILSON, Midsummer madness (21.7). African students attack 
Britons over агтз deal (22.7). Arms against the Africans (23.7). 
US RAP OVER SOUTH AFRICA ARMS (23.7). tos deal. Silence is golden 
(29»7). 
The Daily Express 
Tories face arias poser over South Africa (20.6). Sir Alec faces South 
Africa plea on arms (24.6). ARMS ШЖ SOUTH AFRICA TALKS (2.7). If 
Tories end arms ban ... France may go cold on South Africa (4*7)* South 
African arms 1 a new obstacle (10.7). South Africans put on arms 
pressure. 'Play it our way or we deal with France' threat to Britain 
(11.7)» Comions clash over arms to South Africa (15*7)• Just fishing? 
Sea route fear over secret Red deal with Mauritius (I6.7). My Kremlin 
deal, by Dr. Ram. Danger signal (17.7). THE KEY TO TEE INDIAN OCEAN 
IS IN RUSSIA'S НАШ). UNO fight to stop arms for Vorster. Russia lands 
a prize catch (18.7). SIR ALEC FACES CRITICS OVER ARMS DEAL (20.7). 
VORSTER SEEKS CAST 3H0N ARMS TREATY (21.7). ROtf OVER SIR ALEC'S LETTER 
ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS. Zambia mob tears down Union Jack (22.7). 
South Africa 'must come in from the cold' (23*7). Revealed 1 Labour's 
own arms deal with South Africa (24.7). British subs and frigates to 
exercise beside South Africans. Handed over with a hymn ... Vorstor's 
first submarine. Helicopter deal with South Africa8 Benn replies (25*7)* 
NEW HELICOPTER DEAL SHOCK FOR LABOUR MP'S (31.7). 
The Daily Telegraph 
Africa arms deal likely to go ahead (22.6). ARMS FOR S. AFRICA LIKELY 
(23.6). Arms sales to S. Africa expected (24*6). Hew brooms at home — 
and abroad (22.6). UN urges S. Africa arms ban (25.6). ROGERS TO SEE 
SIR ALEC ON S. AFRICA ARMS (1.7). Ho. 10 TALKS ON ARMS FOR S. AFRICA. 
EXPLOSIVE ISSUE FOR NEW MP'S (2.7). NO PROMISE BY SIR ALEC FOR MULLSR 
(2.7). Arms and Africa (2.7). SIR ALEC PRESSED ON ARMS (7.7). Britain 
cannot risk its life, says Sir Alec (7.7). French ready for S. Africa 
arms 'duel! with Britain (9*7)» S. Africa wants navy pact revised in 
arms deal (11.7)* 'Cloud' over supplies from France (11.7)* Arms and 
Africa (11.7). WALK-OUT BY ELDON GRIFFITHS (13.7). LABOUR ATTACK ON 
ARMS (15.7). Peers in angry clashes on arms for S. Africa (15*7). 
Obsession (15.7)* 5 Tory points on arms for South Africa (16.7). 
SOLE TORY DOUBTS ON ARMS SALE (17.?). Africans demand total Pretoria 
arms ban (18.7). 3. AFRICA ARMS FOR NAVY ONLY. HAIN THREATENS A BIGGER 
CAMPAIGN (20.7). SIR ALEC UNDER FIRE (20.7). VORSTSR IS CONFIDENT OF 
DEAL (20.7). «Ban the arms* rallies (20.7). Pressure grows against 
lifting of arms ban (20.7). ARMS TALKS WITH S. AFRICA TO LAST ALL 
SUMMER (21.7). BRITAIN PUTS CASE TO UN (21.7). Sir Alec's Commonwealth 
consultations on S. African arms (21.7). Sir Alec moves gently (21.7). 
VORSTER PLEDGES PEACE WITH BLACK AFRICA (21.7). •SECRET1 LETTER BY 
HEATH ON ARMS SALES (22.7). SAMBIANS RIP UNION JACK (22.7). 11 Common-
wealth countries .oppose S. Africa arms (22.7). SIR ALEC IN ANGRY ARMS 
Й Ш (23.7). Inquiry into Heath arms letter leak (23*7). Total arms 
ban in UN (23.7;. Sir Alec calls Wilson •Prime Humbug' in angry olash 
on S. African arms (23.7). US CRITICISES BRITAIN'S ARMS DECISION (23.7). 
Students bum Union Jack in arms protest (24*7). •Spies' plan to prevent 
arms sales (24.7). Trade reasons for British arms sales (24.7). Africans 
seeking arms veto power (24*7). Minister denies South African weapon 
hunger (24.7). Fog over Africa (24.7). UGANDAN THREAT ON ARMS (25.7). 
Britain unable to stop sale of helioopters (25.7)- S. AFRICA'S GLOOMY 
VIEW OVER ARMS (25*7). 'HUNT THE SUBS1 EXERCISE OFF CAPS (25.7). 
CHURCHES ASKED TO OPPOSE ARMS (25.7). S. Afrioa delays arms plea to 
take heat off Heath (31.7)* Close study of Russian fishing fleet (31«7). 
Chapter Sevent The contribution of the media toward the social 
construction of political consensus in modern Britain 
In a purely empirical sense, the delineation of the ways 
race relations and work relations are presented in the main British 
news media has been accomplished. Yet sociologically, the information 
provided in answer to that empirical question cannot be allowed to 
float suspended in a vacuum. It is necessary to proceed to analyse 
the impact of this media output on British society. 
It is the argument of this concluding chapter that as critical 
instances of the handling of social conflicts, tho data presented 
powerfully underpin the conclusion in chapter 1, and by other social 
theorists, that the media contribute toward the social construction 
of political consensus - in this ease, in contemporary Britain. In 
order to present this case in any way satisfactorily, the argument 
must proceed by first examining some varied theoretical explanations 
of the role of ideas in situations of social division and conflict| 
specifically, ideology-as-hegomony, ideology-as-suture, ideology-as-
confrontation, and ideology-as-negotiation. As a sub-section of this 
discussion, a particular set of data from anthropological rosearch, 
which bears illuminatingly on this area, will be noted. Hext, the 
network of social institutions which arguably combine to forgo a 
degree of social consensus in British society, and as an element of 
which the media themselves operate, will be rapidly surveyed. The 
media do not function in isolation, and any discussion of their 
funotion in a particular society must attempt to clarify the extent 
to which they mesh with other institutions. And lastly, tho analysis 
of two ideologies (nationalism and objectivity) in British society and 
the British news media, will lead directly into the concluding state-
ment of this rosearch on tho social roles of the mass media as social-
ising agents and as potential stimulators of public discussion. 
Cultural constructs and sooial division 
(a) Theoretical analyses of their Inter-relation. 
In examining thoorotical understandings of the relationship 
between ideology and social division, certain representatives of 
three styles in sociological theory (phenomenology/interactionlora, 
functionalists, conflict-theory) will be assessed for tho illumination 
they are able to offer on that relationship. The writers in question 
are Borger and Luokmann (l), together with Berger (2), and Ilolzner ( 3 ) j 
then Cramsoi (4) and Barthes (5); then Geertz (6); and finally 
Converse (7), Parkin (8) and Mann (9), whose work belongs rather more 
to the middle range of theory than the others'. 
Berger's work on religion in a pluralistic society, end 
Holz пег* a work on tho social construction of reality (which largely 
parallels Berger and Luckaann's book), only deal with the relation be-
tween culture (10) and social division from two perspectives. One is 
the extent to which a particular dominant legitimation of the existing 
social order tends to rule out alternative explanations end interpret-
ations of that social order. By implication, dissident analyses carry 
less weight, less conviction. 
The other perspective is that of the problems encountered by 
cortain members of a pluralistic society in maintaining their own 
reality construct against competition from others. An instance would 
be the problems of the members of a puritanical sect, faced with the 
daily barrage of sexually loaded advertising for alcohol, or with the 
frequency of "blasphemy" and "obcconity" in everyday conversation. 
Holzner's interest is rather in the differing reality constructs 
which proliferate in modem societies as a result of the dizzy 
expansion in the division of labour (ch. IX), which also generates 
many layers of authority requiring varying ideological legitimations 
(ch. X). 
Both these perspectives, especially Berger's, tend to 
stress pluralistic divisions and conflicts to the exclusion of 
"horizontal" industrial and racial confliotsi yet it is certainly 
the case that the significance of these latter cleavages for the sta— 
bility of a society may ho far greater. She categories of competing 
definitions of reality which they discuss are thoreforo of only 
limited utility in the present context of trying to understand how 
societies cope culturally with significant rifts in their composition. 
To he fair to Holzner, he doos offer (ch. X) a descriptive typology 
of loyalistic radicalism (e.g. Nazism), alienative radicalism 
(e.g. socialism), and accommodative and escapist sectarianisms 
(i.e. tho previous pair of responses on a minority level of organisa-
tion), which in principle encompasses conflict and change. But ho 
sees these ideological гезропвез explicitly (p. 159) as (i) typically 
competing with and even moulding each other, and (ii) as reflecting 
the increasing differentiation and complexity of modern socio ties. 
While quite possibly accurate, this analysis de-emphasises tho necessity 
of explaining the conditions which favour the origination, tho develop-
ment or tho diminution of any one response. Tho tendency to timelcs3ness 
in phenomonological analysis is evident once more. 
Tho same may bo said of the first perspective i that in its 
failure to analyse how deviant and dissident definitions emerge and 
sometimes even overwhelm the dominant construction of social reality, 
it does represent in many ways an argument presupposing inertia} and 
modem British society, to take but one example, is far from boing 
inert. Tho particular importance of the news media, as noted in 
chap tor 1, in mediating social change by assimilating it to existing 
cultural categories which are themselves in turn modified by thi3 
process, is one instance only of how those broadly phonomonological 
analyses need to be supplemented. 
It is precisely at this point that some of Gramsci's social 
analyses are of considerable help. In his discussion of the ideological 
hegemony of ruling groups in societies, and of the ways in which 
intellectuals and tho educational system sustain and develop this 
hegemony, he is arguing in a way that resembles at first glance the 
Derger and Luokmann, and Kolzner, positions. In fact, of course, his 
argument is different even at this point in two major respects $ first, 
his linking of the definition of everyday life with tho dominance of 
a particular social group, rather than with some more •democratic1 
• spontaneous1 origins. Second, tho way in which these definitions 
also act as a suture, binding classes together and overlaying their 
conflicting economic and political interests. 
However, Gramsci also analyses the way in which emergent 
groups develop their own ideological definitions and analyses which 
conflict with the ideological hegemony of the still existing ruling 
group. In time, as they wrest power by one means or another from the 
existing ruling group, their development of their own ideological 
position is both vital to their success and guarantees the hegemony of 
that ideology to match their new economic and political hegemony. An 
instance from the past would be the historical rise to power of tho 
bourgeoisie in Europe. Gramsci wa3 of course aware that the precise 
content of this ideological hegemony would vary from society to socioty» 
including the strong possibility that elements from earlier epochs 
would continue to play a role in that hegemony. An instance of this 
which he cites, is the decision by Groce to reintroduce Catholic 
religious instruction in Italian schools because of his own view, 
shared by other members of the Italian bourgeoisie, that religion 
was necessary for the masses though not to the dominant group. 
A further interesting point made by Gramsci relates to the 
correspondence between liberal definitions of the economic market in 
a capitalist society, and the typical tasks adopted by trade unions. 
In the pursuance of their own economic interost in the marketplace, 
trade unions effectively sot themselves a permanent target, which 
would always be renewed by market forces. Their existence, although 
it could certainly make life more difficult for employers than their 
absence, represented in the end only a more advanced and organised 
form of participation in the market - in this case, the market for 
labour. Thoir existenco at loggerheads with employers could never 
bo transcended, because in the final analysis their self-definition, 
albeit one of conflict, was taken from the definition of the economic 
organisation of society that belonged to the dominant group. 
The importance of Gramsc^s analyses is that they introduce 
a diachronic and confliotual perspective into the purely synchronic 
perspectives of the authors discussed so far} and further, that they 
sketch out the complex articulation between intellectuals, the 
educational system, the dominant ideological perspectives, the form 
of social stratification, and the processes of social change. Idoology-
as-suture, idoology-as-negotiation, ideology-as-confrontation and 
ideology-as-hegemony are all present in his analysis. Furthermore, 
Gramsci's perspective avoids the subtle trap of commencing the analysis 
of ideolo^/socialisation/communication/role-expectations/exchange from 
the apparently simple notional base of two actors, Alter and Ego (ll). 
Such simplicity ends by being more confusing, since the primary base 
for socialisation is the macro-social sphere? the shape that communi-
cation and ideology take is not the product of two individuals meeting 
&3 tabulae rasao in a fictitious jungle clearing, but the product of 
the complex of stratified roles that make up a society, with due 
emphasis being given to dominant groups and the oppositions they may 
arouse. 
Barthes, writing as Gramsci from tho marxi3t tradition of 
analysis, discusses tho relation between culture and social class on 
a much more immediate level. His use of tho term •myth; is almost 
identical to one meaning of the term •ideology1, as the following 
quotation makes plains 
"iyth hides nothing and flaunts nothing} it distorts» 
myth is neither a lie nor a confession; it is an 
inflexion." (12). 
However, what Barthes has to say about myth/ideology is primarily 
concerned with how ideology achieves its effeot, with certain of its 
particular communicative characteristics, with ideology-as-suturej 
and especially with the sign-form that ideology may take in a capitalist 
society, which in his view renders it enormously seduotivo and tolling, 
A clear instance of what he moans is a picture he cites from 
a cover of Paris-Match, which shows an immaculately turned out Africai 
soldier, eyos aloft, saluting the French flag. Barthos' coments on 
this are several, but ho especially notes two dimensions of the ideol-
ogical meaning of tho photograph-as-sign. First, that words are 
unnecessary: the juxtaposition of saluting black soldier and Krench 
flag proclaims the living, vital present of French "imperiality". (Barthos1 
term), and consequently ita future too. Second, that myth does not 
pretend certain facto do not exist« 
"Ц/th does not deny things, on the contrary, 
ito function is to talk about them; simply, 
it purifies them, it mokes them innocent, it 
gives them a natural and eternal justification, 
it gives them a clarity which io not that of 
an explanation but that of a statement of fact. 
If 1 state .the fact of French imperiality 
without explaining it, I am very near to finding 
it is natural and goes without Saving.11 (13) 
Of additional interest and importance is Barthes * recognition 
that the richness of allusion of a sign or symbol may easily be in 
inverse ratio to its own simplicity and directness. He encapsulates 
this observation in the recognition that myth is quantitatively far 
less than its potentially numerous signs, but qualitatively far greater« 
there are strong points of overlap here with Sapir's analysis of 
"condensation symbols", noted in sub-section (b) (14). 
In general, Barthes» concern is with the myriad tiny elements 
of the texture of everyday life in society, which establish and support 
the ideological hegemony of the dominant group. So slight individually, 
and so pervasive in the тазз, they easily go unnoticed and unquestioned 
even by political militants and diösident professional intellectuals. 
He argues that typically dominant group norms impact on non-dominant 
classes through a series of progressively looser approximations down 
th. social scale. Even when for various reasons (o.g. insufficient 
wealth) norms cannot bo fulfilled exactly, the tost then becomes one 
of how closely they can be followed within existing constraints. 
This analysis is similar to Pallors1 1 trickle effect1 (15) model; 
but it has the added implication (not noted by Barthes) that as 
norms become attenuated further on down tho social hierarchy, so 
there emerges more «space1 for ambivalence and alternatives. Ilannerz» 
dissection of lower class cultural variants in Washington ВС is an 
instance of precisely this phenomenon (16). 
Bar theo« particular contribution to tho present discussion 
is to fill out the contributions so far summarised on the relation 
between culture and social cleavage. Operating on a more immediate 
level of analysis than Gramsci and the other writers, ho enables 
understanding of some of tho day-to-day forms of the cultural hegemony 
of socially dominant groups. Н1з focus is exclusively an ideology-as-
cuturo, however, and ideology-as-hogemonyj its negotiational and 
confrontational aspects aro not diseased by him. 
The importance of Geertz • analysis of ideology for tho present 
discussion is twofold. First, his critique of functionalist analyses 
of ideology is sufficiently telling to allow them to be bypassed -
although ho concludes by producing a more sophisticated version of 
the same theoretical position. Second, io his distinction between 
science (аз critical diagnosis) and ideology (as committed justifica-
tion), while accepting that both endeavour to provide guides to the 
comprehension of reality. 
Tho manner in which standard functionalist arguments relate 
ideology to social division is to claim that the very production of 
ideologies is a response to social strains in an insufficiently 
equilibrated society; and that in turn they contribute toward forging 
a new social equilibrium. Georts« attack is not directed to the 
genesis aspect of the theory, whioh ho considers much more convincing 
than the argument that ideologies are goneratod by "interests11, but to 
the supposition that by its very emergence an ideology contributes to 
the resolution of tho strain«s general psychological impact and so to 
a new foim of social balance. Ho points out how the emergence of an 
ideology nay easily have the opposite offect of intensifying social 
strains rather than muting thoir impact (idoology-as-confrontation). 
However, his definition of ideologies (whether conservative or radical) 
as the cultural product of rapid social change - he instances tho 
disruption of the settled Hindu world view in late medieval Indonesia -
is very arbitrary. It assumes the defining characteristic of a 
conservative ideology vis-a-vis a traditional world view to be simply 
one of greater articulateneso, almost of having a sharper and того 
controversial nature. But why should not tho traditional world view 
also be ideological? Ho draws attention to an interesting dimonoion 
of ideological formation, rather than to the nature of all ideology 
as such. It may be that ho is still subtly influenced by the pejorative 
sense of the word 'ideology1• 
In fact, his analysis of ideology as an essentially committed, 
definition of reality (as against scientific analysis), contrasts 
oddly with his earlier near-dismissal of interest-theories of the 
generation of ideology. The question of how "committed" poople aro 
who chare an ideology is actually a veiy open one; but the extent to 
which the dominance and weakness of certain ideologies must be related 
at least synchronically and in some manner to the power-position of 
various social interests сеетз highly uncontroversial. It may bo 
that the tendency to respond to the marxist tradition of social science 
in terms of the aphorisms of the Communist Manifesto, or certain famous 
singlo sentences ("ruling ideas...ruling class"), rather than in the 
broadcloth, is responsible for Goertz • ambivalence at this point. It 
is also pertinent to ask, whioh neither Gecrtz nor the functionalist 
analysts he criticises do, whether social strains are not often 
themselves the product of the clash of interests. Despite the accuracy 
of his attack on the standard functionalist position, then, it cannot 
be said that Geertz takes the discussion of culture and social division 
much further; and if he does not do so, still less could be attributed 
to other functionalists. 
Tho differing levels of penetration of political information, 
which has important implications for tho character of ideological 
hegemony and its relation to social divisions, is the subject of 
Converse1 essay in the same volume. Eis argument is as follows. 
Empirical ovidenco demonstrates that there is a very wide gulf in 
information about public issues between the top 10-15>S of US society 
and the remaining 65-9Q& even though in this as other respects this 
majority is not an undifferentiated bloc. Lbre specifically, items 
which form natural clusters of political opinion aro in no way 
instinctively associated among the mass of people; and further, the 
tendency to cluster items of public policy in any form is much того 
likely to be associated for most Americans with generalised attitudes 
to clearly identifiable groups (Converse instances black Americans 
and policies with an effect on reducing their disadvantage). In 
other words, white Americans in tho mass know what they think very 
often about black Americans, but not about the propriety or otherwise 
of State intervention in the есопошу. People tend to be m&ch more 
stable over time on issues such as tho former, than they do with 
regard to the latter. Converse hypothesises that a society is in 
fact composed of several different "issue publics", which to a 
certain extent may overlap, but only to any great extent within the 
most informed 10-15^. He cites two historical examples as prima facie 
evidence for his cases the northern United States immediately before 
tho Civil War, and Nazi Germany from 1920-33. In both cases, ho 
argues there arc strong indications that the supposedly most salient 
issue (Abolition, Nazism) did not penetrate tho consciousness of tho 
vast mass of the public. If ideological clarity is effectively an 
upper-class preserve, the implication would seem to bo that mass 
publics are mobilised by less rational factors; and that social 
divisions persist in an ideological fog. 
Though veiy carefully argued, Converse* analysis appears 
open to criticism on throe counts: his relatively unreflexive 
interpretation of "natural" clusters of issues; his partial conclusions 
from his two historical oxamples; and his omission of any discussion 
as to wjby the gap in information to which ho draws attention exists 
in the first place. 
Essentially, what Converse defines as a "natural" cluster of 
issues tends to be the group of policies asoooiated with either "pole" 
in tho North American consorvative-liberal spectrum (which of course 
reflects the political spectrum in similar polities elsewhere). From 
the relative irrelevance of these positions to tho general public in 
the USA Converse deduces a colossal lack of information and ignorance 
about real issues. His interpretation, to make any sense, must be 
redefined and separated out into three separate questions. First, are 
real issues (ouch as employment) outside people's awareness in the 
mass? Converse' own data indicate they are not (fig. 3, p. 240). 
Second, does the extent of variation in government policies in the USA 
make a very substantial difference either way to a high proportion of 
Americans? Who determines the criterion of a "natural" cluster of 
policies: the public, or the leadership elites of the major parties? 
Third, is the undoubted misinformation that exists not more properly 
attributable to yet other factors, rather than ingrained and instinctive 
political lethargy (see below)? 
The lack of connection between the American Civil War and 
Abolition in the minds of most Horthern State Americans is almost 
certainly an accurate historical verdict. Yet Converse slides from 
a revisionist interpretation of its meaning (as against the liberal 
legend) to arguing that only the American elite were fighting the war 
for abolitionist ends, rather than that the war was fought for a 
variety of ends by all concerned, of which Abolition and traditionalist 
hostility to certain values of urban industrial capitalism were only 
perhaps the most respectable. Similarly in the German instance, Converse' 
stress on the marginal nature of the Nazi vote in I93O (accounting for 
регЬарз million out of million voters for the National Socialist 
Party) omits any consideration of who the other 3 million were, and 
why. It also leaves undiscussed the respective roles of the Versailles 
Treaty, the Arqy, leading industrialists, Social Democratic Party, and 
Connuniot Party, together with the experience of тавз unemployment 
and runaway inflation, in producing considerable tolerance for the 
liazi rise to power. Undoubtedly these factors and this ensuing 
tolerance were as significant as active support for Nazism. What too 
is the meaning of successful ideological hegemony if not the paralysis 
of opponents and the absorption of neutrals as well as allies? 
Thirdly, Converse fails to discuss the role of schools and 
the mass media in relation to this gap in information, but presents 
the gap rather as a stubborn fact of life which persists despite these 
informational agencies rather than in some measure because of them. 
He certainly establishes that there may be a gap between the few and 
tho many in terms of political information and discourse; but he fails 
successfully to analyse its constituent parts or social origins. 
This task is rather better performed, in general terms, by 
Parkin, and also by Mann. Parkin distinguishes three "meaning-systems" 
characteristic of the stratification of V/estem societies i the dominant 
value system, the subordinate value system, and the radical value 
system. Either deference or aspiration are characteristic patterns of 
acceptance of the dominant value-system. The subordinate value-system 
corresponds in some ways to Gr ansehe analysis of trade unionism as a 
response to the dominant classt that is, a defensive and even fatalistic 
form of opposition to the status quo, with no real impetus or perspective 
to transcend it. Parkin describes it (pp. 91-92) as an uneasy position 
between rejection and endorsement of the status quo; or alternatively 
as a negotiated version of the dominant values. 
Here he makes a number of points of great importance for the 
present discussion. He argues that characteristically the negotiated 
version produces adherence to dominant values in the abstract, but to 
a substantially reduced version of those values in existential situations 
(a similar analysis to Barthes and Hanners). He instances the high job-
aspirations of young workers when asked temporarily to jettison the 
reality of their lives, and their actual aspirations; or the generalised 
condemnation of trade union power and other people's strikes, while 
supporting one's own union (and strike)} or the upgrading of one's 
own (manual) occupation while accepting the low grading of manual 
work in general. Cloarly, tho impact of these ambivalent attitudes 
may in many instances be the further consolidation of the status quo, 
in that certain relatively harmless forms of opposition are not 
crushed (a kind of Marcusean repressive tolerance). On the other hand, 
the possibility exists that almost without realising it those attitudes 
may lead to very considerable disruption, as some analyses of contemporary 
Britain claim. Goldthorpe, as already noted, argues that industrial 
unrest is the inevitable outcomo of a eocial situation whore differ-
entials in wealth aro extreme and not legitimated (17)* As noted in 
chapter 3, it has been argued that this unrest led to an anomie 
situation, and the severe loss of profits, in Britain in tho late 
60's and early 70*s (18). 
Parkin also analyses the radical value system, and its crys-
tallisation in and development by, the radical political party, as one 
result of the emergence of the urban industrial working class. Once 
again, tho analyses of Gramsci are quite similar. Clearly the absence 
of such a focu3 in the shape of a political party has a very considerable 
impact on the relation between culture and sooial division. 
The last discussion to be taken into account is that of 
Michael Mann. He surveys, insofar as the very different research 
methodologies utilised will allow him, a range of American and British 
studies bearing on values, consensus and social class. Hie survey is 
extraordinarily useful, summarising as it does a whole collection of 
empirical studies from two societies. His results indicated that two 
types of deviant values tend to bo widely endorsed by manual stratum 
respondents. First wore concrete values in line with everyday reality 
(similar to Parkin's subordinate values)} and second were highly 
generalised divisions of society into rich arid poor, Us and Them. 
However, Mann argues that what characterises ideological 
consciousness in the British and American manual stratum io not its 
harmonisation with the ideology of dominant groups, nor its 
active participation in tho social consensus, hut precisely its own 
confusion and lack of consensus in opposition to the status quo. 
Politico and political values in particular seem to be typically 
confused and/or conservative at an abstract level and/or only 
marginally important anyway. Tho participation of the working class 
in the status quo appears to bo pragmatic and local, rather than 
genuinely normative (19)» 
2-arm points to empirical evidence to support his contention 
that tho prime agency in this ideological confusion and ambivalence 
is the educational system, which rather than providing formal 
indoctrination in tho dominant value system provides absolutely 
nothing on tho clash between dominant and deviant values. The social 
order io presented generally, or is alluded to, as benevolent; and 
where the recognition of social conflict cannot be avoided, it is 
presented as a phenomenon without any attempt at explanation. Ho 
concludes; 
"Thus the moot common form of manipulative 
socialisation by the liberal democratic state 
does not seek to change values, but rather to 
perpetuate values that do not aid tho working 
class to interpret the reality it actually 
experiences. These values merely deny the 
existence of group and class conflict within 
the nation-state society and therefore, are 
demonstrably false." (20) 
Mann's insights usefully complement the other contributions surveyedf 
to the vacuum left by the absence of an organised focus for radical 
values, is added only the'^ silence" of the school system (in conjunction, 
we may add, with characteristic forms of media output). 
To summarise the theoretical understanding so far achieved on 
the relation between ideology and social divisions, the following 
assertions can be made, (l) Certain social definitions have intellectual 
and general prestige. (2) These social definitions aro associated 
with dominant social groups, (j) Dominant definitions are mediated 
in a myriad ways. (4) 2hcy can face two types of opposition from 
subordinate groups, subordinate/nogotiatory and radical. (5) The 
subordinate value system is ambivalent, confused, local. (6) The 
radical value system is not only much more intractable and highly 
organised, but under certain conditions may bo developed from 
subordinate values. (7) Every ideology, dominant or subordinate or 
radical, must have roles or institutions to "carry" it. (8) The only 
real focus for radical values is the radical political party, in 
modern industrial societies. 
(This analysis of ideologies is highly schematic, especially 
in its second assumption above of a 1 i 1 correspondence between a 
particular dominant social group and a particular ideology; an 
ideology may be characteristic only of a particular section of a 
dominant group and may be hotly contested by a different ideology 
belonging to a different section. In British terms, on tho two 
subject-areas of this study, one might instance tho ideological 
foundation of policies of attacking tho unions versus attaching them; 
or of strict immigration control versus free movement of labour.) 
(b) The analysis of ritual functions in some anthropological 
research 
At much less longth, certain social anthropological data on 
the relation between culture and social division will now be examined. 
There is of course a whole literature on the subject, dealing with 
witchcraft accusations and social strains, with feuds and judicial 
processes, with myths аз etiologies of endemic conflict, and pre-
eminently with religion as providing the fabric of social cohesion. 
Here tho discussion will dv/ell on a particular aspect of this last 
point, namely, the role of ritual in assuaging endemic social conflicts. 
Without being able to enter upon a discussion of the theory 
of ritual in non-western societies, it is sufficient to recognise that 
by and large anthropol6gists seem agreed that ritual reflects myth 
and often is an enactment of it. In turn, both ritual and myth 
reflect the society from which they emanate, even though this 
correspondence is usually not a simple one. The classical example 
is rites of passage, which embody the social organisation of the 
society together with the social significance attributed to death, 
birth, зех, and so on. In addition - and this Is of special interest 
for the present discussion - there is evidence that ritual in certain 
societies may serve to express and mediato social conflict in the 
lives of the participants in way3 which may reduce Its disruptive 
potential (21). 
Three examples have been located in tho literature, from 
social groups in Java (22), Mexico (23) and Sambia (24). In the first 
two cases the conflicts were related to the problems and traumas of 
social change produced by the impact of the wider society on peasants 
of rural or recently rural origins. In Java theatrical dramas, and 
in Mexico ritual dramas, served to express the ambivalences of 
transition, and to extablish the new roles and their accompanying 
mores. In Zambia, the conflict arose out of a fundamental structural 
disjunction in the social organisation of kinship roles, but the 
ritual was similarly reconstitutive of sooial order. A particular 
feature of the rituals, in all three cases, was the utilisation of 
"condensation symbols" (Sapir) (25)* that is, symbols which are 
pregnant with allusions to emotive past events and poworful appeals 
to people's desires and hopes. 
According to Gluckman (26), such rituals act as instruments 
of legitimate release of emotion which otherwise is dofinod аз 
illegitimate, rather like the medieval All Pools1 Day in Europe. 
This position is akin to the functionalist analyses criticised by 
Geertz, and is beset by the problem that there is no means of checking 
whether it contains any truth, however plausible it may appear to be. 
The interpretation of the function of these rituals in managing social 
conflict that will be adopted here is that of the three writers 
concerned, which is woll summarised by Mary Douglass 
(The ritual functions) "in modifying experience. 
Often it works retroactively. Officiants may 
solemnly deny the quarrels and misconduct which 
are the actual occasion of a sacrifice. •. .The 
object of the ritual is not to deceive God, but 
to re-formulate past experience. % ritual and 
speech what has passed is restated so that what 
ought to have been prevails over what is." (27) 
In other words, ritual acts to re-define social reality in the minds 
of the participants, and in this way draws tho sting from conflicts. 
It need not automatically/magically succeed; but it is a very potent 
influence. 
The importance of these comparative data for present purposes 
is that they are highly suggestive of part of on interpretation of how 
the news media operate in British society. The discussion of how they 
do 30 must wait a little; but in general it would bo a great mistake 
to assume that the decline In the public significance of religion (28) 
has evaporated the rolo of symbols, myth and ritual in public life. 
The use of symbol and ritual in modem American politics has been 
examined by Edelman (29), particularly to explain the successful 
blurring of the disjunction between theory and actuality in tho 
tradition of US liberal demooraoy: the contradiction between the 
vaunted power of the public to have their wishes translated into 
policy, and the real problems of government. Amongst the topics he 
studies aro the ambiguity of symbolic appeals in political campaigns, 
and tho primarily legitimating role of elections. We shall see in a 
moment how secular ideologies of nationalism and objectivity are also 
repeatedly enacted in rituals that themselves constitute potent 
condensation symbols, in modem British society. 
ii. Social institutions and the construction of consensus in Britain» 
It is now time to turn to the analysis of certain specific 
institutions of British society whioh share with the гдааз media a 
funtion of ideological definition end diffusion, and (potentially) 
of stimulating public discussion. It is essential, if the role of 
the nass media in tho social construction of political consensus in 
British society is to be properly conceived, to realise they do not 
operate in a (consensual) vacuum, and to attempt to understand how 
they articulate with other major sources of consensus, stability and 
cohesion. The institutions in question are notably the two main 
political parties, the Civil Service, the trade unions, and the 
educational system. Other potent sources of consensual definitions, 
though not stimulators of public discussion, are the social welfare 
system, and the organisation of career and professional work. This 
list, though significant, does not pretend to be exhaustive г the 
complexities of primary socialisation and family structure ere omitted, 
for instance, as are the churches. A substantial or original analysis 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, which is necessarily confined to 
an argument rather than a definitive conclusion. 
(a) The two major political parties are the fairly standard 
north-west European type of conservative and social demooratio, except 
that the Labour Party's marxist antecedents are confined to a very 
small fringe of people. Clearly, political parties act as major 
agencies for the definition of social reality, both for their adherents 
and for the society at large. In practice in the Ш , through the 
requirement of political balance in broadcasting (by tradition in the 
BBC, by law in tho IBA), they exert an extremely important influence 
over the definition of tho proper boundaries of political discourse. 
This being the case, tho historic ideological positions of 
tho Conservative and Labour Parties, and their relation to each other, 
are of very groat influence. It is impossible in this compass even to 
refer to all theao positions, as also to argue the case on the precise 
extent of their assimilation the one to the other. It can only be 
noted that the two leading analysts of the major British parties are 
in no disagreement about tho fact of their rapprochement over tho 
decades, but only about its degree (30). On the Conservative Party 
it may be argued that the pressures of the form of economic develop-
ment in Britain have led it to adopt an increasingly interventionist 
role in the econoqy (31). On the Labour Party it may bo argued that 
the drive for parliamentary success, the centralisation of the 
есопощу, and tho growing hegemony of middle class administrative 
perspectives within tho Party's grassroots and at its head, have 
brought it to its present position as aspiring leader of a non-
confrontation society with a mixed economy (32). This trend appears 
to bo a characteristic of social democratic parties (33). Whatever 
the reasons, the similarity is there, and embracing. 
Certainly both parties have increasingly adopted extremely 
similar policies vis-a-vis industrial and race relations. Wage freezes, 
voluntary and statutory incomes restraint, attempts to involve trade 
unions with government, legislation for industrial disputes, have 
characterised both parties since the end of World War II (the attach-
ment of tho unions dates particularly from the war years). 
A pro-colonial policy was shared by both parties between the 
wars, with Labour's divergence being restricted largely to questions 
of stylos of administration, and speed of "preparation for independence". 
During the 50' о again, the Fabian Colonial Bureau, which was at the 
centre of Labour Party colonial policy-formation, took a very similar 
position in favour of moderate and gradual decolonisation. Under 
MacItLllan and MacLeod, by теапз of a lightning programme from 1959» 
it was the Conservative Party which eventually dismantled the bulk 
of the colonial structure (34). But it was the Labour Party in power 
which committed British troops to preserve Aden (till 1967)» yet which 
offered the white UBI regime in Rhodesia almost continuous temporisation. 
Internally, policies to control black immigration (1962$ 1965} 1968} 
1971) have been enacted in an increasingly stringent manner by both 
parties in power. Similarly, though not without some revolt on the 
Conservative side, both parties backed tho second Race Relations 
Act I968), which was designed to combat racial discrimination in a 
piecemeal fashion with weak enforcement procedures. 
Fundamentally"! both parties have always claimed to be, or 
striven to bo, national parties - in the ideological, as well as the 
purely geographical sense. This has always been an extremely important 
component of tho Conservative Party1 s self-image (35)» and never more 
so then in its attacks on the Labour Party for boing sectional and 
disloyal (this last tradition continues in the Conservative national 
press). In responso to this attack, and in the effort to capture the 
middle ground of voters, the Labour Party has developed more and more 
it3 endeavour to present itself as a national party rather than as the 
parliamentary representative of a sectional interest (the labour move-
ment). As well ал its overall importance, this nationalist posture 
has a particular application to industrial arid race relations, which 
will be discussed in a little while. 
(b) The Civil Service (36), nationally and locally, is of course 
a key structural expression of political consensus. The fact that the 
mass of its members do readily servo the alternating politioal parties 
is due primarily to three factors 1 the relatively short political 
distance between the parties, the attraction of public office, and the 
usual grip of oareer employment. Without this administrative reflection 
of the relatively narrow party-political speotrua in Britain there 
would ensue a massive breakdown in the organisation of social and 
economic lifei thus the Civil Service represents a very active as well 
as passive expression of political consensus in Britain. In this 
context it is also important to recall tho increasing utilisation of 
outside exports from industry and tho universities both as committee-
members, and occasionally as semi-permanent officials, in policy-asking 
in Britain; this contributes further legitimacy to government. 
Secondly, it is of considerable importance for this analysis 
that the British civil service has a notable preoccupation with secrecy, 
and distaste for public discussion, by comparison with the civil service 
in many other societies (such as the United States). Insofar as it 
menaces to bo successful in curtailing the public Пои of information, 
it follows as a truism that public ignoranco is sustained, llhoro this 
information right oxacorbatc tensions of a "horizontal" kind, its 
retention clearly contributes to tho maintenance of consensus; except 
that in situations where this proclivity for secrocy itself becomes 
the object of attention, concensus can bo ruptured. (An instance 
right voll bo the successful attack by right-wing MP's on tho 
statistical basis by which the nunbors of black people in Britain 
wore ©numerated by the authorities.) In general however, the level 
of public debate in British society is undoubtedly negatively 
influenced by Civil Service concern for classifying information. 
(c) As notod in oh» p*ii, the British trade union movement by 
and largo fit3 Gramsci's analysis of oorporatist ideology as a response 
to dominant groups? the view by workers that they aro a bloc within 
oocioiy with thoir internets, and thoro aro othor blocs with other 
intorcsts, tmd that when these bloos clash it is the various blocs* 
task to realise thoir respective interests to the greatest possible 
extent (37). During tho later 6o«s and early 70*3, partly in response 
to the continued assimilation of tho Labour Party to tho centro, and 
partly in response to tho increasingly hostile ooonos&o mid political 
environment, the trado union movement in Britain boo ало considerably 
sore active and in соло oases radicalised than it had been since World 
Наг II and before. lot it is important to see this development in 
its full context, and not only in relation to cone supposed 'norm1 of 
minimal union militancy characteristic of such of the 30*0, 4Dfa end 
'jO's in Britain. 
The full context includes the following factors, (i) The 
»space1 for a cortain degree of trade union activity within existing 
Grrangononts without upsetting those arrangements (Gramsci, Parkin), 
(ii) The ambivalent development of «white collar1 unionism, duo in 
noot part to their encouragement by tho State in tho public sector 
rather than to any widespread spontaneous militancy; oven tho growth 
of A.S.T.H.3., the most militant of the white-collar unions, is 
characterised by reluctance in its new recruits (38). (iii) The 
ever-growing involvement of trade unionists in State committees arid 
consultations (39) • (iv) The continuing presence of accommodating 
trade unionists at tho head of several large unions, (v) Particularly, 
the negligible extent to which trade union leaders attempt to politi-
cise their members (let alone the infrequency with which trade union 
magazines and journals are read). It would appear therefore that the 
profits squeeze analysed by Glyn and Sutcliffe (40) is more likely to 
be tho result of a plethora of local decisions taken independently, 
than a real index of the upsurge of a radical value system in British 
society. Since in default of a major radical political party, only 
the trade union movement could conceivably act as any kind of carrier 
of 3uch values,- the current condition of the British trade union 
movement means that the dominant value system of British society is 
not sirnificantly opposed. Аз Mann puts it* 
(There is) "a lack of consensus in the crucial 
area where concrete experiences and vague 
populism might be translated into radical 
politics." (41) 
(d) Despite education and social class being the topic par 
excellence of British empirical sociological research, the ideological 
and consensual content of British education has only recently begun 
to be analysed. There is consequently very little material with whioh 
to produce any real analysis of the role of the educational system as 
a centre of ideological diffusion in relation to sooial divisions 
within British society, (its particular pattern of relationship with 
the nedia as euch will be analysed further later in this chapter.) 
A number of general points may be made however. Firstly, it 
is clear that educational knowledge is organised in the same way as 
educational establishments, to reproduce the entire range of categories 
of worker (from labourer to professional)! this takes place via the 
definition and demarcation of ""types of child", and а1зо through the 
tendency to inculcate a strong work-ethos in classroom teaching (42). 
Secondly, although in popular educational thinking there is supposed 
to bo no connection between politico and education, the processes of 
control of British education are evidently sufficiently "political" 
to make them officially subject to a surprising degree of secrecy: 
this offers a good illustration of the point made already about the 
Civil Service (43). Third, the universities exert very considerable 
influence over secondary school curricula because of the need of 
secondary school teaching staff to ensure their pupils will be fitted 
for placements in tertiary education. Fourth, the increasing dominance 
of business finance as tho only source of significant expansion in 
universities, together with tho official State definition of tho 
proper function of polytechnics as centres of applied and not original 
knowledge, draw the whole area of intellectual production further into 
the orbit of the dominant groups in tho society. 
As well as thoso major structural features of tho British 
educational system, there ore two analyses of the content of secondary 
school courses with particular relevance to work relations and race 
relations. Abrains (44) has noted that industrial disputes and strikes, 
if mentioned at all, ore presented without comment or explanation; and 
that politics is presented as a set of technical processes rathor than 
as a struggle for resources. Other studies of tho racial content of 
school textbooks (45) discovered a wide diffusion of racist stereotypes 
in them; and conversely, very little that was effectively anti-racist. 
It appears therefore that tho British educational system produces what 
night bo predicted, given its relationship to other dominant social 
institutionsi that is, a legitimation by various means, overt or 
latent, of the existing social order. 
(e) The recognition that the organisation of social welfare has 
an important bearing on the social construction of consensus does not 
necessarily involve the view that welfare measures represent a 
machiavellian scheme by dominant groups to bolster up their position 
(46). There are two aspects of welfare in Britain which contribute 
to social and political concensus. One is the orientation of at least 
the older generation of professional social workers, which relies 
heavily on psychological explanations of human problems encountered 
in casework. This can moon for instance the translation of a problem 
of low pay into a problem of personal inadequacy, and of a desire to 
robel against certain forms of authority into inadequate parental 
socialisation. While not necessarily successful in »treating1 their 
oases, it is certainly true that this approach can often be disastrously 
misplaced to meet people's real needs, and at the same time not help 
them to identify tho real source of their difficulties (47)* 
The second consensual aspect of social welfare is quite 
simply its veiling of social misery from the public. Mo better comment 
on this can be made than is made in "A Tribute" at the outset of 
rrofeo3or John Grove'з study on homolessness in London, which could 
be replicated for evory major population centre in Britain: 
"It is also right that we should offer 
tribute to the work of thousands of 
people in the statutory and voluntary 
social services - administrators and 
social workers, volunteers as well as 
professionals, the trained and the un-
trained, and the committee members who 
back them up and help to make the 
vital resources available. The total 
contribution mado by all these people 
is enormous. Without it London would 
be stricken by an avalanche of social 
problems of catastrophic proportions. 
Even relatively modest reductions in 
social service efforts in some fields 
- notably housing, welfare, child care 
and health - would quickly reveal 
deprivation and suffering in forms and 
on a scale unimaginod by the majority 
not at present affected by them. And 
one predictable result would bo outcry 
from a scandalised public." (48) 
(f) The final major area of social organisation with a potent 
influence on social сопзепзиз, is the form of organisation of much 
non-manual work as careers and professions. The especial significance 
of the GO occupations for tho present analysis is that (l) they collect-
ively constitute that subsidiary category of authority-roles without 
which dominant groups could not achieve tho execution of their policies, 
so that the adhesion of tho occupants of theso roles to the existing 
order is critical} and (ii) they provide a continuing high-status 
destination for children of parents in this category, together with an 
anticipatory reference group for aspirants to upward mobility from 
other parts of the society. Thus this stratum - of which the Executive 
Class of the Civil Service is one part - io the major repository and 
vehicle for the "trickle-effect" analysed by Pallers and Barthes, and 
discussed in seotion i(a) of this chapter. 
Historically in Britain, the emergence of tho occupation of 
clcrk (49), as of the traditional professional occupations (50), was 
associated for different reasons with strong adherence to tho status 
quo. This has been subsequently dented a little by the developing 
"proletari3ation" of some clerkly work (Lockwood particularly instances 
railway clerics), and a little more by the recruitment by one union, the 
Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff, in tho late 
60*8 and early 70's into new areas of employment such as insurance 
workers. It 1з important to recall though that the major expansion 
of vfhitc collar trade unionism in Britain is due to Government encour-
agement in tho state sector rather than grassroots militancy. It is 
also the appeal of ASTMS as apparently possessing wizardry in the 
economic sphere, to workers whose real incomes have been steadily 
eroded by inflation, which has forcibly attracted small weak staff 
associations to coalesce with the union. In turn this has provided 
ASTIS with a once-for-all straightforward series of bloc increments 
in membership. Such economic pressures by themselves have naturally 
nothing about them which innately leads to a rejection of the dominant 
value-system: indeed it may be a situation of dissonance with that 
value-system which simply leads to a desire that it should bo properly 
observed (why should dockers earn more than wo do?). If Conservative 
Party allegiance at general elections among these strata is any guide, 
then it io important to isolate economic discontent among white 
collar workers, and not to treat it as an index of their endorsement 
of even a subordinate value-system (51)» 
In terms of professionals, and the considerable development 
in modern societies not only of occupations claiming the cachet of 
professional status, but also the particular attributes of the career, 
further links are established between tho occupants of these roles and 
the existing social order. (This is despite the fact that the tradi-
tional ideology of the professionals as non-competitive gentlemen, 
which still has considerable currency, was counterposed to cortain 
values of urban industriell capitalism (52)* On the one hand, the 
visibility of a ladder of positions, each with increasing income and 
status, acts as a powerful method of imposing self-restraint on the 
people involved. None of thorn would wish to jeopardise their chances 
of stable movement up tho hierarchy, especially when there are generally 
examples of some older workers being left behind and repeatedly bypassed 
by younger and less experienced entrants. This is specially true, of 
course, of a career bureaucracy, which io increasingly the major 
location of professional practice. 
Further instances of tho impact on consciousnoss of professional 
work-organisation include the Pähls1 study of industrial managers and 
their wives (53). The managers, the Pähls note drily, were under the 
impression that their companies were looking after their interests very 
veilj their wives very frequently resented the huge inroads mado by 
their work into thoir husbands1 and their private lives. This strongly 
illustrates the degreo of commitment generated to the established 
ordor among these industrial professionals, even to tho extent of 
distorting their relationship with their wives. Another instance, 
noted by irTandy (54), is the way that professional associations are 
utilised as institutions to aid personal, advancement, by professionals 
attached to organisations, rather than as organisations for corporate 
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defence and advance (ouch as trade unions). Such an orientation to 
the conditions of work botokens an unusually зесиге work environment, 
in turn producing positive attitudes to the status quo. 
Major institutions involved in tho generation of oooiol and 
political concensus in modern British society (55) have now been 
surveyed: the main political parties, the Civil Service, the trade 
unions, the educational system, the organisation of social welfare, 
and the organisation of career and professional work. It has been clear 
from tho analysis that the consensus spoken of io in no way a monochrome 
or 'flat* state of affairs, with everyone a harmoniously functioning 
robot. It io constructed very importantly out of a series of partial 
conflicts, and out of a series of interests which are distinct yet 
coincide. All these institutions both contribute to the ongoing 
maintenance of societal life, and at the same time convey a set of 
understandings of tho society which help to legitimate it and so 
produce a degree of political consensus. Except within a narrow 
party-political spectrum, public discussion is not greatly stimulated! 
and thoso who espouse a radical value-system within or without these 
institutions are a small minority with negligible influence, what 
then is the role of the British media within this context? 
iii. llaster-ideologies and the newa media in tho conetruetion 
of consensus 
(a) The news media аз socialising agents. Over and above these 
particular institutions, two ideologies have particular importance 
for the current study. They are the Ideologie о of nationalism, and 
objectivity; the first i3 extremely important in British society at 
large, and also in the media system; the second is important especially 
in the media system. Both make a very important contribution to the 
construction of consensus in Britain; therefore their main constituents 
will be analysed first. 
The particular form that nationalist ideology takes in Britain 
is attributable to the societyfs imperial history, to the two World 
liars, to the Cold War, and to the sequence» decline of colonialism -
entry into the EEC. Naturally the various agencies of socialisation 
which have been reviewed have been very important as definers of 
those events; but the actual processes and events themselves have been 
crucial. Some form of nationalist ideology or sense of national 
identity is characteristic of most western societies; but equally 
obviously, this identity need not have the same components in each 
society. There is no full-length study of British nationalist ideology, 
nor any individual intellectual who has dominated nationalist thinking 
(though Churchill's best-diffused speeches, and Powell's speeches, 
would loosely approximate the latter phenomenon). So what follows is 
necessarily a combination of oommon sense and personal projection. 
The British Empire, whose legend lived on long after its 
secular decline had begun (on some views froin about 1870, but 
certainly from the 1920's), almost certainly gave a great proportion 
of British people the feeling that however lowly they might be in 
Britain, in world terms they were a part of the largest exercise of 
dominion ever known in history (and moreover, of one which was 
generally justified as being conducted in the natives' best interest). 
Thoso who travelled out in various roles could actually see this 
structure of power with their own eyes, and in turn could transmit it 
to families and friends, write it in newspapers and magazines, and 
embed it in novclcttos and novels, Ind.Imp« even found its way on 
to the coinage. The specifically colonial phase of the Empire, from 
the latter half of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th oentury, 
involved of course a far greater complex of roles than more indirect 
forms of domination that preceded and succeeded itt no doubt this is 
the major sociological factor in the importance of the British Empire 
in British public consciousness. This assurance of being pre-eminently 
part of the action on the global stage interpenetrated; and underlay 
ideologies of racial supremacy and inferiority, as outlined in chapter 2} 
so that from the outset, racism and nationalism were closely allied in 
British culture. 
Social chauvinism vis-a-vis other imperial rivals (not to 
mention the Boers and the Irish) was also strong, and was fanned to 
white heat by both the experience and even more the propaganda of 
World War I. The second World War, with its new experience of aerial 
bombardment on home territory, and with the unexpected exemption of 
the British Isles from invasion while the rest of Europe was almost 
entirely dominated by Germany, offered fuel to propaganda both about 
German vileness and about British heroism (compared with Prance, etc.). 
The Cold Y/ar with the communist statos that sucoceded the 
second V/orld War drew on traditions of anti-communist propaganda that 
went back over a hundred years (the mob, anarchists), but which were 
obviously given an immense fillip by the Russian Bolshevik revolution 
and oven more stimulus by the Stalin era in the USSR. Once again, the 
Red menace (aided and abetted from 1949 Ъу the Yellow Peril in the 
form of the new Communist regime in China) produced an arms race that 
was repeatedly justified in terms of the determination of communist 
elites for world domination at any cost. Britain was also involved 
in a "hot" part of the Cold War, the conflict in Korea. Insofar as 
Britain needed constantly to arm herself for defence and survival, 
including the development of the hydrogen bomb, it was once again 
apparent that tho British as such were under threat - irrespective, 
as in the two previous "live" wars, of class or religion or region. 
Although heoitant attempts to de-eocalato the Cold War began 
from tho lato 50's, this coincided in time with tho traumas of 
decolonisation. These numbered tho Suez crisis, when the United States 
not only stood aloof f*om Britain, but publicly condemned the venture; 
tho episodes of Indian partition, Mau Hau, and the Congo, which were 
made to oho?? that blacks wore everything racist ideology had always 
defined them as being (European wars were different); and the repeated 
defiance of Britain by Hkrumah. /ill these occurrences were disturbing 
or humiliating to the British senso of imperial national identity. 
If the subject peoples were incapable, why not continue to dominate 
them? 'Thy were tho British publicly attacked by the USA? Why could 
itounah1 a assaults on British property and expatriates be carried out 
unscathed? Indeed, why were the colonised natives so careless of the 
benefits and oven sacrifices made by missionaries, soldiers and civil 
servants from Britain? 
From 1947-67, India to Aden, Britain coded almost all her 
formal colonies. But also from I962 on Britain was supplicating to 
enter tho ESC; a position wounding enough to imperially formed sensi-
bilities, but doubly so in view of the dual rebuff by Franco, and 
trebly 00 in view of the cession of certain formal attributes of 
national sovereignty that successful entry would involve. As for the 
general traditions of ignorance and suspicion of foreigners, these 
wore at best only dormant and waiting to be resuscitated. The Labour 
Party, particularly £rom 1970, joined the traditionalist Tory right 
wing in playing upon precisely these fears (56) 
The development of British nationalism waa also significantly 
inter-related with industrial and racial conflicts. The greater and 
greater dislocation of tho British economy aftor World War II, whose 
origins lie very deep (57)» was increasingly seen as affected by the 
incidence of strikes. Trade unions and strikers, in the dominant 
ideology of nationalism, were seen аз acting sectionally and disloyally 
to disrupt and injure the national economy, and so to attack tho 
national interest. Whether this analysis io accurate is quite another 
matter (58); but it was both drawn from and contributed further to, 
tho specific features of British nationalism. 
Also, from about 1949» in common with other western European 
countries (59), Britain was enabling its economic recovery and expansion 
by the admission of increasing numbers of migrant workers. Hostility 
in previous decades against the traditional pool of labour (the Irish), 
as against special migrants such as Jews at tho turn of tho century, 
and Poles aftor V/orld War II, had been quite considerable, mostly in 
terms of competition for jobs and housing. Tho new migrant workers 
came mostly from the Caribbean or south Asia. They wore subjects of 
recently colonial territories, they had dark skins: both were stigma-
tised in British culture. By end large they stayed, and of course 
stayed visible (unlike other migrants who had had the potential option 
of merging.) In terms of the traditional British ideology cf nationalism, 
quite apart from their definition as tho most illegitimate of competitors 
for scarce urban resources, their vexy pres|gce posed a problem to those 
British people who adhered to some form of/ideology: what was it now 
to be British? Racism and nationalism fused: it might almost be said 
that powellism would have had to be invented (60-). 
As the preceding analysis of this thesis demonstrates, thero 
are many other elements in the formation in British society of fertile 
conditions for powellism beside tho internal drift of this ideology; 
but the co-existence in one articulate public individual of pro-
colonialist, anti-communist, anti-EEC, anti-iamigrant deductions from 
an essentially nationalist and patriotic Ideology could hardly have 
come at a more receptive period in the public mood of uncertain^ about 
the nature of British national identity. Powellism is a ferocious 
re-assertion of traditional nationalist ideology at the time when the 
desire for a national identity is urgent, but the sense of what it is 
has slipped away. It is vital to understand that powellism has 
orupted into a vacuum» but not as an alien wedge: it has been and is 
only possible due to tho major historical occurrences noted, to the 
historical traditions of British racist nationalism, and to the presence 
of a chorus of other contemporary voices and institutions which convey 
the entity of the British nation-state as the most important collectivity 
with - which any inhabitant of these islands should identify. The 
importance of British nationalist ideology for race relations and work 
relatione in the UK has been noted in chapters 5 and 6, and con hardly 
be over-estinated; for it provides a very strong consensus-base for 
their definition and explanation. This will be discussed further 
shortly. 
The ideology of objectivity also has no proper history written 
of it, and so what 1з said about it here is necessarily subject to tho 
same caveat as the preceding analysis of British nationalism. It may 
bo reasonably surmised that the positivist and empiricist tradition in 
British universities, especially in history and philosophy but also in 
social science, together with the image of scientific rigour that ouch 
enormously influential writers as Bertrand Russell employed as a weapon 
against obscurantism and reaction, have enabled detachment and objectivity 
to be enthroned as major secular intellectual values. These values 
clearly have their roots in Victorian England and behind that in the 
Enlightenment, although one of the extraordinary contradictions of the 
Victorian period was the disjunction between the weakness of actual 
scientific institutions, and the high prestige of scientific analysis 
among the intellectuals, such as Darwin, Т. H. Huxley, Matthew Arnold, 
and many others (61). Equally paradoxically, the general conservative 
ideology whioh identifies the ideal with the real (62) has probably 
provided a diffuse form of support for those values. For while on one 
level these values opposed the unoritical justification of tho status 
quo, the tendency has been extremely strong for "Science" itself to be 
accepted as the new absolute) and generally it has been the image of 
"Science" rather than tho logics of Science to which deference has 
been accorded. An unscientific definition of Science has consequently 
furnished an ideal but illusory standard on whioh activities in quite 
distinct fields have tended to bo modelled. 
One such field in which these secular values have become 
institutionalised is in the British broadcast media, and to an 
increasing extent by the Eross as well. The factors influencing this 
development have been at least as political as intellectual, of course. 
In a micro-context, Tuchman (63) has noted how •objectivity1 serves as 
a routine defensive strategy for newsmen to shield them from accusations 
of Ь1аз in their reporting (and further how certain spocific devices 
arc habitually utilised for this purpose). Expanding this insight from 
the micro-level to the development of the British broadcast media, it 
io clear that only the unswerving commitment by Reith to •objectivity* 
enabled broadcast news to be permitted at all. Such activity had been 
excluded until his instantaneous decision to broadcast news during the 
General Strike (which had of course closed down the Press). 
It io of course well known that Reith did so because of hi3 
view that public order would be better enabled to persist by the 
diffusion of accurate information than it would through hopeful but 
inaccurate propaganda by the Government (64). Nevertheless, if the 
broadcast media had given the slightest hint of political partiality 
within the contemporary political spectrum, the forces within the 
Government that were always eyeing the development of radio news and 
talks with suspicion would have been quick to have thom mussled. 
There was a continuing controversy during those years about who, and 
whose vievjs, should be allowed access to the air-waves at any juncture, 
lot alone in news bulletins. 
An interesting, if guarded, exposition of his broadcasting 
philosophy occurs in an essay published by Reith two years before the 
General Strike. It io entitled "Striking a Balance"; and in it he 
begins by quoting Matthew Arnold s 
"..•. the search for truth, however unattainable, 
is tho highest function of man: »To try to 
approach truth on one side after another 1 not to 
strive or cry, not to persist in pressing forward 
on one side with violence and self-will; it io 
only thus, it зеетз to me, that mortals may hope 
to gain any vision of the mysterious goddess whom 
we shall never see except in outline, but only 
thus oven in outline. • 
"We oannot help feeling at times that after 
all there are no competent, impartial and 
established judges to whom we may finally submit 
our efforts for approval or condemnation. There is 
30 much that is, and always will be, contradictory 
in evidence. Wc aro driven back on ourselves." (writer's 
italics) (65)• 
This statement, and the essay, are important on several 
grounds. First, it is clear that Reith knew exactly what he wanted to 
do with broadcasting in tho field of nows and discu33ion: he wanted 
it to fulfil this function of 'balanced1, 'scientific', 'professional' 
investigation and presentation, almost analoges to tho liberal ideal 
of the university, though operating in its own specific fashion. 
Second, he managed to stamp the BBC with this ideology to a quite 
remarkable extent right up to the present time (though the extent his 
to whicjy personal view3 corresponded with the other intellectual 
values already outlined must have contributed greatly to his success)* 
This momentum carried over into British commercial broadcastings 
thus tho 'balance' requirement in political and other items is required 
under tho low for the IBA, whereas it is only a matter of custom inside 
the BBC. The similarity between the two agencies in the news and 
current affairs areas is notable. The example of broadcasting in 
Britain has also coincided in time with other pressures on the Rress 
to pay at least lip-service to the ideology of objectivity: tho 
growth of the news agencies, with their standardised product, and 
the need to appeal to heterogeneous mass audiences, has meant a 
certain blunting of tho "violence and self-will" in communication 
noted and abhorred by Reith (66). 
Having traced in this way the components and development of 
the ideology of nationalism in British society at large, and of the 
ideology of objectivity in the British media (especially in broadcasting), 
the relation of these ideologies to the social construction of political 
сопзепзиз in Britain must be reviewed. In fact, the second - institu-
tionalised in the media practice of 'balance' or 'fairness1 - acts as 
conductor for the first, as well as making its own contribution. 
That specific contribution will be discussed first, and subsequently 
the conductor-relationship will be analysed. 
It is in discussing the specific contribution of the practice 
of 'balance1 to the construction of political consensus that the 
anthropological data outlined earlier in this chapter (i.b) are 
particularly illuminating. For in the British broadcast media there 
is actually a standard ritual which daily and even hourly enacts the 
myth of objectivity-as-balance in millions of situations at homo and 
at work. It is bound up with the roles of newscaster, presenter, 
reporter, interviewer, and link-man; and in television is a visual as 
well as an aural ritual. The official definition of these roles, 
which only marginally differ from each other, precludes editorialising 
of any significance (at least by comparison with American practice). 
It i3 then a peculiarly British phenomenon. 
In their reading of the new3, chairing of discussions, 
descriptive analyses of an event, or interviewing, their obligation is 
always to maintain 'balance'. They are, while fulfilling their roles, 
the living speaking personification of the principles of objectivity 
and neutrality, embodying them and continually diffusing them. The 
ritual is a secular analogue of the religious and dramatic rituals 
discussed earlier, which served to reproduce consensus in situations 
of continuing conflict. They did so, it will be recalled, by 
redefining tho situation. This ritual operates in the same way, by 
tending to redefine each conflict in terms of a proper and natural 
position being one of compromise and negotiation rather than insistence 
on truth and rights. This tendency has been vividly observed in the 
data on thi3 ritual role in situations of industrial and racial 
conflict in chapters 5 and 6. 
This ritual is also illuminated by Barthes1 analysis of the 
qualitative richness of a single sign, and Sapir's category of 
"condensation symbols". For this single, simple ritual certainly 
conveys a wealth of meaning, and does зо - at least analytically -
in a way which io even distinct fron the particular words uttered 
by tho occupants of tho ritual role. Effectively, if the constant 
in any situation i3 the balanced mediator, if every conflict of every 
kind io placed in relation to an uncommitted broker, then social 
reality io defined as something which it is pre-eminently possible to 
bo balanced about: thi3 is tho inferential structure within which 
broadcast communication takes place. Anticipating a little tho 
discussion of nationalism in media output, it may be said further that 
the ritual is a constant reminder to the myth-consumers (Barthos) that 
the conflicts which exist are to be interpreted as on a lesser level 
of social significance than the nation. Tho primacy of tho nation 
interlocks with compromise as the high ground ftom which conflicts 
ore to bo viewed. 
Tho operation of this secular ritual of balance/fairncs3 in 
broadcasting is very likely to ramify into a habit of thought, a 
standard method of cognitive categorisation which nay be extended to 
issues quite unprompted by exposure to a particular broadcast on them. 
It is therefore one of the mo3t important contributions by the media 
to the production of political consensus in Britain. 
(There io no ouch ritual in the Press. Howover, two remarks 
should be made on this point. The Baily I.Iirror does operate with a 
rather similar ideology of balance, compromise, fairness, and reasonable-
ness, as has been empirically established in chapters 5 and 6j so that 
at least one major national newspaper more or less reflects the 
broadcast stylo in this respect. The Daily Express end Daily TelcCTaph 
would almost certainly lay claim to objectivity, moybe in line with a 
leading contemporary Conservative (Amery) who is quotod as claiming to 
be "not so much Right as right". This leads to the second remark, 
which is that there is a tendency in Britain for people to trust the 
broadcast media news output more than the Press (67) t while no doubt 
reflecting the greater angularity of these sections of the Press, it 
also underpins tho enormous significance of the broadcast ritual аз 
analysed above.) 
Before proceeding to the disouosion of how this ritual 
leads directly to the reproduction of nationalist ideology, it is 
important to pause for a brief discussion of how this ritual is 
interpreted inside tho media organisation, since the assertion that 
it is such a ritual with such functions might well be disputed by 
some media personnel involved; and while it is always possible for 
participants to be unaware of the full import of their activity, the 
disjunction should at least be made comprehensible by the sociologist» 
Part of the legitimation of this role among journalists 
consists of the ideology of public service (68), an alternative 
expression for service to the nation. The various conflicts which 
exist within the nation are therefore properly to be presented to the 
nation "as they are", for tho nation to make up it3 mind on them. 
•Balance1 is therefore what a journalist owes the mation, and what by 
his professional training ho is able to offer the nation: the 
scientific principle of the equivalence of trained observers i3 subtly 
redefined here as tho equivalence of English-trained journalists. "Ue 
are driven back on ourselves", as Reith put it. Professionalism is 
then thought to guarantee accuracy in disputed situations, rather 
than tho production of yet another view which may or may not bo 
accurate. BBC Television newsmen pride themselves (69) on their 
corporate ability to mask their own views in the production of news 
stories. 
This perspective of course takes it for granted that the 
nation is the final court of appeal, which in turn assumes that no 
conflict will emerge that is sufficiently deeply grounded and 
justified to supersede this primary loyalty and relegate the nation 
to second place. Such naivete about internal power and conflict is 
characteristic of nationalist ideologies, but has inevitably been 
questioned by the development of the conflict in northern Ireland 
in which first the minority wished to jettison its British national 
status, and then the majority found itself in conflict with the 
British State in its determination to maintain its British nationality. 
Tho problems thlo created for tho consensual presuppositions of tho 
newsroom have been interestingly discussed by a ferner current 
affairs editor (70). 
A cccond, unofficial component of this role-definition is 
the ideology of "tribune of tho people". (This is outside tho 
discretion of the newscaster in coot cases*) It io important in 
lending a little edge to the rather colourless concept of balance, 
end so in making these ritual roles more interesting and acceptable 
to those who fill thoa. On purely impressionistic evidence, it is a 
latitude which tends to be utilised mostly against such targets as 
local bureaucracies, pollution, "juggernaut" lorries* other kinds of 
potential target do not scorn to feature in tho sска way* The weak 
populism of this unofficial role-definition is also based on nationalist 
promises, ultimately, since tho "people" and tho nation arc more or 
loss coterminous in conventional thinking* There is certainly no notion 
inherent in it of cry division which ni^it override national idontity* 
Tho other component in the role-definition vihich helps to 
legitimate and strengthen it is the adnianion cf exceptions to its 
operation, or alternatively its revamping as an ideal rather than 
something perfectly realisable in practicc* naturally, if the 
balanco-roquircsant wore to be imposed with absolute rigour the 
ritual role would collapso through its conflict with other strongly 
internalised cultural norms. The exceptions give it a resilience, 
particularly cincc thoy tend to be on the plane of individual 
morality? tho loathsomeness of sexual assault on children io 
clearly not a subject on which newsmen would find themselves balanced, 
end it is precisely this kind of exception to tho rulo which io 
uppermost in their thinking en the subject* Qnco again, only a 
conflict trensconding these presuppositions, as in northern Ireland, 
can challenge the practice of balauoo seriously* Stating balance 
as an ideal is of course a perfect devicc for avoiding tho analysis 
of its problems on any level but л casual one* 
In озоепсе, then, the internal definition of the balance 
ritual is only sustainable in tho media because no overt conflicts 
challenging the primacy of national identity currently arise inside 
British territory. (Plaid Cymru and the Scottish national Party wax 
and wane only as minority movements») Given the absence of ouch overt 
conflict, it is possible for newsmen to legitimate this ritual in 
terms of service to the nation. 
Already, even before the analysis of the way in which the 
ritual acts as conductor for nationalist ideology, it is clear that 
there are links between the two in the form of newsmen's own justifi-
cation of their role, and in the assumption that compromise is the 
еззепсе of the appropriate response to conflict. The primacy of tho 
nation is the premise in both cases. However, there is still more to 
be stated in this connection, both in relation to the media as 
amplifiers of the national culture, and in relation to racial and 
industrial conflict. 
Objectivity, enshrined in the daily ritual of balance, 
establishes as the main criterion for inclusion and prominence in the 
broadcast media, tho numerical representation of ideas among social 
groups in the society. In so doing, it redefines itself as contemporary 
national culture. Thoro is no longer anything substantial to connect 
the principle of objectivity with a search for the accurate investigation 
and interpretation of social, political or economic reality. Аз noted 
already in chapter 1, if there are no Buddhists, there will be no 
Buddhism on the media. By contrast, attempts at objective analysis 
of molecular structure and interaction would never be confined to the 
views on the subject of British scientific resoarchors. Tho additional 
role of the objectivity ritual is thon to act as amplifier for the 
current national culture. In itself, this does not relay nationalism 
except as a general presupposition that is nover actually stated. It 
does however provide a peculiarly favourable opportunity for ideologists 
of nationalism to diffuse their definitions of race relations and 
work relations, as will now be seen. 
Tho definition of industrial disputes as injurious to tho 
national interest or the,public good or the country's economy has 
already been noted in chapter 3 ns a very frequent interpretive 
category. It was additionally noted there how newsmen (especially on 
tho broadcast media, and the lirror) tended to identify in their 
questions both with tho national interest, and with tho Government as 
guardian of that intorost and presumptive umpire in tho dispute on tho 
nation's bohalf. In this way, tho objectivity ritual cots as conductor 
for nationalist definitions of tho meaning of industrial disputes. 
In tum, this has one notable effecti evoiy conflict is 
declared sectional, end consequently localised. This applies, an was 
seen, to both employees and employers, although tho former had far less 
explanation of thoir case offered than the latter. It means, correspond-
ingly, that any generalised basis of industrial conflict is unlikely to 
bo put forwards it is .those employees who hsvo this (partly comprehensi-
ble) dispute with theso employers. The impact of a period of rapid 
price-inflation, that denies people the secure provision of wants that 
icork normally supplies, was cortainly not mentioned by tho newsmen 
during tho docks strike, though it was a general factor with socio impact 
on that situation. 
Another oxample from chapter 5 of the tendency not to generalise 
is tho way the sympathy notion of dockers in Hestern European ports and 
at Felixstowe was do-emphasised, lurthor examples from this roscarch* 
though not part of tho sample analysed in chapter 5» ore tho uncomprom-
ising condemnation end alarm at the emergence of "flying pickets" in 
the Yorkshire coalfields, end at the occurrcnce of political strikes 
against tho then-irninont Industrial Relations Aot in December 1970. 
Similarly, in coverage of national conferences of the Т1Ю, tho 
stance of the trado unions toward inoomeo policies or wage-claims io 
usually dofincd as a scatter of viows, more or loss militant than tho 
previous year, rather than as a series of responses to a continuing 
and chared problem. Should soma overwhelming unity on tactics bo 
achieved, then organised labour is likely to find Itsolf defined in 
response simply as a large sectional interest; at this point the 
families of trade unionists aro generally separated from them and 
counted with the "majority" (which is vital if it is to be a majority). 
An alternative is to label the active trade unionists as being out of 
step with their membership. It is unusual to find those categories 
being imposed on either employers or the government in its capacity 
as employer. 
The result of those nationalist categorisations is then to 
draw the sting from industrial conflict by firmly localising it, and 
evacuating it of all generalised explanation or implication. In so 
doing, the minority involved is encouraged to see themselves as deviants 
who should endeavour to get back into step as soon as possible. The 
majority io encouraged to define them in the some way, without identifying 
any commonality in their own life-situation. This is a very powerful 
contribution to the construction of social consensus, especially given 
the generalised enthronement of compromise by теопз of the balance-
ritual. 
nationalist definitions of race relations are also given 
substantial amplification by the British news media, although in this 
case the precise way in which the objectivity ritual acted as conductor 
has been different. As already noted in chapter 6.i.a, tho response 
to Powell's I968 Birmin^iam speech on black immigration lodged him 
securely as part of the national culture; and as noted in the present 
section of this chapter, his definition of race relations is a 
dinstinctively nationalist one. Logically, this combination leads 
straight to the point where the vast majority of new3 about domestic 
race relations is about immigration! precisely the point at which the 
foreign-nes3 of black people, their "unprecedented invasion of the 
body politic" (Powell), their defined еззопое as "alien wedge" 
(Radcliffe), is apparently most visible. 
Conversely, in exactly the same way as Powell never addresses 
himself to the issue of racism in British society, so the modia analysis 
of racial discrimination and other forms of racialism is quite negligible. 
Likewise, on the question of selling arms to the South African regime, 
the national interest was enthroned as ono of the two fundamental 
principles involved in the debate. As with industrial conflict, so 
the nationalist categories imposed on racial conflict effectively drew 
attention from the case of the black immigrants and their families, 
end their oppressed position inside tho society, and defined them as 
entrants. The word "immigration", unless otherwise stated, always 
meant black immigration both on TV" and in the Press during this period. 
In other words, the focus was on them аз people who did not belong to 
the nationj their deviance wa3 defined in terms of them themselves, not 
as in the case of strikers in terms of their actions. Given tho 
pormancnce of skin-colour, and its role as culturally defined cue for 
discrimination, together with their status аз а 2-5$ minority, this 
meant that a consensus was being produced about them from which they 
had no escape, either through assimilation or through effective 
countervailing power. The consensus in question defined them as 
undesirable people, and was relatively silent about the discrimination 
they faced. The extent to which their experience represented a radical 
condemnation of the social structure and culture of British society was 
thus totally bypassed. 
The essence of the argument of the preceding pages has been 
that the intensive commitment to the categories of nationalism and 
objectivity in broadcast media and the Press, with the objectivity/ 
balance ritual acting as effective conductor for nationalist ideology, 
has defined industrial and racial conflict in ouch a way аз to rob 
them of their most disruptive and challenging meanings. The various 
forms that this commitment takes have been analysed $ but whatever the 
form, these categories consequently penetrate all 3trata of British 
society and ceaselessly reiterate a fundamental axis for interpreting 
industrial and racial conflicts (and perhaps others as well). Buring 
the late бО'о and early TO's, this placed news media output in a 
particular symbiotic relationship with powellite definitions of black 
members of British society, of a very close kind; definitions of 
industrial conflict that imply every cuch dispute is local in 
character and has no basis in the general structural conditions of 
work-organisation^ had always had a peculiarly strong relation with 
the ritual role of interviewer, reporter, otc., as representing tho 
national interest and the supreme validity of compromise. This should 
not be road as stating that every form of nationalism would produce 
such definitions, or even that every facet of British nationalism 
produces such definitions; but tho main conclusion must be that the 
British news media enable British nationalism to redefine these two 
conflicts in a way which makes them both much less damaging to the 
oxisting consensus in the society. 
(b) The media as stimulators of public discussion. 
So far tho analysis has concentrated on the ideological 
definitions which aro built into the organisation and presentation of 
news in Britain. Tho other key dimension in discussing the rolation 
of the news media to tho social construction of political consensus 
io the extent to which they act as a forum for public discussion of 
public ioouos (71)* There are essentially two (mutually compatible) 
methods by which media organisations may pursue this role. One is 
the inclusion of adequate explanations of the events they present. 
The other io the opportunity given to members of the society to express 
their views competitively on issues that affect them. 
It was evident from the material gathered that the British 
news media used neither of these methods sufficiently. Through their 
lack of explanation, the social origins of the situations which they 
convoy "go without saying" (72)i a major contribution to an uncritical 
consensus, ju3t as is the tendency to provide media access to a 
particular spectrum of definitions and interpretations of reality. 
It appears that the media have a significant role in the discussion 
from informed publio debate in modern British society, particularly 
when thoir heavy utilisation of elite figures is token into account. 
It was noted in chapters 5 and 6 how the leaders of the Transport and 
General Workers1 Union wore intensively interviewed, despite the 
well-known failures of that union to represent its docker members 
anywhere near as efficiently as many of its other members; how lYank 
Cousins and Lord Caradon were both interviewed to speak for tho black 
interest? how unusual it was in programmes on white-dominated southern 
Africa to ask representatives of African national liberation movements 
for their views J how in the Caledonian Boad police-station affray no 
black person was asked for their account of the incident; and how only 
when dealing with Iligeria and its internal strife wore blacks invited 
to criticise the social situation there. The question as to why thero 
is this underdevelopment of the British nows media as a public forum 
must th^ reföro be investigated, in relation to both explanation and 
access. 
The answer to this question is complex, but relates in essence 
to certain aspects of the organisation of the nows media, and to 
certain aspects of thoir articulation with the educational system. 
The weakness of explanation is due to the organisational division of 
news, the stratification of knowledge by programme, and the types of 
oducation and professional socialisation and security of the journalists. 
The limits on access are duo to the dilemmas of semi-expert skilled 
communicators, the southern and London bias of national journalism, 
the definition of particular linguistic codes as inappropriate for 
the public domain of broadcasting, and what can only bo described as 
a policy of "instinctive omission". Further comments on each of these 
points in turn is obviously necessary. 
Tho only reason for the organisational division of broadcast 
news into Hews, Current Affairs and Documentaries is the gradually-
evolving attempt to expand broadcast journalism's freedom of coverage. 
As noted, Hews itself was highly suspect at first; and so only by the 
creation of additional departments has any form of oxpanded coverage 
or opportunity for the expression of divergent views been made possible. 
The institutional separation of presentation of ovents (Hews) from 
analysis and interpretation (Current Affairs), and of tho latter again 
from detailed analysis (Documentaries), represents then merely one 
phase in the contest between State interference and the struggle for 
relative independence by professional broadcast journalists. It does 
not represent the most suitable organisational form for enabling 
explanation end understanding of important issues, especially given 
the majority audience £or News, end the minority audience for the 
other divisions. It means that even where the Hews division has the 
tine (as in the docks strike, or tho South Africa arms issue) it tends 
not to utilise it for proper explanation. 
The strafification of knowledge by programme has closo parallels 
with the stratification of educational knowledge by social class 
destination into curricula (73)* The reference here is to the level 
of communication itself, rather than the degree of depth of explanation. 
This stratification of media knowledge runs from the elitist weight of 
Panorama and Tho Times, through the human interest stories of the 
popular Press and local broadoasting, to instant nows flashes amidst 
continuous pop music. Given however that the level of explanation 
almost must vary with the level of communication, it appears that the 
media arc content to reflect and reinforce rather than alter the levels 
of public discussion institutionalised by tho educational system. 
Ac regards the educational and professional background of 
national journalists, the following points should be made (74)« The 
groat majority of journalists in broadcast Hews, and on the three 
newspapers studied, are presently rooruited from other ranks of broad-
cast or Press journalism, and tend to have entered journalism straight 
from school. Certain journalists in the Press (typically Political and 
Foreign Correspondents), and journalists in broadcast Current Affairs, 
are much more likely to have had a university education before entering 
journalism. 
This divergence in the likoly capacity for in-depth explanation 
among the journalists in the media studied, some of whom have been very 
intensively socialised in the normal practices of British journalism, 
others of whom may have boon exposed to tho degree of reflexive 
questioning encouraged in come university departments, is in practice 
reduced by the occupational position of either set. The television 
Hews journalists are in the most favoured location, at the summit of 
the profession of general journalism, with full security and oxcollent 
pay. The same is practically true of the journalists on the three 
major nationals that have been studied. Television journalism in 
Current Affairs is however a much less secure occupation, with short 
contracts for most of those involved, and heavily under scrutiny in 
Parliament and other places of influence. The capacity for in-depth 
analysis may well be somewhat inhibited by these factors, since there 
can be little doubt that detailed explanations are much more likely to 
reveal latent conflicts of a number of kinds than rapid presentations. 
This is always assuming that Current Affairs broadcasting is dominated 
by editors who prefer in-depth analysis to heated studio discussions, 
whioh empirically is often not the case (75)» 
Further, when it comes to issues involving economics or 
sociology or one of the social sciences, it need not bo the case that 
university-trained journalists are qualified in one of these subjects. 
Pull knowledge of a particular topic could often lead to a much bolder 
and more effective journalistic handling of it than occurs (76); аз it 
is, topics are sometimes thought to be rauch more incomprehensible and 
difficult to communicate to the non-specialist audience than thoy really 
are. At this point, it is the lack of grasp in the produotion-unit of 
the nature of the topic which is at the root of the problem of explan-
ation, not the putative level of attention or understanding of the 
programme's audience. It may at least be hypothesised that the 
constraint on production that is often accepted without question in 
the media, namely that items must be suffioiontly entertaining to keep 
people's attention, has imposed a quite unnecessary degree of caution 
about tho depth to which it was appropriate to take a discussion or 
presentation. 
These aspects of the organisation of tho news media, and of 
their interaction with aspects of the educational system, go some way 
toward explaining the weakness of explanation that has been noted in 
news media output. The under-utilisation of tho nows media as public 
forum is now tho remaining question that has to bo answered. 
Tho dilemmas of the semi-expert, who nonetheless may bo an 
expert communicator, have been analysed by Elliott (77) in relation 
to television production. In planning a television production the 
programme has often to be created virtually ex nihilo. with the 
production-unit familiarising Itself as rapidly as possible both with 
the nature of the topic, and the possible outside participants* Basic 
to this process is the construction of a working view of tho topic, 
but ambivalence in relation to outside participants in terms of thoir 
potential disruption of that working view. A second criterion of 
outside participants, which often becomes merged with the first, is 
thoir likely ability to communicate quickly and olearly to non-
specialists. Tho ossonco of the situation then is that semi-exports, 
with considerable experience and expertise in communication, need to 
be able to wield disoreet but effective control over experts. 
This dilemma breeds standard responses. One such rosponse is 
demonstrated in the definite preference of producors for participants 
v/ho are already known personally, since this reduces tho anxiety and 
uncertainty characteristic of the situation. A high premium is placed 
at early planning meetings on networks of contacts from which members 
of the production-unit can draw; addresses and telephone numbers ore 
especially valuable at this stage. Clearly, this practice tends to 
restrict access rather than expand it. 
A similar response, in many ways derivative from tho first, 
1з tho strong tendency to utilise accessible London-based spokesmen 
of particular interests, to the exclusion of more immediately involved 
spokesmen. Given tho professional experience in the South of England 
of the majority of national journalists; the further consequence that 
their network of personal contacts will be strongly regionally weighted; 
and thfcoextent to which industrial correspondents, for instance, define 
their main work as covering national negotiations in London with only 
the rarest of trips outside (usually to Party or TUG conferences) (78); 
it becomes того comprehensible why the two TGI leaders were so 
intensively utilised during the docks strike. Once again, access 
tends to be restricted rather than expanded. 
The last aspect of the news media that is relevant to their 
under-utilisation аз public forum has not been disoussed elsewhere to 
the writer's knowledge. It is the extent to which particular linguistic 
codes are defined as inappropriate for use in tho public domain of 
broadcasting. As in schools and universities, so in the news media, 
cortain linguistio codes are graded high or low. One of the criteria 
for access is the ability to utilise acceptable linguistic codes, which 
are in general those ranked high in the eduoational system and thought 
to be characterised by fluency and articulateness. Nothing, on the 
face of it, would bo more unproductive in broadcasting than participants 
who could not make themselves clear. 
However, evidence is beginning to be accumulated that the 
assumed correlation between high ranking linguistio codes and articulate-
ness is a spurious one. Experimental work by Labov (79) suggests that 
the apparent correlation between sooial olass and verbal articulateness 
observed by Bernstein (80) and others, may be a product of tho test-
situation. Labov's own analysis of Hon-otandard English as spoken in 
a context where the subject felt entirely at ease and not expected to 
produce sentences in Standard English, indicated that Kon-standard 
English was capable of being utilised with just as great precision, 
logic and fluency as Standard English. He suggests further that the 
presumptive artioulateness of middle-class linguistic codes may often 
öl oak confusion under verbosity, and that verbal flow need not 
necessarily be coterminous with clarity. 
In the context of access to the news media, these findings 
indicate that a particular definition of communicative competence (81) 
tends to hold sway among media personnel. It would be assumed that only 
Standard English could be communicated in nationally, and that it would 
at least be necessary for someone to bo ablo to switch to this code 
even if they did not use it habitually. This indicates the hegemony 
of middle-class experience and perspectives in the media, of course, 
since Labov'o findings would only come as a real surprise to researohers 
with no personal experience of the vividness and fluency of non-standard 
codes, The linguistic code deemed appropriate for the public domain 
doos nonetheless have the effect of screening out large numbers of 
people from participation in broadcast media output. It may be too 
that tho association of broadcasting with a particular code moans that 
a picket, presented with a microphone, will be likely to see it as 
symbolising a demand that he be fluent in a code not his otmj and 
consequently, that in suoh situations people are far loss fluent than 
thoy might be in a different situation. In othor words, their poor 
response may be duo to factors that are similar to the impact of the 
test-situation as analysed by Labov, Since also the development of 
writing skills varies noticeably between strata, ассезз to newspaper 
columns is also limited - quite apart from journalistic restrictions 
on non-journalist contributors. 
The net result of these linguistic criteria is that access is 
once again screened off to a great number of people, even though it 
may be many dockers could have explained the conditions of their work 
entirely luoidly during the coverage of the docks strike. Since 
virtually no one else explained it, it can hardly bo claimed that the 
accoptable verbal code is a sufficient guarantee 6f clarity. Given tho 
huge variety of situations and experiences characteristic of complex 
modern societies, it is entirely predictable that only those who know 
many of them will be able to explain them and discuss them adequately, 
at least as regards their concrote details. If however their communi-
cative competence is downgraded, it will be impossible for them to 
explain these situations to a wider audience. Re -examination of this 
criterion might lead to a very different and greatly expanded use of 
the media аз a publio forum. At present, because of this linguistic 
criterion, it is greatly contracted. 
None of the factors discussed so far would fully account for 
the omission of black spokesmen in situations of racial conflict, 
although they might go some way toward explaining their absence. In 
the writer's view, this еш only be explained by positing a policy 
of "instinctive omission" among media porsonnel; that is to say, that 
traditional English culture has been so devoid of references to asking 
black people their views, at least with any intention of acting upon 
them, that when it comes to situations affecting them they are 
instinctively ommitted, and passed over in preference for white 
spokesmen supposedly articulating their interests. Only so, in the 
writer's view, can the virtual absence of African liberation organisa-
tions' spokesmen during 1970 bo explained, in items on South Africa 
or Rhodesia; only so can the selection of Cousins and Caradon bo 
explained! only so can the silence of ITK, and BBC's utilisation of 
a white spokesman, be explained in the context of the Caledonian Road 
police station affray. It is recognised that this is at present a 
hypothesis which applies a characteristic white response to blacks 
to the particular circumstances of the news media; but otherwise the 
situations described seem practically inexplicable. 
It can then be concluded that the relative absence of 
explanation in situations of industrial conflict and racial conflict, 
together with the restricted access allowed to members of the public, 
aro factors grounded in certain features of the organisation of tho 
media, and in aspects of the articulation between the media and the 
educational system. In practice, the social construction of political 
consensus is dependent therefore on semi-informative information and 
a restricted spectrum of participants. The new3 media act as a 
relatively weak political forum, without actually ceasing altogether 
to operate in that fashion, fere they to do so altogether the degree 
of social and political сопзепзиз might conceivably even be impaired. 
The result of this lack of stimulation of public debate and discussion 
from its major potential source is consequently the existence of 
relative apathy and disinterest in British society about public 
issues - including those issues such as industrial and racial conflict 
which might otherwise be considerably more explosive. 
iv. Conclusions 
This study has attempted to investigate the complex links 
between social conflict and social consensus by examining a particular 
integrative institution in a particular society whose moot significant 
conflicts are polarised around race and work relations. First, a 
model of the söcial role of tho mass media was developed which placed 
their operation within the context of role complexity, pluralism, 
conflict and change. Subsequently, the social origins and components 
of race relations and work relations were analysed, both theoretically 
and in their empirical British context. The results of the primary 
research task of the study, whioh was the content analysis of TV and 
/ 
Ргезз news output on these two sets of relationships, was then presented. 
The contribution of that output on these conflict-areas to the social 
construction of political consensus was then discussed in the contoxt 
of other major sources of consensus in British society, after a prior 
assessment of certain characteristic theoretical interpretations of 
tho role of ideas in divisive (macro-)social situations. 
The conclusion reached was that through the following channels 
the disruptive potential of those conflicts was effectively dissipated, 
namely (l) the definitional categories of British nationalist ideology* 
(ii) the mediating roles of the objectivity/balance ritual in the 
signally important news media; (iii) the virtual absence of explanation 
of particular conflict-situations in work relations and race relations! 
(iv) the utilisation of a relatively narrow spectrum of views in media 
debates of the issues. As socialising agents and аз public forum the 
media consequently contributed to the continuing construction of 
political consensus in British society. 
There are three general observations to be made in concluding 
thio study. First, on the nature of social consensus. Second, on the 
relation between socialisation and social initiatives. Third, the link 
between political theory and sociological theory in the context of this 
study. 
What is without doubt clear fron this research is the complex 
composition of social and political consensus. Both Dürkheim and tho 
mass society theorists do scant justice to this complexity, although 
in both cases certain aspects of the composition of consensus are 
accurately identified г the interdependence generated by the development 
of the division of labour, and tho emasculated nature of public debate 
in modem societies. It is clear that all kinds of conflict and change 
aro compatible with stability, provided they are not generalised. At 
the root of the localisation of conflicts and changes in society, at 
least as related to tho topics of this study, appears to be their 
inadequate explanation, and their definition as being on a lesser level 
of significance than the collectivity of the nation. 
If Weber was right to argue that legitimacy is the key to 
authority, then it has nonetheless to be recognised that legitimacy on 
those issues is not so much rule-based (though that may be an element 
in the situation) as based on a zone of indifference stimulated by the 
major social sources of definitions and discussion* education and the 
media, in interaction with the other institutions specified in section ii 
of this chapter* That is to say, this indifference is argued ho re, 
against Schutz (82), not to be an equilibrium condition of the natural 
man, but to be socially produced. To the same extent that the lack 
of "psychic mobility" of Lerner's Turkish peasant (83) was socially 
produced by his milieu, so the relative apathy and indifference 
characteristic of public life in contemporary Britain io socially 
produced. 
Its production is not founded on the premise of Marcuse's 
"repressive tolerance" (84), but on the existence of channels of 
expression and communication which redefine conflicts and changes in 
ways that so far as possible both preserve their latency (in the case 
of conflict) and emphasise their elements of continuity (in the case 
of change). In the absence of any major focus of radical challenge or 
opposition, there is no reason why the conflicts and changes of modern 
societies should not successfully be redefined in these ways. The 
"reprossive tolerance" argument rests on a combination of the 
"safety-valve" and "super-power" versions of protest and authority, 
tailing it for granted that opposition is always pure, and authority 
always serenely confident. The argument here is that opposition is 
always constructed within and therefore shaped by its social context, 
and that what confidence authority possesses is based on it3 competence 
in managing aspects of that context. The developing utilisation of 
opinion polls in tho practice of government, аз analysed by Habermas (85) 
is one important illustration of the way authority is not so serenely 
confident as Marcuso would have it. 
This leads directly to the second observation, on the relation 
between socialisation and social initiatives. It oould be claimed that 
this study has by implication argued for an "oversocialised" view of 
man (86)5 that members of media audiences aro incapable of responding 
to definitions that contradict media definitions, for instance, or of 
confronting the media as untrustworthy. 
Against this, it should be noted firstly, that most of the 
discussion after chapter 1 has concentrated on tho particular role of 
the media within contemporary British society I in chapter l.ii the 
rather differ ant roles of tho media within other societies were noted. 
In Britain, there is no doubt that the media, especially the broadcast 
media, enjoy a higher degree of publio confidence at tho time of 
writing than in many other societies. 
Secondly, "undersooialisation" is rather the theme of this 
study than "oversocialisation". That is to say, following iJann's 
statement cited in section i(a) of this chapter (87), that values aro 
perpetuated which do not aid people to interpret adequately the reality 
they experience, and that the news media do not utilise the scope in 
principle available to them to operate as public forum. 
Thirdly, this study has taken into account the complexities 
of social attitudes and consciousness, whether the immediate-abstract 
rupture in values noted by Parkin (88), or trade union conflict as 
part of the liberal economy as noted by Gramsci (89), or the hazards 
of attitude-measurement as noted by Pishbein (90). V/hat i3 fully 
stated in this study iD tho vorу substantial degree of opposition 
and conflict which can exist within a consensually ordered society. 
It may he that British society is almost a limiting case in this 
regard, comparatively speaking, for certainly some societies have regimes 
which violently repress conflict very readily, nonetheless, a sociolog-
ical theory of the construction of consensus must be capable of 
encompassing the degree of opposition that is possible without the 
dissolution of social order. 
This loads to tho third and final observation, which is 
concerned with the inter-relation this study posits for political 
theory and sociological theory* At a number of points in the study 
this relationship ha3 been implicit, though not discussed. Those 
points are tho degree of tolerance of opposition that a liberal 
democratic polity can allow and yet survive; the proper representation 
of interests by elite (sometimes elected) representatives; and the 
general question of how interests are defined prior to their political 
articulation, which clearly io critical for the mode of thoir 
articulation. 
As a limiting case, it is obvious that despite liberal 
definitions there are situations which a liberal democratic polity 
cannot permit. Benn and Peters (91) instance the emergence to 
popularity of a political party whose platform proposes the abolition 
of liberal democracy. In general, it would be accurate to draw a 
distinction between the scope for debate and the scopo for action in 
a liberal democratic polity, which is considerable in the case of the 
former but much more hedged about in the сазе of the latter. 
The question of the proper representation of interests by 
clito spokesmen seems by contrast to be a rolativcly pragmatic issue 
in principle, and a quite normal part of democratic theory. That is 
to say, that tho adequacy of representation is an empirical problem; 
and no theory of democracy Ьаз ever offered a guarantee that every 
representative would perform adequately - indeed the possibility that 
this will not be the case is perhaps the principal rationale for 
elections • In some of tho concreto instances of this study, Car ad on 
and Cousins spoke for black interests without having been elected, and 
ineffectively. Jones and O'Leary spoke for dockers, tho former having 
been elected bjit by a much larger constituency, and they spoke against 
an established background of abysmal TGV7U efficiency in its ports 
operation. It io implied that since the now3 media also have an 
investigative role they might at least have indicated there were 
disparities between the perspectives of the representatives and the 
represented. 
As regards social influence on the way political interests ore 
articulated, it is arguable that there is a ratio of sorts between tho 
degree and kind of awareness of interests and tho maximisation of 
developmental (92) powers in a democratic society. Insofar as interests 
are misdefined, or not defined at all, then democratic dimensions of 
modern societies are rendered incapable of significant further evolution. 
Again, concretely, in terms of tho particular focus of this study it 
io the cose that the treatment of work relations and race relations by 
the British news media did not contribute toward the development of the 
powers of the main actors involved, because of the ways their interests 
wero defined and articulated. It was argued that, in interaction with 
other major institutions of British society, this would tend to interfere 
with the extent to which those interests would be accurately articulated, 
and thus to leave them unmet to a degree that was not necessitated by 
the requirements of British society for stability and order. 
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